720th |
History of the Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility |
This Page Last Updated 12 October 2006 ~ Click on thumbnail photographs to enlarge for viewing. |
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The 720th MP Battalion ~ Tactical Area Of Responsibility
North- The TAOR was bordered by Highway #317, separating it from the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post.
The mission became historically significant to the United States Army and the Military Police Corps because it was the first time in the history of the United States Armed Forces that a Military Police Battalion was tasked with an infantry mission. The assignment was designated as Operation STABILIZE, and would last from 11 September 1967 through 25 July 1970. Under the initial plan of Operation STABILIZE, the 22 square mile area containing four principal villages and approximately 5,000 inhabitants became the joint responsibility of the 720th MP Battalions three organic companies along with the 615th MP Company, subordinate to the Battalion until 10 February 1968. To accomplish the infantry mission the Battalion was required to conduct several types of operations that historically, were not a normal function of a Military Police Battalion. The mission also created a logistical problem in that the TO&E of an MP Battalion at that time lacked the necessary authorization for the (official) acquisition of needed training, weapons, and equipment to staff a functional infantry company.
Another primary objective in support of the operations was to get the people to believe in and support their own government. To demonstrate to the villagers through the civic action programs and increased security, that their government was concerned with their welfare. The final goal of the operation was to make the area secure enough for the Vietnamese National Police (Canh Sat) and local Popular Forces (PF) militia units to eventually take the reins of control from the MP's. Towards this end precinct police stations were to be established. To make the mission a success the 720th MP Battalion first had to effectively disrupt and eliminate the long existing Viet Cong infrastructure within the villages of the Tactical Area of Responsibility, which in turn would eliminate the close-in-strike capability against Long Binh Post, and relieve the local villagers of the burden of enemy forced conscription and paying Viet Cong war taxes. As long as the Viet Cong infrastructure remained in place the civic action programs to improve the lives of the villagers and their confidence in their government would be doomed to failure and the lives of the MP's working in the TAOR placed in serious jeopardy. 11 September The Battalion took the first step to accomplish that goal in the TAOR with a multiple force search and destroy cordon operation called Operation CORRAL.
Clearing the "Finger of Land," (see 615th AO map link above) situated (at its closest point) just several hundred yards from the southeastern perimeter of Long Binh Post, was a heavily wooded ridge line that ran west for approximately 2 kilcks (2,000 meters) from Highway QL-15 towards the Rach Bien River. The local Viet Cong used the cover of the wooded ridge line to mortar the post on a regular basis. To eliminate this threat the area was assigned for clearing.
In the years following Operation CORRAL additional cordon and search operations of the villages would continue to root out and weaken the Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages The four existing Popular Forces village outpost in An Hoa Hung, Long Hung, Long Binh Tan, and An Xuan were jointly staffed with MP's and structurally improved for added security. Initial staffing of the northern most outpost, An Hoa Hung and Long Binh Tan were the responsibility of C and A Company, respectively. The two southern outpost, Long Hung and An Xuan were staffed by B Company. The added MP manpower, firepower, and communications enhancement would greatly improve the security of the villages and limit the daily enemy influence on the populace and economic structure. The MP's and PF's at the outpost's were a ready reaction force within the TAOR when needed. Civic Action Program (CAP) assessments were evaluated, prioritized and coordinated with the local village and district government to improve the quality of life and educational needs of the villages. The CAP projects strengthened the status and influence of the South Vietnamese government, both local and national. A combined River Patrol Unit, Ambush and Recon, and MP motorized Civic Action Patrols were formed and equipped. All three organic companies and the 615th MP Company shared in the assignments. The motorized jeep patrols would provide a daily emergency service to the local villagers and act as a constant reminder of the new area security. The river and ambush patrols went into the surrounding countryside and forced the local enemy forces to abandon their oppressive control of the area. They limited the Viet Cong abilities to transport weapons and forces, collect war taxes, harass the village government and press local men into forced service. Operation STABILIZE also expanded the function of the 212th MP Company mission from that of a physical security Sentry Dog mission to adding a Scout Dog Unit to their Long Binh Post detachment to assist the 720th Ambush and Recon Patrols in the field.
26 June To improve organizational and operational control of the mission the task of Operation STABILIZE was reorganized under a single company concept and delegated entirely to the MP's of B Company. They would draw on the other organic companies for support when needed. October A request for defoliation of several heavily wooded and jungle areas within the Battalion Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), particularly those areas bordering rivers and streams, was forwarded to higher authority for approval.
When needed, the Battalion was able to obtain operational control of infantry assets to utilize to support specific Battalion operations, or to use as a ready reaction force within the TAOR. 11 December to 16 December Increased enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the 720th receiving operational control of B Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division.
January The River Patrol Unit continued to be headquartered under the Dong Nai River Bridge until late December 1968 or early January 1969. During that time the units operations were moved to a floating converted 40 by 12 barge called the "Houseboat" that was anchored out in the river just southeast of the Dong Nai Bridge. The barge was provided by the 458th U.S. Army Transportation Company (PBR) and included a sleeping quarters, maintenance area, and tactical operations room. The 458th was a transportation unit attached subordinate to the 18th MP Brigade and wore the 18 MP Brigade patch. Ground transportation of boat crews during shift change was accessible when the docks were under the bridge, with the floating dock the crews utilized the old "French Pier." located north of the bridge at the Cogido Docks and Barge site. 17 January to 19 January Increased enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of A Company, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 22 February to 4 March Increased enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of C Company, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
During the attack by elements of the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division, the 720th MP Battalion would become the first MP Battalion to ever have infantry, armor and artillery under their operation control in support of B Company MP ambush and recon squads in the field fighting as infantry. The 720th MP Battalion prevailed in the night long battle and crushed the NVA assault.
February through April The herbicide spraying program request submitted in October 1968 was approved and initiated in the TAOR. The primary area targeted was the Buong River banks and primary stream junctions along the southeastern border. The tree and jungle shrouded stream junctions were the route used by the NVA to enter the TAOR during the 23 February 1969 Post Tet attack on Long Binh Post. The spraying was conducted by US Naval vessels adapted for that use and their on board security provided by members of the B Company Ambush teams. 23 February to 7 March Continued enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B and D Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and elements of B Troop 1st Battalion 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 4 March to 21 March The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 10 March to 20 March The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of elements of E Troop, 2nd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 20 March to 27 March The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of elements of G Troop, 2nd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 21 March to 2 April The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
Spring Two new "remote" outposts (officially referred to as fortified command post) would be established, one on the Finger of Land in the north eastern sector, and one on Hill-15 in the southeastern sector. 2 April to 21 April The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B Company, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 9 May to 11 May The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of C Company, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 11 May to 15 May Increased enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division.
15 May to 31 May The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of C Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 12 July to 16 July The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B Company, 4rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 29 July to 31 July The continued threat of enemy activity within the TAOR resulted in the Battalion receiving operational control of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 2 August, All Outpost Missions In The TAOR Terminated B Company abandoned the two fortified command post, on Hill-15 and the Finger of Land, both were built in the spring of 1969. The fortifications at both locations were destroyed. The Village Outpost's staffed from late 1967, #1 An Xuan, #2 Long Hung, #3 An Hoa Hung, and #4 Long Binh Tan, were turned over to the local Popular Forces. All B Company personnel withdrawn from the facilities were committed to increased reconnaissance and ambush missions within the Tactical Area of Responsibility.
Under the 720th MP Battalion the combined combat and pacification program that was part of Operation STABILIZE for three years would be instrumental in changing the course of Military Police Corps history, training, and future missions for the next four decades.
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