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TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) The acronym refers to combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Each predesignated military unit has specific limits of the number of Command Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, and Enlisted personnel, specific type and amount of weapons and equipment it is authorized to possess, receive, and utilize.

Army-level MP Battalion TO&E 19-35F

Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), effective 1964.

This WWII and Korean War TO&E was in effect when the battalion first arrived in Vietnam. Under this TO&E the unique nature of the war in Vietnam and the assignments given the 720th MP Battalion resulted in many personnel, training, logistical, problems as well as weapons and equipment shortages. The 18th Military Police Brigade on down through the chain of command to the individual companies learned to adapt and overcome many of these problems as best they could within the existing military bureaucracy.

The Battalion Mission
effective, 1964

Enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations, to include control of traffic, stragglers, circulation of individuals, protection of property, handling of prisoners of war, and operation of checkpoints.

This mission outline for an Army Military Police Battalion was formulated as a result of experiences in WWII and the Korean War.

It expanded upon the arrival of the battalion in Vietnam along with the TO&E as the assignments passed down to the Battalion from higher headquarters grew from the “traditional” standard MP missions, to the “new and sometimes unique direct combat support missions.”

Personnel Allotted

Officers 21

Warrant Officers 4

Noncommissioned Officers (NCO's) 71

Enlisted Men (EM) 499,

for a total strength of 595 men, effective 1964.

It should be noted that during the Vietnam War the U.S. Army had a policy in effect that transferred battalion and company level command officers (Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel), and in some instances junior officers (First and Second Lieutenants), from their field command assignments to command the staff (S) elements of the battalion HHD and sometime up to the Group and Brigade HHD after the first 6 months of their 12 month tour.

The official reasons given then for this policy was it would provide a much more diversified command officer.

The policy removed an experienced battalion/company level field commander or platoon leaders who after 6 months, developed the necessary hands on experience and feel for the complexities and problems of his units mission, and replaced him with a new battalion/company commander that had to “start from scratch.” The policy did not include senior Noncommissioned Officers? Was the war being fought as a field training mission for career officers, did we ever really have winning as our objective or were they just "punching their tickets?" It created much controversy then and still does now depending on who you debate the policy with.

Equipment Allotted

The equipment listed below was what the Battalion was authorized under army regulations for it’s type of mission when it first arrived in Vietnam.

M-14, 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle ............................................ 520

M-119, Colt .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol ........................... 78

M-79, 40mm grenade launcher ................................................. 36

M-2, .50 caliber machine gun .................................................... 4

M-60, 7.62mm machine gun ...................................................... 9

M-20, 3.5 inch rocket launcher (LAW) .................................... 9

Truck, cargo 2&1/2 ton (Deuce and a half).............................. 10

Truck, cargo 3/4 ton with AN/VRC-46 radio.......................... 5

Truck, cargo 1/4 ton (jeep) with AN/VRC-46 radio .............. 116

The modern US military has always accessed and developed specific training and equipment to suit the needs of its soldiers before venturing into any conflict, including Vietnam. However, problems were immediately encountered when it became evident that the situation in Vietnam was different from any previous “modern” wars the military police battalions were equipped for.

In reviewing the first Operations Reports - Lessons Learned from 1966 the first major equipment problems encountered by the battalion was a shortage of M-60 machine guns and pole mounts for the convoy escorts and highway security patrol jeeps . Problems also developed with with the jeep carburetor and radiator due to the heavy dust and grit conditions, as well as problems with the rear fenders cracking under the weight of the large field antennas used for the jeep radios.

When the Battalion was assigned the first Infantry Mission in Unites States Armed Forces and MP Corps History under "Operation Stabilize" in 1967, new problem developed. The standard MP Company TO&E could not provide for the necessary training, equipment, and weapons to field and support an infantry company. Once again the Battalion had to adapt and often utilize "back door" methods to insure the MPs received the needed items.

In Vietnam there were no fixed lines once you ventured outside your base. The local enemy forces within your area of operation did not wear uniforms and were indistinguishable from the local populace. The weather, terrain, and missions that expanded beyond those originally planned for presented their own unforeseen problems. The US military had in place official channels to address most of these problems, however, they were by their very nature meticulous (which was good) and often slow (which was not).

From the Battalion Commanders down through the ranks to the MPs in the field, the rules and the established norms would often have to bend, and imagination and initiative take their place until the military bureaucracy caught up with them.

Thank your support staff for their efforts, everyone did the best they could because our lives depended on it.