After sweeping the pit for mines, load the trucks and send them back, without escort. At the time it was considered “safe” for the trucks to run unescorted from the pit to the work site. The Laterite Pit was approximately 1.5 KM south of the rubber plantation. South of the rubber the road was contested and considered serious “Indian Country”. I was familiar with the area and knew that we could both observe and provide covering fire, if necessary, for the trucks until they reached the relative safety of the rubber plantation about 1.5 KM north of the pit. There had been only light NVA/VC activity in the area for several weeks. If we need fire support, I was to call the artillery battery at FSB Thunder III. We were beyond radio range of Quan Loi.
That afternoon I talked the operation over with my Platoon Sergeant. He was of the opinion that there would be some risk to this operation and that we would be vulnerable to mortar and or ground attack as the day progressed. But with good security on our part and the minimal enemy activity in the area we should not have any significant problems.
On 17 July, just before departing Quan Loi, I was told “If the convoy is hit, you are to act as a reaction force. This is the largest convoy ever sent up highway 13 – 165 trucks.” My Company Commander told me the convoy should pass or position just south of the rubber in the early afternoon. He did not provide me any additional intelligence information. I do not believe he was aware of any I&W or intelligence information that an attack on the convoy was likely.
It was just after noontime and the trucks had returned from a run to the work site. We were getting ready to load them when someone called my attention to a very large smoke plum two or three KM to the south of our position and we began to hear the sounds of a firefight. I had everyone mount up and ordered the trucks and the bucket loader to run for Quan Loi. We could now see several other smoke clouds coming up so we moved out onto QL13 and headed south toward the sound of the fight.
About 500 meters down QL 13, we could see the tanks leading the north bound convoy. As the convoy moved north we passed a tank company, most of a recon troop, several 40mm Dusters, MP V-100s and gun jeeps and 150 or so various size trucks, all escorted by two AH-1 Cobras, running as fast as possible north. The recon troop and the tanks were following SOP – move out of the contact area as quickly as possible and protect the convoy.
We stopped very briefly next to a North bound ACAV while I spoke to the platoon leader. He told me they had lost one ACAV; a lot of trucks had been hit or stopped by the ambush; there were drivers, some wounded or KIA, still with the stopped vehicles; and that they had taken most of the fire from the east side of the road. He then headed north and we started into the contact area.
As we crested a small hill, I could see quite a few vehicles off the road, including: several S&T's loaded with artillery ammunition, four or five 5 Ton cargo trucks and two fuel tankers. In the low valley about 500 to 600 hundred meters from where we crested the hill was a burning 5000 gallon gasoline tanker and a second tanker jack knifed in the ditch. 82mm mortar rounds were impacting around the trucks and I could see green tracers. Also visible were US personnel huddling around two of the trucks. We stared down into the small valley, moving as fast as we could, returning fire.
We made a high speed pass through the contact area to get a better idea of the situation. I can clearly remember hearing AK47 rounds hit the M60 gun shields. As we passed the burning tanker, we had to slow down and the incoming became more intense. We continued on and passed over the top of the next low ridge line and made a short stop. My Platoon Sergeant told me that he had seen about 20 survivors, wounded and dead still in the little valley.
We turned around and headed back into the small valley moving south to north. Just as we crested the ridge line, I could see NVA about 150 meters from the road and moving on line towards the stopped vehicles. I estimated this to be two platoons of infantry. I don’t think that they expected us to attack back up the road. They began to take us under fire. By that time we were back in the valley and no longer silhouetted against the horizon and fire slacked.
At the bottom of the small valley, we stopped and dismounted while the .50 Cal's and the M60s from the ACAV's continued to provide covering fire. I attempted to call for artillery support from Thunder III but could not get a response on the radio. We began collecting the survivors and wounded. I remember ripping open the door of a truck in the ditch and finding a terrified driver hiding in the cab along with his assistant driver who was KIA. We collected them all up and began to bring the situation under reasonable control. This entire sequence, from the time we started the first pass south until we had everyone collected was about ten or fifteen minutes. We continued to search for survivors. I moved around one of the S&T's loaded with 155MM artillery propellant and shells and saw an NVA soldier aiming an RPG-7 at the truck. He fired and the round hit out in front of me. I returned fired at him and he went down. When we searched the area later there was no body or blood trail.
Once we had all the members of the convoy collected, their weapons ready and first aid underway, we organized the group into a defense. We remounted and moved off the road to the east about 30 meters and began laying down fire. We had at least two NVA infantry platoons down in the brush about 150 meters out. I could see lots of movement along the wood line about 500 meters out to our front, but it was too far for and the brush to heavy for an accurate count. However, from the volume of fire it was an infantry company. Fortunately, they had only small arms, light machine guns and RPG's. This company was providing covering fire for the advancing platoons and, in all probability, acting as a covering force for the withdrawal of the main body. The fire and maneuver of the advancing platoons was not well organized or coordinated. The terrain favored our position. When the NVA were down in the brush it would have been hard for them to see us and they were not able to bring all weapons to bear when the advancing platoons were moving. This attempt to overrun the ambush site may have been a hasty attack on a target of opportunity. When we appeared they hesitated. I believe we surprised them and they may have thought we were the advanced elements of a much larger force because we acted aggressively.
Situation: We were in the contact area in an intense fire fight. It was clear this had been a very large ambush. We had no radio contact with Quan Loi, could not raise Thunder III for fire support and had no idea if anyone was on the way to reinforce us. There was an NVA Infantry company in the low scrub brush to our immediate front. The scrub extended about 500 to 700 meters to heavy forest. My field of view was a front of about 1000 meters wide out to the wood line. Close in, it was limited by the terrain to about 300 meters either side of our position. I did not know if the NVA were maneuvering to engage our flanks or rear. We didn’t have enough force to be able to send an ACAV to either recon or cover our flanks. If we were hit from the flanks or rear, our only option was to circle up inside the drivers’ perimeter and shoot it out until help arrived. However, it did appear to me the NVA were attempting to disengage.
I decided not to press an attack on the NVA to our front. I did not want to leave the convoy survivors unprotected with our flanks and rear exposed. At this point, fire died down and my Platoon Sergeant was able to get one of the 5T trucks started. He put all the people from the convoy on that truck got them ready to head north towards the rubber plantation - I think there were about 20. My plan was to move out of the small valley to the military crest of the ridge line just north of us. We would have good fields of fire to cover the truck with the survivors and wounded, the remains of the convoy and a 360 degree view. I did not want to leave the undamaged trucks to the NVA, they were filled with food fuel and ammunition.
About this time the Regimental Commander, appeared overhead in his Huey. He raised me on the radio and I passed him a SIT-REP. I asked for artillery to fire along the wood line. He called Thunder III, but could not get Thunder III to shoot for us. The Regimental Commander could see large numbers of NVA moving east, just to the north of our position and the movement to our direct front. He got a Heavy Fire Team up (two Cobras) and they began to lay down fire, he then brought in a number of air strikes.
The Regimental Commander told me to advance toward the wood line to our front. As we did several groups of NVA made a run for the woods. We began to fire and quite a few went down. When we were about 50 meters from the woods seven or eight jumped up in front of us. For several seconds they just stood there, one started running and they all broke – we opened fire. Most went down, one with a direct hit to the head from a 40mm M79 fired from the ACAV on my left.
We immediately dismounted two teams to chase down the remaining NVA. We entered the forest on foot and ran down a trail for about 50 meters. We began to catch up with two of the escaping NVA. At that point I heard AK and M16 fire to my left in the area where the other pursuit team had followed another trail. The volume of fire was too large for one or two escaping NVA. I had voice contact and called off the chase. We went back to the ACAV's while Cobras and air strikes rolled in on the area. When I got back to the Platoon, I discovered that we had taken a prisoner. The Regimental Commander landed and we quickly searched the dead NVA. He took the prisoner and the documents and lifted off.
It was now late afternoon and we were down to a few boxes of ammunition per ACAV and were still receiving sporadic fire. Our support was gone, the Cobras were gone and we again had no radio contact with anyone. We moved back to QL 13 and found that someone had towed or driven off all but the burned out trucks. We were by ourselves. My Platoon Sergeant and I were very concerned that we would make contact again – not enough ammunition, just enough for four or five minutes in a fight.
Although the NVA had withdrawn to the North East, my Platoon Sergeant and I decided to make a dash for the rubber and hoped that speed and momentum would keep us out of trouble. Instructions to everyone were – “No matter what happens, don’t stop”. We arrived at the Quan Loi front gate at dark and without incident. We were credited with 13 KIA and one prisoner. I saw a lot more than 13 dead but did not get a count. 4th Platoon 919th - one casualty, treated at the Quan Loi Aid Station and returned to duty."
1LT (LTC Ret.) Michael G. Kuehn, The "Red Devils" 919th Engineer Company (Armored), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, June 1969-July 1970.
