According to an intelligence report by MACV on enemy strengths within Military Region III, the number of units still active and combat effective after the failed Post Tet Offensive consisted of twelve infantry regiments, three artillery regiments, fifteen infantry battalions, six sapper battalions, and one reconnaissance battalion. The casualty losses suffered resulted in an overall decrease in the enemy’s effectiveness. In addition, heavy logistical losses were inflicted that adversely affected their morale and ability to conduct major operations, so their strategy would change.

     With the Paris Peace Talks and downsizing of U.S. forces, MACV predicted that the most probable course of enemy action at this time would be to attempt to outlast the resolve of the Allied Forces, especially the American’s, by instilling the belief that the VC/NVA can protract the war indefinitely. Their chosen method would be by “attacks by fire” (rocket and heavy mortar) on major U.S. bases while conducting light to moderate ground and sapper attacks against smaller friendly installations, outposts and troops, as well as the continued use of individual terrorist attacks and physiological warfare programs in the rural countryside.

     The new MACV strategy to counter the enemy plans was to increase the intensity and efficiency of smaller scale Allied Forces defensive ground operations and “rocket belt” defenses around the major bases.

     With emphasis now on the ARVN, MACV had to intensify the rate at which they received training, equipment and supplies. Another area that was long neglected was the technical training and proficiency for maintenance and other support units, as well as the number of qualified combat tested officers and NCO's.

Dau Tieng Convoy Ambushed

     The Dau Tieng serial of the Tay Ninh-Cu Chi convoy was ambushed. No C Company escorts were casualties, and no additional details were available.

1000 hours, A ceremony was conducted in the open area between the battalion mess hall and Annex 11 (NCO Open Mess), Long Binh Post, for the purpose of presenting the Meritorious Unit Commendation to the 95th (1st Oak Leaf Cluster, 1 January-31 December 1967) and 720th (1st Oak Leaf Cluster, 19 October 1966-31 May 1967) MP Battalions. Members of the 89th MP Group in attendance to present the streamers to the battalions were, COL E. J. Murdock, Group Commander, LTC F. L. Griffin, Commander of Troops (Long Binh Post), and five members of the Group Honor Guard, three bearing the United States, South Vietnamese, and 89th MP Group colors, and two guards.

     Standing formation for the 95th MP Battalion (Long Binh Post) were, LTC Ossorio, Battalion Commander, their Battalion Honor Guard with colors, and all company commanders and guidon bearers of HQ & HQ Detachment, 557th MP Company (2nd Oak Leaf Cluster), 560th MP Company (2nd Oak Leaf Cluster), 179th MP Detachment (Basic Award), and D Company, 52nd Infantry (Basic Award), D Company, 87th Infantry (Basic Award), both rifle security units-attached.

     Standing formation for the 720th MP Battalion were, LTC O’Malley, Battalion Commander, their Battalion Honor Guard with colors, and all company commanders and guidon bearers of, HQ & HQ Detachment, Alfa Company (1st Oak Leaf Cluster), Bravo Company (1st Oak Leaf Cluster), Charlie Company (1st Oak Leaf Cluster), and 615th MP Company-attached (Basic Award).

     Only one problem was encountered when an amplifier tube within the public address system burned out immediately prior to the ceremony causing loss of amplification.

     Ambush Squad’s 75 and 78 were assigned to the hill for surveillance, and arrived by boat just before dark to set up in their night defensive positions. With two squads on the hill that night they were cautious but relaxed, any chances of VC activity against them was slim at best, and the night passed quietly without incident, or so they thought.

TAOR At daybreak SSG Richard Slaven prepared Squad-75 to depart the hill, and as they were walking down the southern trail to the river their point man, SP/4 Robert Cressman, triggered a hidden Claymore mine set up by the VC sometime after their arrival the night before. SP/4 Cressman, SSG Slaven, PFC Larry W. Holton, and their PF Scout-Interpreter CPL Lee Van Muon were all struck by the shrapnel and severely wounded.

     In the morning SSG Richard Slaven died from his wounds at the hospital on Long Binh Post. SSG Slaven was one of fifty-one American servicemen that died that day in Vietnam. His name is etched in The Wall of the Vietnam Memorial on Panel 28W - Row 086.

     SSG Slaven was 31 years old and a fourteen-year career soldier. He was married and hailed from Elmira, New York. His tour with the Battalion started on 1 December 1968 and he was assigned as the Squad Leader of Ambush Team-75. The members of the squad liked his easygoing personality and quickly bonded with him.

      All the other wounded squad members recovered and eventually returned to duty.

Wanted: Photograph of PFC Holton, and additional names and interviews of the MP's that were present in the two ambush squads on Hill-15. Use the Email Link at the top of this page to contact the Histroy Project Manager.

     On the same day CPT Jimmy H. Rich transferred command of B Company to CPT Harold "Hal" D. Lockhart. CPT Rich was next assigned to the 95th MP Battalion (Long Binh Post), and duty as the Provost Marshal of the Vung Tau Area.

     One of CPT Lockhart’s first duties as the new company commander was to write a letter of condolence to the family of SSG Slaven. A chore he described as a very sobering welcome to B Company and Operation STABILIZE.

Wanted: Photographs of the change of command ceremony.