4th Trans. Command

18th MP Brigade

89th MP Group

716th MP Battalion

92nd MP Battalion

95th MP Battalion

720th MP Battalion

Quan Canh

Canh Sat

     By 1 January the first phase of Operation OVERTAKE was in progress. The 89th MP Group tasked the 92nd MP Battalion, headquartered at Pershing Field (Saigon), with the operational authority and they in turn tasked their 188th MP Company (+) to provide the bulk of the staffing.

     Elements of the 716th MP Battalion were responsible for the Capital Military District, and conducted escort patrols from the docks into metropolitan Saigon. The 188th provided escorts for the trucks heading south into the Mekong Delta Region of CTZ IV.

     The 720th was tasked by Group to provide the checkpoint and roving patrols for Highway-316 north (designated as Highway-1A) to Long Binh Post and Bien Hoa.

Personal Reflection

     “I was part of the initial Operation Overtake. The 188th did most of the patrolling until we redeployed to the Delta. I helped set up the dispatch location in Long Binh. The MP’s at the port would radio us the vehicle numbers of trucks, and their cargo, when they were leaving. Most were operated by Philco Ford or Equipment Inc. Gun Jeeps would patrol the sections of the highway between Newport and Long Binh.”  SP/4 Carl Ray Smoot, 188th MP Company, 92nd MP Battalion, December 1967-May 1969.

        When we discovered the "domestic" profile (post, camp and station attitude of units along the convoy route), COL Francis E. "Frank" Payne, 89th MP Group Commander and I took action to help protect the MP escorts. They were not all from the 720th.

        We established a Reaction Team with Armored Personnel Carriers which COL Payne and I hammered at until we received authorization for delivery of about 13 of the APC's, and several V100's and the 720th was backed up with personnel from the Infantry company assigned to the 89th MP Group, D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security), from the ammo depot security.

        I have a lot of memories about Operation OVERTAKE. I was very involved with its creation and operations during 1968, and I witnessed first hand the bravery of the MP's and Infantry assigned to that detail. And I witnessed more that is not so positive with some of the units involved.   MAJ Frederick J. Villella, (LTC Retired) S3 Operations Officer, 720th MP Battalion & 89th MP Group, October 1967-October 1968.

     With direction from Group, the 95th established an operations room in the rear of the 179th PMO Detachment (USARV) MP Station located just inside of Gate-1.

     Communications were the backbone of coordination for the combined unit MP escorts and check points that would shadow the civilian trucks used in the convoys from the Saigon and Newport Docks to Long Binh Post.

     An operations room was set up in the rear of the Post Provost Marshal Office and MP Station, located just inside of Gate #1 on Long Binh Post. From that location the OVERTAKE operators charted on an operations map the number of vehicles, frequency of departures, and progress of the vehicle groups along the route.

     It also made it much easier to dispatch assistance from pre-designated units when needed by the escorts.

     The staff maintained their own duty rosters, operating procedures, trip logs and a separate radio system. They charted the location of checkpoints, number of vehicles, frequency of departures and progress of the vehicle groups as they progressed along the route on a large operations map hung on the TOC wall.

     A direct telephone landline to Battalion S2 and S3 provided real time reports on enemy activity along the routes. Its location also made it much easier to dispatch assistance from pre-designated support units on post, and along the route when needed.

     The MP's were initially assigned to five roving patrols and eleven vehicles as static (fixed) posts, monitoring the contracted vehicles as they progressed along Highway #316 (later designated as Highway QL-1A) from the Newport Docks in Saigon to the supply depots at Bien Hoa Air Force Base and Long Binh Post. The Operation OVERTAKE "Day" assignment operated daily between 0700 hours (7:00AM) and 1900 hours (7:00PM).

     Escorting the night convoys was like running a gauntlet; the VC knew when they were coming, and by counting the headlights-their strength and how well they were armed. They picked the time and place carefully for each ambush, and it was like a shooting gallery with the MP gun-jeeps and their charges as the ducks.

     The Viet Cong’s primary weapon of choice was small arms fire for harassment, and the dreaded RPG for ambushes.

2 February, 0100 hours The A Company Overtake Night escort group of four gun-jeeps supervised by SSG Michael J. Maratea just completed the return leg of their last escort. They crossed over the Newport Bridge to the south side, and entered the dock complex gate to pick up their last convoy for the night.

     At the same time remnants of the 273d VC Main Force Regiment, already battered from an unsuccessful attack on Thu Duc several miles northeast of the bridge the previous day, were laying in wait. Their plan was to overrun the small RF-PF compound and destroy the Newport Bridge.

     While the MP escorts were waiting in the complex, the attack began with a barrage of mortar rounds followed by a fierce ground assault against the RF-PF bunkers. Members of the 154th Transportation Command took up defensive positions along the inside perimeter of the Newport complex, and directed their rifle fire towards the firing from the enemy force. Undeterred, the VC quickly overran a number of the RF/PF bunkers and took control of the southern end of the bridge.

     SSG Maratea immediately notified Overtake TOC of the attack, and ordered his gun-jeeps to take up positions along the roadway to defend against an expected ground assault on the main gate of the complex. Within minutes, several helicopter gunship's arrived and provided fire support for the RF-PF defensive positions. Fire from an enemy heavy machine gun struck one of the helicopters disabling it, and forcing it to leave the area trailing black smoke. With their line of fire at the enemy on the bridge obstructed due to their position below its level, the MP gun-jeeps directed their machine gun fire on and near the south end of the bridge. Their actions succeeded in preventing further enemy reinforcements from moving through the RF/PF compound to the bridge deck.

     The firefight lasted for an hour before a relief force from the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Cavalry Squadron arrived and counterattacked the VC positions recapturing the bridge. During the attack the VC were unsuccessful in damaging the bridge. After the battle eleven enemy bodies were found on the bridge, and additional bodies were recovered from the approach. The Overtake escorts were ordered to remain at the yard until an Expended Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assessment of the bridge deck could be conducted in daylight. The remaining convoy run was canceled, and the escort unit was finally released to return to post.

     "I came across your website and was interested to see the bit about the "ambush" on 26 March during the early morning hours.

     I was in Vietnam with the U.S. Army from August 1966 until February 1968 when I ETS'd in-country. My first employment as a civilian was with Equipment Incorporated at Thu Duc as a Security Specialist. Our job was to ride the convoys in International pick up trucks, and attempt to detect and prevent diversions of cargo. I worked for Equipment Inc. from around the end of February 1968 until they lost their contract with the U.S. Army around November of that year.

     Philco Ford took over both contracts at that time. I was involved with the convoy that took fire from the woods south of the compound on 26 March. Our compound was right next to the Philco Ford compound on the highway [Highway 316 - 1A]. As soon as we took fire we got the hell out of there, and our MP security hosed down the area. I think that as soon as it was daylight there was a recon into the area, which met with negative results. The Equipment, Inc. compound was in communication with Overtake at Long Binh Post via our Motorola radio system. If I recall correctly, one of the call signs was "Pimpwood."  Nigel Brooks, U.S. Civilian Contractor, Equipment Incorporated.

Personal Reflection

8 April As if running night convoys for the civilian contractors was not dangerous enough, Overtake Night operations were further expanded. They were instructed to provide night escort of all U.S. cargo being transported by civilian contractor and-or military vehicles, except those military vehicles already moving in prearranged tactical convoy on Highway-1A from the Newport Docks to Long Binh Post and Bien Hoa.

     Night Overtake had previously allowed unescorted military transports into the convoys on a limited basis. The new orders now required them to make it a regular procedure. The expansion now incorporated lethal ammunition and fuel cargo transports into the night convoys, making them an even more attractive target to the VC. With the changes, A Company now had to increase their commitment to Overtake by providing ninety-five enlisted men, two officers, six APC’s, and twenty-eight gun-jeeps. The nightly Bearcat to Newport 9th Infantry Division supply convoy escorts being conducted by two APC’s of C Company were also incorporated into the operation.

4 May, 1400 hours  PFC’s John V. Pepka and James B. Ahlfeld, Jr. were on Operation OVERTAKE Day patrol in Car [Jeep] #12 on Highway-1A (Grid Coordinates YT 125123) when they attempted to stop civilian contract vehicle #1654 belonging to Philco Ford. The truck fit the profile of a convoy runner or contraband carrier. It was a flatbed carrying cargo covered with a tarp, and there were two Vietnamese males in civilian clothing armed with rifles on the back. They decided to stop and check them out.

     PFC Ahlfeld turned on the red lights and siren, and observed one of the armed passengers on the back move forward and talk to the people in the cab. The truck didn’t heed their request to pull over and continued on. They informed Overtake TOC of their pursuit, and were instructed by radio to disable it by gunfire if needed. By now the pursuit had progressed for approximately 3-miles with the driver continuing to ignore their commands to stop. PFC Pepka fired two rounds from his M-14 rifle into the trucks right rear tire bringing the chase to a quick end.

     The truck was carrying five passengers all dressed as civilians. The three in the cab were identified as Troung Ba Tribc a civilian Philco Ford driver, Bui Huo Thanh a member of Department of Security, Duc Tu Subsector, and U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Anges M. Ortiz of the U.S. 98th MACV Advisory Team, also of the Duc Tu Subsector. The two-armed men on the bed in civilian clothes were unidentified ARVN soldiers. Passenger Bui Huo Thanh drew his .45 caliber pistol on the MP’s when he exited the truck cab.

Personal Reflection

     “Bui Huo Thanh was the first one out of the cab, and he pulled out his pistol and waved it about, but he did not aim it directly at us, probably because I had my rifle aimed directly at his chest. About fifteen seconds later SFC Ortiz appeared at the rear of the truck; this was the only time that I knew that an American was involved. Approximately one or two minutes later our NCOIC arrived on scene and took charge.

     I was very surprised that when our sergeant first arrived he recognized SFC Ortiz from a distance of twenty to thirty feet away, and seemed to know him personally. I have almost no memory of events after our NCOIC took charge.

     An officer interviewed me about the stop, and since I was due to leave country in late June it was possible they would delay my leaving or recall me back to testify. Thank god neither happened. I have always wondered what the final outcome was.” ”   PFC John V. Pepka, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, June 1967-June 1968.

5 May The VC launched their “Mini Tet” Offensive. MACV records declared it officially ended on 13 May; however, it would be one of the worst months on record for the Overtake crews.

     During the early hours of the day, the VC attacked the Thu Duc Water Works and National Police Station at the intersection of Highway-1A and 15, and the RF/PF compound at the Newport Bridge. The highway was closed and it disrupted the Overtake schedule.

     To compound the problem, due to the increase of enemy activity during the early days of the offensive, at least half of the civilian contract drivers for Philco Ford and Equipment Inc. refused to operate their vehicles. The 89th MP Group had a contingency OPLAN (#16-67) to fall back on in the event of such situations, providing for the authorization of U.S. military transportation units to assign drivers on a temporary interim basis to insure that the transport of priority cargo would continue. The plan was activated, and the Overtake convoys soon continued.

7 May The day’s first adventure started at just after mid-day when enemy snipers opened fire as an Overtake Day escort jeep arrived at the main gate of the Newport Terminal. None of the crew or the jeep was struck, and they took temporary shelter within the facility.

     Four hours later, Overtake Day patrols were sent to Gasoline Alley on Highway-1A to investigate a report of a “runner” off loading cargo. When the patrols arrived at the scene they were stopped by a roadblock and received small arms fire. Overtake TOC dispatched a helicopter light-fire team to support them. By the time the MP’s gained access to the truck, three of its four pallets of beer were gone. The cargo loss was estimated at $480.00. The truck was also damaged to the value of $500.00, and no suspects were located.

8 May In the early evening an Overtake Day patrol observed a Philco Ford contracted vehicle leave Highway-1A, and enter the Rock Quarry site located on the west side of Highway 316 (1-A) midway between Long Binh Post and Thu Duc. The patrol followed the runner into the quarry and found it with a Canh Sat (National Police) vehicle.

     As they approached to investigate, they came under small arms fire from the two Canh Sat’s. The MP patrol returned fire wounding one of them before the vehicle fled from the quarry. The MP’s stayed with the contractor vehicle and secured the load intact.

     The incident precipitated the start of a Battalion-wide inquiry into operational deficiencies with the district National Police.

     Later that same night, the 300th MP Company security detachment at the Newport Dock facility reported to Battalion TOC that a VC unit with an estimated strength of two companies plus one platoon were observed operating along Highway-1A just northwest of the Newport Bridge. Overtake TOC was notified and held their night escorts for an hour until authorization was finally received from Group to continue.

     At approximately the same time, another Overtake Night escort team reported one RPG round was fired at their vehicle in the area of the Newport Bridge. It missed, and there were no injuries or damage.

     Just before midnight as another Overtake Night convoy was departing the #208 cargo storage area on Long Binh Post, it reported a firefight in progress nearby. TOC authorized the convoy to continue.

12 May, 0210 Hours VC elements again attacked the Newport Bridge, the Dock facilities, and the RF/PF security compound under cover of a rocket and mortar attack. They quickly overran the RF/PF compound, and this time their sapper teams were successful in destroying a 150-foot section of the south bound lane, dropping it into the Saigon River before being driven from the field.

     Approximately fifty vehicles under Overtake Night escort were being held at the facility with an additional eighty being held in the staging area at Gate-2 on Long Binh Post. By daylight the area was declared secured, the damage evaluated, and the Overtake convoys returned to normal operational status. An Overtake gun-jeep was also tasked with providing a traffic control defile at the damaged bridge section until further notice.

14 May In the early morning darkness VC elements began another coordinated harassment along Highway-1A by firing 30 rounds of small arms fire into the Thu Duc National Police Station, followed several minutes later with the ambush of A Company APC #103 on "Rocket Alley." They fired one RPG round while it was traveling north on the highway between Thu Duc and the Newport Bridge. The round exploded short of the vehicle and no injuries or damage were inflicted.

     The crew of APC #103 continued to have a bad but lucky day on Highway-1A, when within a seventy minute span that night they were ambushed three separate times by RPG fire, fortunately all three rounds missed their vehicle. After the third attack, CPT Paul R. Guimond the Battalion S3, ordered all Overtake Night operations between Thu Duc and the Newport Bridge to cease until the enemy unit could be located and the threat neutralized. The highway support force from the 1st Infantry Division located at the Water Works in Thu Duc was sent out to sweep the highway.

     Later in the morning during daylight, the Overtake Day patrol at the ARVN Tomb Of The Unknown Soldier Cemetery north of the Thu Duc intersection received three to four rounds of sniper fire. They were unable to locate the source and there were no injuries.

17 May During the early morning, enemy elements again conducted coordinated harassment attacks with small arms and RPG fire against the Thu Duc National Police Station, nearby ARVN compound, and the Water Plant.

     At the south end of highway-1A, they fired RPG’s at the Newport Bridge and engaged a local ARVN unit in a firefight and were repulsed.

     Undeterred from the earlier attack, that evening they again attacked the RF/PF Outpost outside the Newport facilities. During the firefights the convoys were only temporarily delayed, but the actions resulted in another threatened call for a mass sickout of civilian drivers at Equipment Inc.

20 May Just after midnight VC elements ambushed an Overtake Night convoy just south of the Dong Nai River Bridge on Highway-1A with six RPG rounds. One contract vehicle was destroyed and burning, and one civilian driver was killed. The convoy escorts returned fire while continuing through the kill-zone towards the safety of Long Binh Post. A light-fire team was dispatched to the area but could not locate the enemy unit.

     To bolster the escort capabilities and deter further attacks, CPT Guimond at Battalion TOC ordered C Company to assign one APC to each Overtake Night convoy from Newport to Long Binh Post until daylight. The remaining escort runs were uneventful.

1938 hours A C Company convoy escort was proceeding to the Bearcat base camp headquarters of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division on Highway QL-15 just several miles southeast of Long Binh Post Gate-11 to pick up their empty trucks scheduled for an Overtake Night run to the Newport Docks when it was ambushed with small arms and RPG fire by a VC force of unknown strength in the vicinity of the bridge at Checkpoint-19. During the initial attack, two MP’s were immediately struck and wounded. The two APC’s returned suppression fire along the kill-zone, as they headed for the safety of the Bearcat base.

     As they approached the base camp entrance, a second enemy force ambushed them resulting in two more wounded. As they attempted to remove themselves from the second kill zone one of the wounded MP’s was knocked from an APC and the escort team had to return to recover their fallen comrade. After making a successful recovery of the wounded MP the vehicles finally made it out of the kill zone and into the Bearcat base at 2028 hours to deliver their wounded to the hospital.

     The C Company wounded were: PFC Howard E. Doran, punctured eardrum; SP/4 Thomas E. Walker, shrapnel wound to the jaw; PFC John R. Hollander, shrapnel wound in both knees; PFC Daniel J. Flynn, serious shrapnel wounds requiring an emergency tracheotomy. PFC Daniel Joseph Flynn age 20, of Kings Park, NY, would die of his wounds within several hours. Flynn wasn't scheduled for the escort mission; he volunteered that night to fill in for a sick buddy. He served only 20 days in Vietnam. His name is etched on The Wall at the Vietnam Memorial, Panel 69W - Row 003.

PFC Flynn

28 May The most costly ambush of the Battalion’s Overtake mission occurred, and was preceded by a report from SFC Roger F. Ruggles Operations NCO at Battalion TOC at 1700 hours of enemy forces digging emplacements “somewhere” along the convoy route on Highway-1A. There were no specific details provided, and it is unknown if the report had any involvement in the later events. The night shift reported for duty, and after their guard-mount inspection, picked up their assigned trucks and proceeded to the Newport Docks as scheduled.

     It was a routine start of a night shift with one exception. According to SP/4 Peter Schroeter, the escort teams from each platoon worked together, this night they were intermingled. As he recalls, “It was done because our platoon, the 3rd, were known for our over exuberance and at times rowdy behavior.” This night they found themselves working under SSG John H. Wilkens, Jr. from the 1st Platoon. Since they were all experienced and SSG Wilkens was a well-respected and popular NCO, Schroeter recalls that everyone was comfortable with the new arrangement.

2240 hours, SGT Steven O. Payton of Overtake TOC reported to Battalion TOC, that a call was received by SGT Tallent at their operations desk from CPT Jenkins the operations officer at the Newport Docks that the 300th MP Company (Physical Security) complained that the escort team of SSG Wilkens and its convoy of trucks had not arrived as scheduled, and was delaying loading operations. Unknown to them at the time, the escort unit and the trail transport turck had been ambushed along “Rocket Alley," and Overtake TOC's attempts to reach SSG Wilkens gun-jeep via radio for a situation report (Sit-Rep) went unanswered.

     SP/4 Robert P. Seay recalled that as the convoy passed the Tu Duc intersection “everything seemed quiet.” Approximately one mile north of the Newport Bridge they were passing through an area surrounded on both sides by open rice paddies. It was a favorite place for VC snipers who could hit the convoy from a distance and fade into the nearby woods without ever being seen.

     The convoy was just about through the area when the escorts heard the Sit-Rep calls to SSG Wilkins in the trail jeep were not being answered. The floating gun-jeeps in which SP/4 Seay and SP/4 Schroeter were crewmembers, turned around and headed back to see what the problem was. As they proceeded past the end of the convoy they could see in the distance a gun-jeep burning in proximity to a disabled Army 10-ton truck at Grid Coordinates XS 919945. Now cautiously continuing their approach towards the jeep, they observed the highway was covered with debris, bodies, spent shell casings and the driver of the 10-ton was wounded. They secured the area and called TOC for the reaction force.

     The mechanized infantry troop of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division stationed at the Thu Duc Water Works several miles to the north responded to assist. Once they arrived with their APC’s and a platoon of infantry, they took over highway security and conducted a search for the enemy. The convoy continued on to the safety of the docks, and the remaining runs for the night were canceled.

     An investigation at the ambush scene indicated that the 10-ton truck driver was wounded by small arms fire, and RPG and small arms fire struck the trail gun-jeep causing to burn.

1st Infantry Division

     All three members of the crew: SSG John Herman Wilkens, Jr. age 26 a career NCO from New York City, NY; SP/4 Dennis Rae Mason age 20 a draftee from Argyle, Wisconsin; and PFC Roy William Neal age 21 a draftee from Blountville, Tennessee died at the ambush site. They were three of seventy-four American servicemen that died that day in Vietnam.

     Further examination determined that the jeep was struck in front by two RPG’s causing it to loose control and burn. One of the two RPG’s also appeared to have hit the driver instantly killing him and the gunner. SSG Wilkens who was in the front passenger seat, although badly wounded, severely burned and thrown from the wreckage onto the roadway, was able to empty his M-16 at the enemy and drew his .45-pistol before finally succumbing to his wounds.

     SSG Wilkens tour began on 27 August 1967, and his name is etched on The Wall at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Panel 63W - Row 001. SP/4 Mason’s tour began on 28 October 1967, and his name is etched on Panel 64W - Row 012. PFC Neal’s tour began on 1 November 1967, and his name is etched on Panel 64W - Row 013.

SSG Wilkens

SP/4 Mason

PFC Neal

Personal Reflection

     “I remember Dennis Mason very well. We went over together after training and serving at Fort Carson, Colorado from 1966-1967. It was very hard learning he had been killed in action; especially knowing he had gotten married during his thirty-day leave before heading to Viet Nam.

     Although I've never visited the wall in Washington DC, I have had several opportunities to visit the moving wall. I found his name, and that of others I knew.“  SP/4 Marvin L. “Marve” Conover, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, October 1967-October 1968.

29 May, 0245 Hours LT Volt notified Battalion TOC that the EOD team completed blowing up in place the 40mm M-79 grenade rounds that were burned as a result of the ambush of the gun-jeep, and the roadway was now open to normal traffic.

     To increase support for the Overtake escort operations and hamper VC infiltrators movements via civilian traffic, CPT Steven Vass, Jr. Battalion S3 contacted MAJ Tuy the Police Chief of Gia Dinh Province and requested fifty Vietnamese National Police be attached to the Battalion for daily duty with the day escorts and checkpoints. MAJ Tuy agreed with the request, and immediately assigned fifteen officers from Gia Dinh and twelve from Thu Duc District Headquarters. That same day the National Policemen arrived at Long Binh Post and were billeted in the A Company compound. The initial request for fifty officers was later downgraded to thirty-one.

1905 Hours 2LT Eugene S. Edey of C Company, the Overtake Duty Officer, notified Battalion TOC that an unknown size VC force fired one RPG round at one of the APC’s in the Overtake Night convoy at Grid Coordinates XS 925958 while it was traveling south on Highway-1A to the Newport Docks facility.

     The RPG missed and struck a telephone pole on the side of the highway. The convoy continued on without stopping, and there was no vehicle damage or casualties. All additional Overtake convoys for that night were halted until the designated combat support unit could sweep the area and clear the road.

2258 Hours Information was received from 1LT Darryl K. Solomonson [B Company] the Battalion Staff Duty Officer, that the Overtake Night convoy halted due to enemy activity on Highway-1A at 1905 hours this date, were once again permitted to continue.

     Elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse Base at Xuan Loc) conducted a sweep of the area with negative results for the enemy force.

11th Armor Cav. Reg.

2nd Theft Attempt On the same convoy, two A Company gun-jeeps commanded by SP/4 James E. Scott and SP/4 Jerry L. King positioned them on a parallel roadway from the highway and placed the oncoming Overtake Night convoy under surveillance. PFC Robert P. Seay, the machine-gunner in SP/4 Scott’s jeep spotted another contracted truck leaving Highway-1A onto a back roadway. They pursued the truck until its driver lost control and the truck became stuck in a ditch. The driver fled on foot- escaping capture. The truck and its unidentified cargo worth $1,536.00 was secured and recovered.

    On 29 July SP/4 King received a Letter of Commendation for his initiative, professionalism and devotion to duty from COL Keith L. Monroe the Commander of the 89th MP Group.

September Having to perform memorial services for four Battalion MP's killed in action during Operation OVERTAKE escorts on Memorial Day, 30 May, may have been the influencing reason behind 89th MP Group's Chaplin (captain) Jed O. Pancost's prayer relating to the Battalion's Operation OVERTAKE mission.

     The prayer appeared in the Chaplain’s Corner of the September 1968 edition of the 18th MP Brigade Roundup Newspaper.