720th Military Police Battalion Vietnam History Project
1968 Vietnam Timeline
212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog)
This Page Last Updated   10 January 2018

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    During 1968 the troops of the company served subordinate to the commands depicted in the column to the right   >

Veteran's of the 212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog), we need your assistance to obtain official documents, information, personal stories, and photographs for your history website. If you would like to assist in preserving the proud history of your units Vietnam tour, please click on the Email Link of any page to contact Tom Watson (History Project & Website Manager).

     Your historical contributions and comments are always welcomed and appreciated on this website.

18th MP
Brigade
89th MP
Group
95th MP
Battalion
720th MP
Battalion
     To eliminate duplication of materials and information, the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog) Long Binh Post Detachment pages have been incorporated into this company timeline page. Specific activities relative to it are identified with- HQ Long Binh Detachment. In addition, all page links, linked photographs and their Email links have been reformatted and updated. The same process, with the exception of some dated photographs (most will still be maintained in their respective detachment pages), has been done with the textual timeline history of all the other 212th company detachments.
     If you have any questions about this process please feel free to direct them to the History Project and Website Manager via the Email Link at the top of this page.
1968
January

Exact Date Unknown, Long Than Detachment  The Company was tasked by the 89th MP Group with providing a detachment of handlers to improve security at the airfield flight line of the Long Thanh (North) base camp on Highway QL-15 in Bien Hoa Province, III Corps Tactical Zone. The detachment was formed but there were no facilities for their cantonment. Until one could be provided the detachment stayed at the Bearcat base camp (9th Infantry Division) a few miles north.

Long Than Detachment

Personal Reflection    “I have many fond memories of the 212th, and especially of the detachment at Long Thanh, which my platoon initiated. We had to "hand-build" our billets, out-houses, kennels, showers, bunkers, etc. It was an amazing team-building project and instilled a lot of pride and teamwork in our detachment. Two of our handlers, Schmidt and Gerald S. Sauve, were carpenters in civilian life, and became our construction foremen. We even had to build the dog dip tanks, and I came up with the bright idea of building a frame upside-down (in order to cement a solid bottom), filling it with concrete, and once it dried, turning it upright and dismantling the wood frame.

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     The first one was great, until we realized we had installed no drain and had to, subsequently, empty the chemicals every time by bucket. Needless to say, the remaining dip tanks had bottom drains.

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     We also had one of our handlers (Dorsey F. Sapp), who was also a great artist, paint a giant Snoopy Dog with an MP helmet on top of the kennel roof."  2LT Gary M. Freeman, 1st Platoon Leader, 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog), 95th & 720th MP Battalion’s, 89th MP Group, 1967-1968.

23 January, Long Than Detachment   Once the billets and kennels were completed, the detachment of approximately fifteen handlers and K9's moved into their new cantonment at Long Thanh. Of the four billets, two were for the enlisted men, one for the NCO's and one was the officers tent. When off duty the MP's continued to work on quality of life projects for the new facilities.

29 January, II Field Forces, Long Binh Post   BG John S. Lekson, the Commanding General of Headquarters, II Field Forces (Long Binh Post), issued a Joint Message Form to all it’s major commands.

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     There are a number of positive intelligence indicators that the enemy will deliberately violate the truce by attacking friendly installations during the night of 29 January or the early morning hours of 30 January.

     Addressees will take action to insure maximum alert posture throughout the TET period. Be particularly alert for enemy deception involving use of friendly vehicles or uniform.

30 January-1 April 1968

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HQ Long Binh Post,  Personal Reflection  “During the afternoon the 18th MP Brigade headquarters issued an alert order to all of its units. I gathered the officers to review our compound defense plan. This was coordinated with the adjacent units. To the west, across the street was the 42nd Engineer Company (Port Construction) and to the east across that street was an engineer bridge company. We had the slice in the middle with the hill in front of us. The 720th MP Battalion’s TAOR mortar platoon [D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security) subordinate to the 95th MP Battalion] was to the west of the 42nd and could provide us high explosive and illuminating mortar rounds for our support.

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     I placed the company on 50 percent alert. The officers set up a TOC roster so that we would have some rest until action occurred. 2LT Freedman ensured the dog handlers going to the Long Binh Depot were fully briefed prior to their departure. They were to follow the defensive SOP instructions to fall back to fighting positions by the perimeter watchtowers of D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security) if a ground attack was launched against the ammunition depot perimeter. If the company’s remote detachments had to be resupplied, arrangements were made with the USARV air detachment helicopters on Long Binh Post.

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     SGT Sylvan Schrank our kennel master, made sure the dogs were ready for their tour of duty. With the remainder of the headquarters soldiers, we manned the water tower, several fighting positions facing the perimeter, and the TOC."   CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

The Communist Tet New Years Offensive
31 January

Editors Notes:    A major coordination mistake by Hanoi resulted in serious complications and losses for their troops as their nationwide attack began. Hanoi told its NVA commands to begin the "N-Day" attack on 31 January, their New Years Day. However, South Vietnam celebrated under a revised calendar of 30 January.

     Some of the NVA commands began their N-Day attacks on the 30th, while the others were waiting for the attacks to be launched on the 31st. This mistake provided the U.S. and ARVN troops an early warning and critical defensive response time. The mistake prevented many of the NVA troops from being in place in the center of all the major cities. In addition, their sapper teams were also left without the support of their second wave support battalions.

Exact Time Unknown, Tay Ninh Detachment An unidentified detachment handler’s K-9’s alerted to movement at the perimeter wire. The handler reconed by fire and one VC suspect fled through the wire. They conducted a sweep, found a blood trail and followed it towards the direction of the Cambodian border. Maps of the interior of the ammo depot were found during the subsequent perimeter search.


0130 hours (approximately), HQ Long Binh Detachment  1LT Seligman sent a runner to inform CPT Roberts that radio traffic had picked up and that some III and IV Corps locations were reporting incoming fire. CPT Roberts reported it to the TOC and from then on closely monitored the situation.

0310 hours,  II Field Force intelligence reports identified the enemy units assigned to attack and hold Bien Hoa City, and the Long Binh Post Complex as elements of the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division, the 274th and 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiments and combined Artillery Group, and the U-1 Local Force VC Battalion supported by other local force VC elements organic to the area. Their mission was to target the Bien Hoa National Police Station, the ARVN Ho Nai POW Camp where approximately 2,000 VC prisoners were held, Bien Hoa Air Force Base, HQ II Field Force and III Corps HQ compound, and destruction of the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot on Long Binh Post.

0315 hours,  The attack against Long Binh Post was directed at its northwest corner, and began with a heavy rocket and mortar barrage followed by  a ground assault at the Headquarters of II Field Force, and progressed from there.

0345 hours, Long Binh Detachment  The 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot reported they were under mortar attack followed by an undetermined number of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) into the northeast sector of the perimeter in the vicinity of Watchtower #13. It was the prelude to a sapper attack.

0443 hours,  Enemy forces and perimeter guards were engaged in a fire-fight inside the Ammunition Supply Depot.

Personal Reflection  "2LT Freedman immediately requested to enter the depot to search for his men. We discussed how we could do this. We looked at our resources for night operations and identified the ability of the enemy to ambush any rescue column. It was determined that our soldiers would follow their battle drill orders and would have moved to the perimeter fighting positions by the watchtowers supported by D Company, 87th Infantry subordinate to the 95th MP Battalion, 18th MP Brigade. These soldiers manned the towers that were equipped with 7.62 mm machine guns. Our handler teams did as we thought."   CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

     PFC Gordon Leroy Currier, age 22 of Independence, Missouri, and his K9 partner Satch (M164) of the Long Binh Detachment were Killed In Action at the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot.

     This early morning PFC Currier would face a K9 Handlers greatest concern when through the early morning darkness the enemy force found a gully to move their force to within assault distance of the perimeter. Fortune was with the enemy unit as the wind was blowing towards them preventing Satch from going on alert.

    They waited until their heavy mortar attack stopped, moved forward and penetrated the perimeter area of Tower #13 at his sector. During the mortar attack PFC Currier and Satch moved to a prepared fighting position to defend against the initial ground assault. Armed only with his M-16 rifle and a 45. caliber side arm they fought back until overwhelmed by an estimated 20-30 enemy soldiers. Both died from small arms fire.

     Enemy sapper teams who followed the ground assault that overran PFC Currier and Satch's position hid timed satchel charges on many of the ammunition pads. EOD Teams were able to locate and disarm most of the hidden charges before four of the 100 pads detonated at 0800 hours.

      PFC Currier was one of 250 U.S. Military personnel killed in Vietnam that day. His name is etched on the Vietnam Memorial Wall, Panel 36E - Line 4.

PFC Currier & Satch

     On 2 May the Currier family received a letter from Major General Kenneth G. Wickham, Adjuant General, Department Of The Army, offering them his sympathy in the loss of their son and notifying them that PFC Currier was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service, the Purple Heart Medal and the Good Conduct Medal.
     Once the initial assault at the 3rd Ordinance Ammo Supply Depot was defeated, at sun up CPT (COL Ret.) Thomas Roberts and 2LT Gary Freedman went in to recover the casualties and check for unexploded or timed satchel charges. They identified the remains of PFC Currier and Satch who were KIA in the attack. During the search they discovered and removed one charge and a second one exploded on a pad in the depot. They were knocked to the ground and their vehicle overturned. The search by EOD lasted for approximately 2 hours.
0600 hours,  It was reported by "Available-22" (720th MP Battalion Operations mobile element) that the enemy forces that overran the ammunition supply depot perimeter, were now headed in the direction of the 90th Replacement Battalion compound.
     Once the ground attack at the Ammo Supply Depot was turned, at sun up CPT Roberts, 2LT Gary Freedman and their driver SP/4 Danny Conyers went in to recover their casualties and check on the other handler teams. While there they also planned to look for unexploded or timed satchel charges. They identified the remains of PFC Currier and Satch, and discovered the enemy had taken PFC Currier’s weapons and ammunition.

Personal Reflection  “The Ordnance Depot Commander and I had only been at the tower for two-three minutes when we heard a muffled explosion from one of the pads. It was evident that the attacking party had placed charges and that the explosion was a failed ignition of a larger charge. I ordered 2LT Freedman to take charge of the location and extract the bodies of PFC Currier and Satch.

     The Ordnance Depot commander, SP/4 Conyers, and I raced up the hill where the pads were in neat alternate alignment on each side of a number of dirt roads. Our mission was to find and remove any explosive satchels found. Each pad was protected by a 10-12 foot berm surrounding the pad on three sides. SP/4 Conyers and I took one road while the battalion commander and his driver drove down another road.

     We entered a pad with multiple stacks of 155mm projectiles, dismounted and ran up and down the narrow paths between the stacks. Neither of us were able to see any charges. We then proceeded down the road to the next pad. About half way, there was a tremendous explosion behind us. Although we were protected by the high berm of the exploded pad from direct shrapnel, the shock wave hit our jeep and blew us off the road and near the back berm of a pad on the adjoining road. The driver’s side lifted off the ground and partly dumped us out. I grabbed SP/4 Conyers and pulled him out of the jeep. As we lay on the ground we were pelted by falling shards of metal. Almost immediately after hitting the ground, the pad we were next to suddenly exploded. All I could see was bright orange. Fortunately, it was a powder pad. Again, we were lucky in that the protecting berm forced the flames and energy upward.

     After the debris had stopped falling, Conyers and I climbed into our jeep, half expecting it to be non functional. Fortunately, Conyers got it started. The over-pressure had flattened all tires and we had body damage from the falling shrapnel. Fortune had protected us for I found a five-inch metal shard in the middle of my seat that would have hit me if I had remained there. Because pads were still exploding we drove down to a culvert, dismounted and got under cover. During the next 10-20 minutes, I counted eleven major explosions. Once the explosions stopped, we waited five more minutes then drove to the entrance of the depot where the Ordnance Battalion Commander was located. We had transited the depot from north to south without encountering any of the enemy. 2LT Freedman was with the depot commander waiting for authorization to move around the perimeter with a two-and-a-half ton truck to pick up his handlers and their dogs. After making a report to the depot commander and getting an updated report from our TOC, we headed back to Long Binh Post and a cleanup at the medical clinic.

     We then returned to the company by way of the 95th MP Battalion and the 89th MP Group. There, I gave my report to the respective operations officers.

     1LT Arnie Seligman had ably been running the company operations during my absence. He gave me the nationwide situation and reviewed the status of our detachments. All had come through well, although, several were short ammunition and food for our working dogs. He and I discussed resupply if convoys could not immediately reconnect with those garrisons. He immediately went to work to initiate aerial resupply protocols.” CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

Personal Reflection  “As I recall, about 1330 hours I received a telephone call from COL Frank Payne, the 89th MP Group Commander. He issued a verbal operations order that indicated that I should report to the International Compound in Saigon, temporarily take command of the divergent security elements that were securing Ambassador Bunker, and secure that portion of the compound that was Ambassador Bunker’s residence. I was to report back when the Ambassador’s compound was secure

     I selected SGT Smith of the 1st Platoon and two scout dog handlers SP/4’s Roger W. Fauver and Jim Kelly and their dogs (rather than sentry dogs) and several other military policemen for sweeps of areas around the Ambassador’s home. I briefed 1LT Seligman, 2LT Freedman and the selected soldiers about the mission.

     SP/4 Conyers had refurbished our vehicle as best he could after we returned (Danny throughout his service as my driver was always prepared for our trips and ensured we were ready to go.) So, we moved out after getting Highway-1A road movement permission from the Provost Marshal. On the trip down, I noticed that the South Vietnamese Army had secured the road. There was very little, if any, damage to the villages along the route.

     As we entered Saigon proper, we were immersed in the destruction of the ongoing battle. As we drove from the port to the downtown area, we noticed that the ARVN and U.S. troops were in the last phase of mopping up any remnants of enemy that had survived the night’s urban warfare.

     The International Compound was located several blocks from the U.S. Embassy. Within the compound resided a large number of members of the diplomatic community. For the most part, a ten-foot high wall with gated vehicle entryways that allowed backdoor deliveries and secure parking surrounded the exterior of the multi-block compound.

     About mid afternoon, we entered the compound through a street entrance and turned into a dead-end street. The Ambassador’s two-story residence was at the end of the street on the right hand side. The house was modest with a small, well-manicured lawn in front where we parked our vehicles. The Diplomatic Security Service regional security officer, Leo Cramsey came out to meet us. We then went inside to discuss the security situation. He gave me a rundown on the events surrounding the Embassy fighting. The Embassy was secured. The area around the International Compound was more problematical. There was a city block sized cemetery across the street from the entryway that had not been secured. Otherwise the compound had not been harmed.

      Ambassador Bunker arrived as RSO Cramsey was finishing his briefing. After introductions, he placed the entire house at my disposal. I then established my command post in his living room with the promise that we would remain only as long as necessary. Our scout dogs remained outside on the front lawn. The Ambassador instructed his kitchen staff to feed our soldiers.

      RSO Cramsey had cobbled together an unusual security force. There were a number of U.S. Marines, a squad of 101st Airborne Division troopers who were led by a second lieutenant who had been in-country one day (this group came by way of a helicopter trip to the top of the embassy). They had arrived after the fighting had ceased around the embassy and our portion of the city. An U.S. Agency for International Development police advisor was present with him.

      Of immediate concern was the brick and stucco walled cemetery across the street from the Ambassador’s house. It had not been swept since the VC had initiated their attack on the city. The entrance to the cemetery was about fifty yards down the street from the rear gate.

      We began the sweep of the cemetery with the scout dogs at 0100 hours on 1 February and concluded after two passes before returning to the Ambassador’s residence and set up a perimeter. The hours passed uneventful. In the morning reports came in that our portion of the city was secure. I waited until later in the morning to ensure that Ambassador Bunker’s home was safe. With assurances that it was, I radioed the 89th MP Group’s operations center with my security estimate. Colonel Payne issued orders that we could return to Long Binh Post, and elements of the 716th MP Battalion would be responsible for area security around the residence. Our return trip was uneventful. Military vehicles were the only occupants of Highway-1A.”  CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

Personal Reflection  "During the Tet Offensive of 1968 SP/4 Jim Kelly and I went to Saigon to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunkers home. I worked with a platoon from the 101st. Airborne Division clearing an old French cemetery adjacent to Bunkers home. Our dogs were not allowed in the house, so I spent my nights sleeping with "Prince" in the courtyard when we weren’t on patrol." SP/4 Roger W. Fauver, 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog), Scout Dog Unit, 95th MP Battalion, 1967-1968.
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lf you participated in this Saigon detail, please contact the History Project Manager via the Email Link provided at the top of this page.
February
1 February
Personal Reflection, HQ Long Binh Detachment  "After returning from Saigon, 1LT Seligman and I reviewed our situation. All six detachments of the three platoons had reported in. The only casualties were associated with the Long Binh ammunition depot.
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Vinh Long Detachment  The Vinh Long Detachment had been in the midst of the battle for the airfield. Our handler teams went into defensive positions around the dog kennel (which was on the perimeter) and had to depend on the airfield for ammunition resupply. The sergeant-in-charge indicated that he needed hand-held slap flares as the garrison had expended their entire basic load.
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Tay Ninh Detachment The Tay Ninh Detachment had also been involved in the fight for the base camp. However, that detachment sergeant indicated that his soldiers were in good shape.
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Soc Trang Detachment The Soc Trang Detachment had no contact and contented themselves by watching the armed helicopters from the base seek out the VC in the firefights in the surrounding countryside.
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Bearcat & Vung Tau Detachments  The Bearcat and Vung Tau Detachment’s were 100 percent battle ready. But, they had no contact."  CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.
Exact Time Unknown, Tay Ninh Detachment An unidentified detachment handler’s K-9’s alerted to movement at the perimeter wire. The handler reconed by fire and one VC suspect fled through the wire. They conducted a sweep, found a blood trail and followed it towards the direction of the Cambodian border. Maps of the interior of the ammo depot were found during the subsequent perimeter search. It appeared the intruder was finishing up the maps for a future attack on the depot.
2 February

Vinh Long Detachment, Personal Reflection  “We were able to secure a helicopter from the USARV aviation detachment for a re-supply flight to Vinh Long. When I arrived at the heliport, the aircraft was waiting. We secured our supplies inside the cabin, took off, and headed southwest into the delta. As we passed Saigon, we could see the smoke rising from the fighting still raging west of the city.

     The flight was about forty-five minutes. We landed without incident and the pilot, CPT Montgomery Price, parked the aircraft near Ambassador Bunker’s C-47. He was visiting the provinces to determine the status of the government’s capability to continue governance.

     While CPT Price checked in at airfield operations, several of our handlers unloaded the supplies while the detachment sergeant and I visited the others. They briefed me on the attack and their response. I was pretty proud of their actions. They had held a piece of the perimeter that was critical. The VC attacked through the wire at the far end of the runway and seized a number of the perimeter bunkers lining it before being driven off.

     CPT Price came over and indicated that we had limited minutes on the ground. Operations had notified him that they were expecting another attack. We took off and headed northeast. We settled down to another uneventful flight using the black smoke plume that identified the western part of Saigon as our guide.

      We went back to our normal security duties knowing that we had seen combat and were better for it. During the next six months, the VC tried a number of times to penetrate our detachment perimeters. Our dogs always alerted and we were able to cause the penetrations to fail. With the exception of the unfortunate attack at Long Binh depot, the deployed company teams never allowed a penetration of their posts. In the tradition of the Military Police Corps, every man and dog did his duty to his utmost.” CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

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3rd Change of Command Structure

10 February, HQ Long Binh Detachment  The company with a total strength of 218 personnel was detached from operational control of the 18th MP Brigade and the 95th MP Battalion (administrative) and attached subordinate to the 720th MP Battalion for administrative and logistical support with the 89th MP Group tasked with operational control.

     The 95th was an “Army cellular” battalion headquarters detachment, had no organic letter companies, only numbered detachment, platoon or companies and assigned the responsibility of operational control of its service support military police subordinate units in and around Long Binh Post.

95th MP
Battalion
     The 720th was an “Army level” battalion headquarters detachment with three organic companies (Alpha, Bravo and Charlie) and assigned the operational responsibility of its subordinate units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone. With the reassignment of the 615th MP Company from the 720th to the 95th just after the Tet Offensive, it became available for the reassignment of the 212th. In addition, the company’s Scout Dog Unit was formed to deploy its handler teams in support of the 720th’s ambush and reconnaissance counter insurgency mission in its 22 square mile Tactical Area Of Responsibility along the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post.
720th MP
Battalion
15 February   The 18th MP Brigade issued a letter and attached addendum to Headquarters, USARV titled Lessons Learned During VC/NVA Tet Offensive. It advised USARV to add their 18 page special addendum (separate) to the Brigade’s quarterly report of Operations Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 February-30 April.
     The addendum covered many issues relative to military police operations of all types throughout its command. Of specific reference to the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog) mission, it offered a list of shortcomings and recommendations to upgrade the security of the 3rd Ordnance Battalion Ammunition Supply Depot, and by reference to dog handlers at other remote detachments. None of the shortcomings were found to be specific to the company headquarters or handler teams operations, and were directed towards the higher commands responsible for the facility security structure and operations.
Discussion:
     On 31 January 1968, a hostile force estimated to be a reinforced company conducted a rocket and ground attack on the [3rd Ordnance Battalion] Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. The force of the attack succeeded in penetrating three (3) concertina fences and overrunning at least two tower positions. After penetration was accomplished, hostile forces had clear access to the ammo dump. Charges were placed on at least three pads, which were detonated. The entire perimeter of the supply depot is based on the concept of surveillance rather that defensive type positions.
Lessons Learned:
a. Tower guards must have ample small arms ammunition available in their guard towers, and be equipped with hand grenades and anti-personnel devises to retard enemy penetrations. Indirect weapons fire is also required.
b. Normal towers do not afford guards any protection.
c. There is an urgent requirement for communications between all towers and the CP [Command Post].
d. Due to the size of the ammo supply depot, present tower locations are too far apart to provide mutual support for protection.
e. Also, some ammo storage pads are too close to the perimeter fences making them readily accessible to a hostile force.
Recommendation:
a. That tower guards be furnished a double basic load.
b. That tower guards be armed with M-79’s or 3 to 5 hand grenades in addition to their individual weapon.
c. That an anti-personnel minefield be placed inside the perimeter fence.
d. That tower guards be supplied with hand flares.
e. That pre-planned mortar and artillery fires be established.
f. That sector commanders conduct rehearsals during the hours of darkness to enable the force to become familiar with night operations.
g. That raised bunkers with sandbag protection be erected, thus allowing personnel to remain on post and vigilant regardless of incoming indirect fire.
h. That a communication system among and between towers and CP’s [command posts] be established.
i. That those storage pads located near the fence line be relocated to a more secure area.
     Problems encountered at the company’s remote detachments delt with availability of and the immediate access for resupply of rifle ammunition stocks at Dalat and Ban Me Thuot. The recommendation to correct the problem called for the stockpiling of double basic loads of ammunition for small remote detachments.
March
HQ Long Binh Detachment   The company strength was 214 personnel.

Exact Date Unknown, MACV   The 95th MP Battalion HQ Detachment prepared the required documentation to submit to higher headquarters making application for its first Meritorious Unit Commendation for the period of 1 January through 31 December 1967. The 212th was included with others in its list of subordinate units to receive the award. During the higher command review process the company, along with the 148th MP Platoon, were removed from the application on 14 May 1968 by the Adjutant Generals Office, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) because they had not met the Department of The Army requirements that subordinate units must have served with the submitting command agency for six months during the inclusive dates of 1 January through 31 December 1967 before becoming eligible for the award.

     Due to the company’s early command reassignments, recognition for its service during that period of eligibility would go unrecognized, and they would not receive their first and only Meritorious Unit Commendation until 22 November 1969 while serving with the 720th MP Battalion.

18 March  The following company personnel were awarded the Army Commendation Medal for Meritorious Service under 18th MP Brigade General Orders #214: SP/5’s Gilbert C. Beyer for service March 1967 to March 1968, and Floyd R. Bryan for service November 1966 to February 1968.

23 March, Long Binh Detachment At 2030 hours, a truck drove up to the gate between perimeter watchtowers #16 an #17 at the west side of the ammunition depot on Highway QL-15. The tower guards notified the security officer, 1LT Wactor and SGT Steinberg, the Duty NCO. Flares were fired and the truck departed. At approximately 2115 hours, the truck returned to the same gate, the guard notified the patrol, the security officer and duty NCO. The patrol ordered the truck to halt, the truck disregarded the commands. The patrol fired three rounds, the truck was not struck. At 2120 hours, the security officer arrived. Two MP jeeps arrived and took the truck to the Long Binh Post Provost Marshal Office. The shots were fired at the truck by PFC Harvey O. Shimko, US54818953, 212th MP Company. 89th MP Group was notified, SGT Bryant stated that the incident was cleared up, reporting that the contracted Vietnamese National truck driver was attempting to make a delivery from Saigon and became lost.

April

2 April-30 June 1968

The Mini-Tet or May Offensive

Editors Notes: During this period (5 May through 18 June) North Vietnamese Army, Main Force Viet Cong and local organic VC units initiated their planned second phase of the Tet New Years Offensive known to Vietnam era historians as the Mini-Tet or May Communist Offensive. The North Vietnamese government’s objective was to maintain constant pressure on Saigon in III Corps Tactical Zone, although scattered attacks were conducted across the country, particularly in the far northern costal region. Their goal was to inflict casualties on the South Vietnamese Government and people, and pursue a talk-fight strategy to influence their political capital at the commencement of the Paris peace talks.

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     There is also some speculation that after suffering their most severe military defeat during the war in the Tet New Years offensive, GEN Vo Nguyen Giap could have called off the second phase attacks because the element of surprise was now lost. Instead, he wanted to parlay the perceived victory granted to them by the leftist antiwar American media into further political propaganda gains without regard to the additional loss of thousands of dead and wounded among their ranks, which is what they suffered before the second phase of their offensive was over.

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     It should also be noted that the NVA Main Force VC military elements in III CTZ that survived the slaughter and retreated into the local countryside, provided the local organic VC units within the Battalion’s Tactical Area Of Responsibility and around Long Binh Post with improved armaments, ammunition and explosives to carry out small unit strikes and harassment against Allied units and infrastructure in the area while they once again took sanctuary in their bases across the Cambodian border.

HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 214 personnel.
May
May, HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 195 personnel.
 

5 May, at 0200 hours, Soc Trang Detachment The city received 25-30 mortar rounds. Detachment handler PFC David E. Reynolds, US51774856 was Injured suffering a cut hand.

June
June, HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 194 personnel.
 
Exact Date Unknown

Personal Reflection "Lady was a German Shepard pup that was taken to Vietnam by a crew member of an off shore oil rig. When told that he could not keep a dog on the rig, Lady was sent to the MP K9 company. I was told that she received the full scout dog training and was put into service as a scout dog (but never appeared on any official books). There were rumors that she was used to produce "pure bred" pups which were sold to various units. When it was learned that the dog company was selling dogs, the Inspector General was sent to investigate.

     As the IG’s helicopter was landing, Lady was taking off in another ship. I received a call from CPT Charles E. Hobbs of the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog) asking if I wanted a scout dog. By the time I said "yes", Lady was landing. Lady became part of the 615th and was transferred (with me) to Bien Hoa when I became Deputy Provost Marshal. Lady ended up saving my life twice and I had an opportunity to return the favor for her.

     I learned of a pending change that would prohibit any Army dog from leaving Nam (due to some infection found somewhere). I had her checked by our vet, and with the help of a member of our unit whose father worked for Pan Am, I had her shipped out of Nam and back to Michigan where she lived out her life in comfort." CPT Frederick W. Honerkamp, III, Commanding Officer, 615th MP Company, 95th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, June 1968-1969.
16 June, HQ Long Binh Detachment  1LT John A. Milligan, 2nd Platoon Leader was awarded the Air Medal for meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flights from October 1966-September 1967.
 

21 June The following company personnel were awarded the Good Conduct Medal for exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity under HQ 720th MP Battalion General Orders #21.

SP/4 Jake E. Ross, 10 August 1966 to 9 August 1968, SP/4 James L. Julian 15 September 1966 to 14 September 1968, SP/4 Gary W. Porter 3 August 1966 to 2 August 1968, SP/4 Roger Handley 2 August 1966 to 1 August 1968, SP/4 Eliberto Elizondo, Jr. 6 October 1966 to 5 October 1968.

July

1 July-1 November 1968

HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 182 personnel.
 

2 July The following company personnel received promotions to Sergeant (E5); Thomas R. Brun and Edward G. Cline.

August
HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 192 personnel.
September
HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 195 personnel.
 
2 September, HQ Long Binh Detachment The following company personnel were promoted under HQ 720th MP Battalion Special Orders Orders #201.  Promoted to Staff Sergeant: SGT Donald B. Hamilton, promoted to Sergeant: CPL’s James C. Dicks and Gary L. Hile, promoted to Specialist 5th Class: SP/4 Robert A. Livingston.
October
HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 193 personnel.
 
1 October, Long Binh Detachment At 0055 hours, PFC Falibenbach reported that Long Binh Post Bunker #548, Grid Coordinates [map location] YT 068052 received a burst of approximately seven to ten rounds of automatic weapons fire from one-hundred and fifty meters northeast of the bunker. Bunker personnel returned fire with unknown results, no injuries or damages were reported.
 
3 October, Scout Dog Detachment  At 1400 hours, a male Vietnamese National named Dao Van Lan, civilian from Long Binh Than Village, ID#161755, DOB 1927, was accidentally bitten by PFC Bobbie E. Graff's Scout Dog named “Princess” in the 720th MP Battalion Tactical Area of Responsibility.
     Mr. Lan received lacerations of the upper thigh and was taken to the 24th Evacuation Hospital for treatment. He was being detained in area during a routine check when he made a quick move, possibly out of fright, when the Scout Dog did the same and bit him. The Scout Dogs shot record was up to date. Mr. Lan was treated and released at 24th Evacuation Hospital by Doctor (MAJ) Clyde W. Wagner, 094534.
Personal Reflection “I remember some things about this, although I was not present when it happened. I wasn’t assigned to the Scout Dog section until the end of October 1968, but I knew Bob Graff, and heard him talk about it. His dog Princess was a smaller female, about 55 pounds, but she often just acted like she had a bad temper. She was pretty feisty, and very fast. I'm sure the old "Papasan" probably didn't do anything wrong, Princess probably scared him. Bob said the guy was screaming real loud, and there was a lot of blood. I think he was the owner of a large sampan that the 720th B Company Ambush Squad had stopped for a ride across the river, and that Princess bit him as she was starting to get onto the boat.” SP/4 Mel R. Steinhauer, 212th MP Company, Scout Dog Unit, July 1968-June 1969.
20 October, Scout Dog Unit SP/4 David Richards, of the Scout Dog Unit, was walking pointwith his K9 for a B Company, 720th MP Battalion ambush team in the village of An Hoa Hung, when he was wounded in the hand by small arms fire when the Viet Cong came out from behind a hooch in the dark triple canopy tree covered area near the Rack Ben Tributary. SP/4 Brownenberg of B Company was wounded in both legs. The VC melted back into the darkness. At daylight Ambush Squad-76 found about a dozen U.S. 7.62mm M-14 shell casings on the ground at the VC position.
Company Detachments during August through October
31 October
Detachment Locations
Posts
K9's
MP's
3rd Ordnance Ammunition Depot, Long Binh Post
19
93
112
Scout Dog Section, Long Binh Post
as required
6
6
Perimeter, Long Binh Post
2
4
4
Tay Ninh Ammunition Supply Depot
4
10
12
Long Than Airfield
10
18
21
Vung Tau Ammunition Depot
7
21
24
Soc Trang Airfield
5
11
15
Totals 47
163
194
November
HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 208 personnel.

2 November 1968-22 February 1969

December
December, HQ Long Binh Detachment The company strength was 172 personnel.
Exact Date Unknown, Scout Dog Unit Members of the company Scout Dog Unit were tasked to assisted the 92nd MP Battalion by working shifts at the Newport [Saigon] Docks to aid in night security for military cargo of a sensitive nature awaiting transportation. Patrol teams of one dog handler team with one MP from the 92nd walked patrols of the docks in specific areas during the evening hours.
5 December, HQ Long Binh Detachment  CSM Doyle of the 89th MP Group, escorted by 720th MP Battalion CSM Burton E. Morrow, spent the day visiting the Battalion units and facilities in the Long Binh Post area. The itinerary of the visit included: 1640 hours, a visit to the 212th MP Company compound where 1SG Jack Centers joined the escort.

Christmas Party At The Thu Duc Orphanage

18 December 1330 Hours, Members of the company hosted a Christmas Party for the 800 children of the Thu Duc National Orphanage. Approximate thirty MP’s from the company arrived with ice cream and goodies for the children, and enjoyed a joint entertainment program. The sleigh was an olive drab deuce-and-a-half truck and there were no reindeer, but it added up to Christmas just the same for the children.
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     The deuce-and-a-half filled with ice cream and “goodies", rolled through the orphanage gate at 1330 hours, beginning the party. Accompanying the truck were several other vehicles bringing thirty or more MP’s from the company to join the festivities.
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      The company, which recently adopted the orphanage, raised some $150.00 to fete the children. One hundred dollars was raised by contributions from the MP’s and $50.00 was sent by LTC (Retired) H. M. Witbeck of Rancho Cordova, California, who contributes annually to the orphanage.
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      Before the MP’s arrived, the sisters and teachers of the Catholic-run orphanage assembled the children into the large auditorium where they sat and waited for the MPI’s. The soldiers arrived shortly afterwards and passed out ice cream to the excited children.
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      The MP’s joined the orphans in watching theirband perform several American popular songs. Later, ten girls from the orphanage dressed in colorful costumes, and performed traditional Vietnamese dances.
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     Not to be left out, the MP's mounted the stage en masse and assembled into a choir formation. The men swung into an off-key rendition of “Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer.” Then, with a boy from the orphanage sitting in on drums, they sang a lusty, and still out of tune, “Jingle Bells.”
      Following the songs, the men distributed more candy and treats to the children.
  If you attended and can provide personal reflections and or photographs of the party, please notify the History Project Manager via the Email Link at the top of this page.
1968 Miscellaneous Photographs
A "?" following the photo number denotes further identifications are needed, and an Email Link is provided.
Personnel & Facilities
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