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~ 720th Military Police Battalion Vietnam History Project ~ |
Operation OVERTAKE |
1967 Timeline |
Participating Commands |
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This Page Last Updated 3 April 2018 |
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Original OVERTAKE Wall Map |
Area Map
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CLICK ON TO ENLARGE |
CLICK ON TO ENLARGE
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Faced with competing tactical combat support and physical security priorities dictated by the new and unfamiliar nonlinear theater of operations, the 18th MP Brigade’s limited military police trained personnel assets and vehicle resources were already stretched to their breaking point. With the limited troop levels authorized by the U.S. Congress, emphasis was on providing combat arms, not military police. The last thing the Brigade needed was another major long-term security assignment of guarding civilian contracted convoys. |
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Another factor for consideration was the cargos were primarily high end Post Exchange and Service Club supplies and merchandise: electronics; clothing; soda, liquor and beer. There were some fuel supplies hauled, but they were carried in smaller tank trucks and destined for the civilian contractor facilities. There were also some U.S. military logistical supplies like, clothing, non-lethal equipment, and C-Rations. Never-the less, the cargos were paid for by the U.S. taxpayers, and thus their security was the responsibility of the U.S. Army. |
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The Joint Resources Control Checkpoint Operation (JRCCO) |
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In their first effort to combat the thefts, U.S. Army Provost Marshal Vietnam ordered the establishment of the Joint Resources Control Checkpoint Operation (JRCCO) under the Revolutionary Development and Economic Warfare Program. JRCCO involved the establishment of joint U.S. Military Police, Vietnamese National Uniformed (Can Sat) and Military Police (Quan Canh) static checkpoints in CTZ I on Highway QL-1, the Saigon metropolitan area and major cargo transport routes in CTZ III, as well as Highway QL-4 in CTZ IV. |
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10 March Brigade authorized the Operational Plan (OPLAN). It was hoped that the checkpoints located throughout the city and on the surrounding highways would curtail the thefts by means of visibility, deterrence, and interdiction. |
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19 April The 89th MP Group assigned the task in CTZ III (Saigon area) to the 720th MP Battalion. The JRCCO plan would cause the least drain on MP resources by incorporating the Group’s current highway security responsibilities with the new theft deterrence program with only a small additional commitment of manpower and jeeps, and a minor readjustment of the current standard operating procedures (SOP). Their biggest headache was negotiating an increase in the allocation of additional Army Of The Republic Of Vietnam (ARVN) MP’s and National Policemen from the local civil district bureaucrats. |
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As a result of the steady increase in volume of civilian and military traffic caused by the troop buildup, the contracted trucks easily blended into the already heavy volume of city traffic. In addition, the gangs quickly changed their criminal operations by adopting a shotgun approach to their transport process. They set up local clandestine storage facilities, and transferred their stolen cargos into multiple smaller vehicles that passed under the scrutiny of the checkpoints in the heavy traffic. After two months the operation was found to be ineffective for primarily the same reasons as the contractor’s security measures. They lacked the constant control that small size convoy and dedicated security escorts could provide. |
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30 May Brigade recommended by letter to USARV that the JRCCO static checkpoint concept be abandoned or modified. Still trying to conserve their critical personnel and vehicle assets, they asked that mobile checkpoints be employed to complement the static checkpoints. The II Field Forces (IIFF) Headquarters concurred and signed on. |
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14 July The legal issue of military searches of civilian vehicles was addressed and resolved. Brigade announced in their Operational Newsletter No. 5-67, that the Provost Marshal Vietnam ruled that U.S. MP’s could search any civilian vehicle under U.S. military contract anywhere in South Vietnam, but could only detain civilian vehicles they “suspected” were transporting stolen military cargo pending response of Vietnamese National Police to conduct any searches or seizures. |
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Unfortunately, even with the new legal edict, the roving checkpoint patrol plan was found to be seriously flawed. Trying to identify the vehicles carrying the stolen cargo once it was transferred from the contractor’s trucks; was like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Their attempt to conserve assets while addressing the theft problems had twice failed and was dropped. To conduct a successful mission, additional assets had to be dedicated. Brigade once again submitted a new letter to USARV formulating a revised plan of action, and before the end of the year the new OPLAN was approved. It was code named Operation OVERTAKE. |
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The supplies were being transported from the Saigon Port and Newport Military Terminal in III Corps Tactical Zone by vehicles under civilian contract to the U.S. Government through companies such as Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), Philco Ford, Equipment Inc. (Division of Sea Land Services), Do Thi Nuong (Vietnamese Common Carrier Company) and Pope-Evans & Robins International, Ltd (PERIL Ltd.). Although RMK-BRJ was the primary Private Military Contractor (PMC) for construction, other PMC's transported the goods from base to base or from port to base. The three major trucking PMC’s used in the Saigon area were Equipment Inc., Philco Ford, and Do Thi Nuong. To add to the problem of security, many of the trucks used by these contract companies were subcontracted from local Vietnamese civilian companies and independent operators. |
PERIL Ltd. Yard
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