4th Trans. Command

18th MP Brigade

89th MP Group

716th MP Battalion

92nd MP Battalion

95th MP Battalion

720th MP Battalion

Quan Canh

Canh Sat

     The first solution Brigade initiated was fraught with difficulty, both tactical and legal. As with any problem the military faces, they first examine the lessons learned and make the appropriate adjustments. The legal jurisdictional issues were corrected and the tactical adjustments were examined. A decision was made to expand oversight by breaking down the convoys into smaller serials, and adding dedicated escorts to “ride-herd” and establishing a series of joint checkpoints as further deterrent

      The losses due to theft were lowered but still unacceptable. There was also another tactical problem. The enemy started to target the convoys in Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) IV (Mekong Delta Region) because they were left without dedicated rout support, and the casualties mounted. Once again lessons were learned and dedicated support was arranged correcting the casualty problem but leaving the still unacceptable cargo theft ratio.

     The most obvious alternative would have been to ship the cargo during daytime via U.S. military transport vehicles, forgoing the security problems created by the civilian teamsters. However, that would have defeated the reason for using local civilian transports, which was to free up limited U.S. military transportation units. To handle the load, almost an entire transportation battalion would have been needed just for those shipments of PX goods coming from the Saigon Port for III and IV CTZ. Any additional assets would have to have been approved up the chain of command to Washington. There was a troop ceiling in place, and MACV wanted as many combat arms units as they could muster. In addition, with the civilian vendor contracts generated stateside through the Department of Defense (DOA), it was doubtful they would have been renegotiated. The jobs created contributed to the Vietnamese economy.

     They also examined assigning an armed U.S. enlisted man to each truck, again the manpower requirements were found to be unacceptable. Another alternative would have involved the dedication of additional MP assets to insure better control, but MP assets in-country were already stretched thin.

     It was at this time the most controversial decision was made- to expand the operation by adding night convoys. Every unit in Vietnam that had to ship cargo via ground transport always avoided night convoys unless it was under dire emergent circumstances, where there was no other alternative, and the cargos were food, fuel and ammunition to sustain an on going defensive or tactical operation. The decision to transition high-end PX cargo into the night runs had to be so controversial that it could not have been made without direct approval at the highest levels of Brigade. The VC constantly looked for routine patterns in U.S. tactics, and without hesitation took immediate advantage of them. So the MP’s ran the night convoys, the PX’s received their goods, the troops were happy, the VC extracted their pound of flesh, and after examining the history of Operation OVERTAKE, one has to ask was it all worth it?

     In 1964 the U.S. Army Support Group Vietnam’s 9th Logistical Command, headquartered in Okinawa, Japan, serviced the cargo flow at the Saigon Port. In 1965 as military assistance was being increased Saigon remained the only deep-water port in South Vietnam capable of handling the large flow of cargo.

4th Trans. Command

USARV .

     With the rush to provide the needed military supplies and materials to sustain the U.S. buildup, security standards were lax as the diplomatic bureaucracy of the South Vietnamese and U.S. government’s slowly worked out the separation of protocols and civil laws governing the handling and separation of the civil and military cargo.

     As other port facilities were being modified in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, total operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. military section at the Saigon port was delegated to the U.S. Army 4th Transportation Command’s Port Security Office (1st Logistical Command), and supported by the United States Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) Provost Marshal.

   Since the start of the U.S. involvement in the war, the U.S. House of Representatives- Committee on Government Operations, was investigating the pilferage problems on a continuous basis. In addition, the House Committee was also addressing contractual obligations, purchasing matters and issues of total oversight of facility operations.

     There were two primary causes for the need to conduct the reviews. In the rush to meet the needs of the buildup, the Department Of Defense (DOD) and Pentagon were less than judicious in their oversight when drafting and issuing contracts.

     The failures resulted in a lack of critical parameters and liabilities, for responsibility of control and security of the incoming cargos.

     By mid 1965, the cargo flow at the Saigon Port, averaging approximately three million tons annually, increased ten fold. The shortages of berths, docks, and warehousing facilities required a massive expansion to handle the military buildup.

   With the assistance of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the facility also upgraded its manual off loading operations with the addition of new modern pallet and forklift equipment.

     The rapid increase also created major security concerns for the now crowded harbor and warehouses. Ships loaded with both civil and military cargo were anchored in close proximity, and many contained highly volatile fuel and explosive ordnance.

     The crowding now created diplomatic conflicts over prioritizing and scheduling which cargos were to be off loaded first. A separate military dock and storage facility was needed so they began construction of the U.S. Newport Military Terminal on the north side of the Saigon River.

     The separate facilities would also provide better security and control of the high priority military cargo.

     In late 1965, the military police responsibilities for port-ship security and special convoys to Bien Hoa from Saigon Port fell to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) via the 1st Field Force and the 615th MP Company, 716th MP Battalion until the activation of the 89th MP Group on 14 March 1966, then under OPCON of USARV, until the arrival of the 18th MP Brigade on 8 September.

Saigon River Port & Docks

Newport Military Terminal, Saigon River

     The Port Security Office never acquired the 225 enlisted men recommended, and on 1 August 1966 the DOD, whose primary concern at the time was the troop level ceiling, made the recommendation moot when it reported to the subcommittee that new government contracts (requiring corporate security responsibility) negated the need for the increase in U.S. military truck guards. They reported that only twenty guards would be needed because they established a new system of convoy and escort control. The DOD and military bureaucracy dropped the ball, and the thefts continued unabated.