720th Military Police Battalion Vietnam History Project

The Tactical Area Of Responsibility
Last Updated ~ 30 October 2017
   Regardless of MOS if you recognize or participated in any of the events listed on this Timeline page and would like to contribute any information, personal stories, documents, media articles, photographs, or, if you can provide information on any events not listed, please take a moment to contact the History Project Manager at the Email Link provided above. Your contributions are important to the recording of the Battalion history and always welcomed here.
   Please take the time to report any broken links on this page to the Webmaster via the above Email Link.
    Send your photographs as .jpg via the Email Link at the top of this page. Scan them as large as you can, one to an Email and include as much information as you can. Direct any questions via the Email Link.
The first Military Police Battalion in the history of the United States Armed Forces to be assigned a counterinsurgency-pacification light infantry mission and command and operational control of infantry, armor, air, and artillery elements in support of Military Police ground forces.
Republic of South Vietnam ~ 11 September 1967 through 25 July 1970.
   The command and line units represented by the various patches displayed to the right and below supported the 720th MP Battalion and Bravo Company during its three year mission, and at times were directly instrumental in saving the lives of  the local villagers and MP's. For that we offer our sincere appreciation and are eternally grateful.
18th MP
89th MP
720th MP
(Mortar Pl)
25th Inf.
44th Med.
1st Inf.
11th AC
199th LI
9th Inf.
II Field

   The Battalion paid a steep price for their efforts during the three year mission. The Soldiers of The Gauntlet who worked in the TAOR earned a total of 2 Silver Stars, 18 Bronze Stars for Valor, 1 Army Commendation Medal for Valor, 16 Purple Hearts, and 1 Soldiers Medal. (This count is incomplete and based only on a limited supply of records. New information on additional awards continues to be discovered.) It is only fitting that before we tell the story of Operation STABILIZE, we first recognize our brother MPs who paid the ultimate sacrifice within the TAOR as this historic event was unfolding.

Alpha Co. 1967
Charlie Co. 1967
615th MP Co. 1967
Charlie Co. 1968
Charlie Co. 1968
Charlie Co. 1968
PFC Carter
SGT Walter
PFC Davis
SGT Lara
SFC Condon
SP/4 Lovell
Bravo Co. 1968
Bravo Co. 1969
Bravo Co. 1970
Bravo Co. 1970
Bravo Co. 1970
PFC Alicia
SSG Slaven
PFC Hemke
SP/4 Johnson
PFC McArthur
   This section is an just an overview to give you an understanding of how this unique mission came to be. Daily details of the various specialized units formed to carry out the operational plan are included in the pages of the Vietnam Era (September 1967-July 1970) Battalion Timeline, and can be found by looking for the notation "TAOR"  preceding each entree. To aid your Timeline visit to this section, specific Unit links, Timeline and incident page links have been provided to take you to the monthly page where you will find the additional details.
It all began with Operation MOOSE

  To reduce the command footprint in Saigon, sometime in early to mid 1967 GEN William C. Westmoreland Commanding General of the Military Assistance Command (MACV) initiated Operation MOOSE (Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiously). It required that the United States Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) Headquarters, Joint General Staff Headquarters and the 1st Logistics Command to move from Saigon to new facilities constructed on Long Binh Post.

   With USARV headquarters security in mind MACV decided it needed to eliminate the enemy close-in-strike capability that existed along the southern perimeter of the post where the headquarters building was located. MACV called on the 18th Military Police Brigade to handle the assignment under a Letter of Instructions, AVCG-O dated 9 October 1967.

   The 18th MP Brigade issued a Letter of Instructions (undated) to the 89th MP Groups, 720th MP Battalion to perform a pacification program within a designated 22 square mile Tactical Area Of Responsibility (TAOR). The counterinsurgency infantry mission which would involve enemy suppression and civil pacification of the four villages and surrounding countryside utilizing ambush & recon, river patrol & security, local level civil & military liaison (outpost duty) and civic action quality of life programs. The first year of the mission would involve all three organic companies of the Battalion and the 615th MP Company (subordinate).

    The mission became historically significant to the United States Army and the Military Police Corps because it was the first time in the history of the United States Armed Forces that a Military Police Battalion was tasked with an infantry counterinsurgency - pacification mission, and placed in direct operation control of infantry, air and artillery elements when called upon for assistance. The assignment was designated as Operation STABILIZE and would last from 11 September 1967 through 25 July 1970.

   The Battalion now had to balance their regular missions of enemy POW security & transport, detachment support, convoy and road clearing escort and post and highway security throughout III Corps Tactical Zone, with the staffing of a company sized counterinsurgency mission for which they could draw no logistical support due to their MP TO&E. Based on interviews of former logistical (S4) staff officers it is apparent that the 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group and 18th MP Brigade had to forage outside official Army regulations and channels to obtain many of the the necessary items.

The Tactical Area Of Responsibility

   The TAOR was previously under the operational control of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Camp Frenzel-Jones, northwest of Long Binh Post), followed by the 9th Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade HQ (Bearcat Base Highway QL-15), both subordinate to the II Field Force Command. Its northern border was Highway #317, separating it from the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post.

   The southern border was the Buong River that formed an intersection with the Dong Nai River (western border) referred to as "The Boot." The 9th Infantry Division was responsible for for operations in the entire area south of the Buong River, between the Dong Nai east to Highway QL-15.

     In 1968 when the 9th Infantry Division started moving its operations to the Mekong Delta, the Black Panther Division of the Royal Thi Army assumed operational control. The west side of the Dong Nai River was the 1st Infantry Division area of operations.

   The eastern border began at Gate-11 Long Binh Post south down Highway OL-15 towards Bearcat to the Buong River Bridge. Where Highway QL-15 crossed the river there was a Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) outpost that guarded the village of Phuoc Cang and the Highway QL-15 bridge over the river.

   There were also several major landmarks, bridges and Allied facilities located within the TAOR. Its topographical and geographical  layout was mostly high ground along its northern border that gently sloped south becoming tidal marshes fed by its three primary rivers.

   Besides an occasional U.S. Army or ARVN patrol passing through the area, the security of the TAOR was provided by the Vietnamese National Police (Can Sat) police station located in An Hoa Hung Village, and local Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) militia units located at each of the four village outpost's. All were under trained, under equipped, lacked quality cross communications and were poorly armed with an inadequate inventory of old surplus WWII small arms.

  In addition the local village and government infrastructure was old and insufficient, thus unable to improve the areas economic and security needs.

        The primary enemy units that exercised control in the Tactical Area Of Responsibility were the Long Hung and An Xuan Viet Cong Platoons, D445 Viet Cong Dong Nai Battalion, 274th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, 5th North Vietnamese Army Division, North Vietnamese Central Office for South Vietnam Command (COSVN).
NVA Flag
VC Flag
Planning & Preparation

   The counterinsurgency - pacification operation was primarily focused on destroying the local Viet Cong infrastructure and their close-in-strike capability against Long Binh Post facilities from the south. At the same time they were charged with ending the enemy's ability to operate freely within the TAOR while improving the economic and civil infrastructure, promoting quality of life and self sufficiency for the villagers, their civil government and local security forces.

    It was the ultimate challenge in military police work, and although there were many transitional blisters formed along the way, the Battalion was able to successfully adapt their traditional operational skills to the unique mission.

  The plan involved three primary operational phases. Phase-1, Operation CORRAL to clear and secure the TAOR; Phase-2, Operation STABILIZE to conduct counterinsurgency operations to eliminate guerilla activities and provide security screening; Phase-3, Vietnamization to return control of the TAOR to the local and national governments.

   As long as the Viet Cong infrastructure remained in place the civic action programs to improve the lives of the villagers and their confidence in their government would be doomed to failure and the lives of the MP's working in the TAOR placed in serious jeopardy.

   To prepare the Battalion for their new infantry mission selected members of the three organic companies, and the 615th MP Company (subordinate) were given crash training in ambush and reconnaissance tactics by A Company, 5th Special Forces Group, Camp-3, headquartered in Bien Hoa, III Corps Tactical Zone.
5th SF
Phase-I Operation CORRAL

11 September, The Battalion took the first step to accomplish that goal in the TAOR with a multiple force search and destroy cordon operation called Operation CORRAL.

   The 72 hour cordon and search operation of the four primary villages within the TAOR was conducted by the 720th MP Battalion, 615th MP Company, with assistance from: 2nd Battalion of the 39th Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; their 9th MP Company; Vietnamese National Police and their specialized branch of National Police Field Forces (NPFF); local village Regional Forces/Popular Forces militia; and the ARVN 15th Military Intelligence Detachment (Thu Duc) and U.S. Army 702nd Military Intelligence Detachment (Long Binh Post). All the primary villages within the TAOR were thoroughly cordoned off and searched.

   A large quantity of enemy logistical supplies were seized and over thirty suspects and sympathizers were captured forcing the enemy to move their once unmolested operational bases from the villages into the countryside. The valuable information gleaned from the captures allowed Battalion S2 shop (intelligence & security) to build a foundation for future successful counterinsurgency operations.

Phase-II Operation STABILIZE
Civic Action Program
Village Outpost Liaison
Ambush & Recon
River Patrol & Security

16 September Operation CORRAL came to an end and the Battalion immediately phased into Operation STABILIZE to maintain the momentum of surprise and disruption to the organic enemy operations.

Clearing the Finger of Land  Just several hundred yards (at its closest point) from the southeastern perimeter of Long Binh Post, was a heavily wooded ridge line that ran west for approximately 2 kilometers (2,000 meters) from Highway QL-15 towards the Rach Bien River called the Finger of Land. The local Viet Cong used the cover of the wooded ridge line to mortar the post and harass military traffic on a regular basis. To eliminate this threat the area was assigned for clearing.

        Elements of C Company, 46th Engineer Battalion, 20th Engineer Brigade, 159th Engineer Group supported by members of the 615th MP Company serving as equipment escort and site security, bulldozed the ridge of all vegetative cover and left only a narrow dirt roadway along half of the top that connected with Highway QL-15.

  The Civic Action Program (CAP) was staffed by HQ Detachment supported by the 89th MP Group and the 18th MP Brigade until the end of Operation SABILIZE in July 1970.

   The Village Outpost Liaison provided MPs to live work or live within each of the four village Popular Forces security outposts assigned as follows: A Company to Long Binh Tan, Outpost-4, operated as a 12 hour rotating shift assignment; B Company to Long Hung Outpost-2, and An Xuan Outpost-1, where the MPs lived within the outpost; C Company to An Hoa Hung, Outpost-3, operated as a rotating 12 hour shift assignment.

   The Ambush & Reconnaissance (original platoon) was formed jointly from all three organic companies and operated within the boundaries of the Dong Nai River (west) to Highway QL-15 (east). They were then restricted to a new eastern boundary of the Ben Go River when the 615th MP Company was assigned to the area east that included the land feature known as The Finger of Land. The 615th Area Of Operation (AO) was bordered by the Ben Go River (west) to Highway QL-15 (East) and Buong River (south).

   Later in 1967 the joint platoon concept was abandoned and each of the organic companies were assigned to their respective outpost areas of operation.

   River Patrol & Security was assigned to A Company who formed the original unit and built the dock, obtained the boat fleet and established the operational criteria. Later joined by a squad from C Company, then B Company to share operations until just before the Tet Offensive of January 1968, when the entire mission was assigned to B Company.



    In early January a survey conducted by Brigade on the rapid growth of allied units on Long Binh Post determined there was an immediate need for one dedicated MP Company to handle the security and discipline law and order mission. The 615th MP Company was chosen, permanently detached from the battalion and assigned subordinate to the 95th MP Battalion to work with the 179th Provost Marshal Detachment with jurisdiction in Bien Hoa and Long Binh Post.

The TET New Years Offensive   The main enemy attacks on Long Binh Post during the Tet Offensive were primarily concentrated to the northwest closer to Bien Hoa so their activity in and around the TAOR were primarily of a staging and transport nature.  None of the villages or Outpost's were molested, however, the local Viet Cong did benefit from the newly available supplies of food, weapons, explosives and well trained and experienced staff.

   The Battalion was now reduced to three letter companies, and throughout the first half of the year they focused on continued upgrading of security at the outpost's and planning numerous Civic Action Programs including the popular Medical Civic Action (MED-CAP) program. They also addressed programs to improve the village infrastructure including, water sources, sanitation, roadways and bridges. The roadway-bridge repairs and upgrades were focused on improving the access to local and regional markets to improve commerce in the TAOR, as well as improving the Battalion's logistical support capabilities.

   The four principle villages within the TAOR, in order of size and population were, An Hoa Hung, Long Binh Tan, Long Hung, and An Xuan. Their four existing Popular Forces village outpost were jointly staffed with MP's and structurally improved for added security. The added MP manpower, firepower, and communications enhancement greatly improved the security of the villages and limited the daily enemy influence on the populace and economic infrastructure. The MPs and PF's at the outpost's provided a ready reaction force within the TAOR when needed.


   Battalion assisted by Group and Brigade began Civic Action Program assessments, evaluated, prioritized and coordinated with the local village and district government to improve the quality of life and educational needs of the villages. The CAP projects strengthened the status and influence of the South Vietnamese government, both local and national. Motorized jeep patrols by C Company provided a daily emergency service to the local villagers and act as a constant reminder of the new area security.

   The ambush patrols supported by the River Patrol Unit went into the surrounding countryside and waterways hunting the local Viet Cong. The constant pressure of the joint patrols limited the Viet Cong ability to transport weapons and personnel, collect war taxes,and conduct any large scale harassment against the village governments within the TAOR.

   The 89th MP Group also expanded the function of the 212th MP Company Sentry Dog (subordinate to 89th MP Group- operations, 720th MP Battalion- administration-logistical) mission from that of a physical security Sentry Dog mission to adding a Scout Dog Unit to their Long Binh Post detachment to assist the 720th Ambush and Recon Patrols in the field.


   During each phase of the plan the local VC pushed back trying to maintain their control through fear and intimidation. Their attacks were met and suppressed,and their disruptions and destruction mitigated and repaired. Along the way the pressure applied by the Outpost's Liaisons, Ambush & River Patrol assets continued to shut down their base camps, way stations, forced recruitment and war tax collection programs.

   Battalion S3 (operations) learned quickly that the joint staffing of the mission assignments by all four companies resulted in ineffective coordination of small scale operations, intelligence and communications. A communications mistake also resulted in three wounded MPs due to"friendly fire" when S3 changed the operational mission of two ambush teams conducting a sweep in the field without proper notification of one, resulting in their meeting in the dark outside An Xuan Village.

   The Viet Cong also noted the routines being established by the separate companies and immediately took advantage of the predictable daily night staffing changes at Outpost-4 in Long Binh Tan and Outpost-3 in An Hoa Hung and the construction traffic for the new Friendship Bridge outside An Xuan. They launched several small scale ambushes and conducted land mine placements. Their ambushes and land mines resulted in casualties, weapons losses and several vehicle destructions.

   Even with the operational problems in the first half of the year the Battalion mission had many successes and their TAOR operations were gaining ground in winning the loyalty of the majority of the villagers. As a result of the improved security and progress of Civic Action programs, intelligence from villagers and major land owners on the identity of local VC and their activities within the TAOR increased.

Operational Consolidation

26 June Battalion consolidated all A & C Company outpost's and operations tasking them to B Company who now had sole responsibility for the mission and security of the TAOR. The personnel from A & C Companies that were dedicated for the mission were now reassigned to other organic Battalion missions, and would be available for reaction team support for B Company. Enemy attacks and MP casualties quickly dropped with the new coordination.

    Before the end of the summer season the new "Friendship Bridge" connecting Ax Xuan Village to Long hung was completed becoming the jewel of the Civic Action plan and a great embarrassment to the local Viet Cong. One enemy attempt to destroy the bridge during construction was thwarted by an MP security team who killed one attacker.

    During the months of October, November and December enemy activity across the Buong River began to intensify and their incursions in the eastern half of the TAOR increased. The B Company ambush teams focused operations in the area and were successful in killing several of the enemy, destroying a way station, sampans and seizing valuable intelligence information on a major upcoming offensive being planned against Long Binh Post for the Tet Holiday in 1969.



   Evidence of enemy activity within the eastern half of the TAOR continued and B Company ambush teams maintained pressure disrupting their scouting parties, killing several in ambush operations and destroying additional sampans and several way stations. During the same period a local VC leader who held legendary status among the villagers was killed in an ambush outside An Xuan Village and another was captured on the Dong Nai River by a combined River Patrol and ARVM Military Intelligence checkpoint. Where needed to assist and act as standby support, Battalion continued to receive operational control of several local U.S. infantry combat arms units.

   The River Patrol docks under the Dong Nai Bridge were relinquished to the local PF bridge security unit as the 458th U.S. Army Transportation Company (PBR) provided a maintenance and Operations barge to replace it. The barge was anchored south of the bridge, and the boats were now docked on it. The crews were transported to the barge by boat from the Old French Pier at Cogido.

   Intelligence on the major offensive planned against the post through the TAOR continued to mount, and II Field Force began planning to counter it. Rather than initiate a preemptive ground offensive against the enemy stronghold in the Thai Army area west of Bearcat and south of the TAOR, it appears the plan was to allow the enemy access to the TAOR and strike with massive air and artillery once they were trapped between the post perimeter and the Buong River, in the open and vulnerable.


The Post TET New Years Offensive  II Field Forces alerted the Battalion to the date of the attack and plans were formulated to repress it. II Field Force positioned the bulk of its local organic Infantry and armored units, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse), in positions in which the 1968 Tet Offensive attack was launched, to the north and west of Long Binh Post, leaving the security for the southern perimeter of the post to B Company.

22 February B Company strengthened all four outpost's and River Patrols, four of its five Ambush Squads, and alerted A & C Company to place their Reaction Teams on standby. Battalion acquired a platoon of C Company, 5th Battalion, 199th Light Infantry Brigade (waterborne), and assigned it to security at the Dong Nai River Bridge with its landing craft.

   Four of the five B Company ambush teams were given missions to disrupt the enemy ground attack along the eastern end of the TAOR, the fifth, Squad-75 was held on post in reserve. Squad-76 was sent to Hill-15 in the most remote part of the TAOR, Squads 74, 77 & 78 were assigned to separate positions along the crest of the Finger Of Land.

23rd of February, 0200 Hours A Battalion of the 274th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, 5th NVA Division launched their attack through the TAOR. It began with 122 mm rocket and heavy mortar attack fired from south of the Buong River, and followed by sapper team and ground assaults on Gates 10 & 11. The ambush squads were at first surprised by the intensity of the attack but soon settled down to their missions. Squad 76 directed counter fire suppressing the enemy rocket and mortar sites. The squads along the Finger were instrumental in disrupting enemy travel to reinforce the initial thrust that was being repulsed along the perimeter, identified targets and assisted in directing massive air and artillery response on the enemy ground units observed moving through their area.

   By the next morning the enemy attack was crushed and and sweep operations were launched along Highway 317 and the Finger Of Land. Held in reserve through the night, Ambush Squad-75 was sent to the area of Gate-10 where the were surprised by an entrenched platoon of well armed enemy hidden along a small hill next to a Buddhist Monastery. The point man was severely wounded when the ambush was sprung,and thee others were wounded in the successful fight to recover him. Four Sherman tanks from B Troop of the 11th Armored Cavalry arrived to assist, and were stopped by the accurate onslaught of heavy machinegun fire, grenades and RPG's. Cobra gunship's arrived and finally cleared the trench. The clean up operation found 31 enemy dead.

   On Hill-15 Squad-76 who spent the night under continuous sniper fire by enemy elements on Little Hill-38 across the Buong River to their south and in the wood lines to the north and east of their position, were reinforced by the platoon of infantry from C Company, 199th Light Infantry Brigade who responded from their security detail at Dong Nai River Bridge. The squad who were out of M-60 ammunition replenished their supply as the infantry platoon conducted a sweep around the base of the hill. During the sweep an RPG fired from Hill-38 missed the landing craft by only a few feet wounding one of the crewmen. Further fire was ended by the crafts 50 cal. machinegun and the M-60 of Squad-76. The platoon supported by the MP squad started a sweep from the hill north towards the Ben Go River. Along the way they killed and captured several enemy troops.Two MPs and the Scout Dog were extracted by a Dust Off due to heat stroke and dehydration.

   On the Finger Of Land another Troop from the 11th Cavalry spearheaded a sweep from Gate-11 towards the Buddhist Monastery. Ambush teams 74, 77, & 78 who spent the night on the land mass were consolidated and lead by CPT Jimmy Rich their Company Commander, joined the the sweep supporting the armored spearhead. Small pockets of enemy resistance were met along the way resulting in the capture of several wounded POW's and another large body count. One cavalry trooper was wounded in the sweep operation.

   At the conclusion of the sweeps a total of 131 enemy dead and their weapons were removed from the field. The enemy positions were cleared, and the Battalion reaction force supported by an infantry company and elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry set up a defensive perimeter along the northeastern perimeter of the TAOR. B Company elements were kept on post to rest and resupply.

    The night of the 24th Ambush Squad-76 was again assigned to secure Hill-15 and set up an observation post. When they were dropped off by boat north of the hill they came under immediate enemy mortar fire. The Viet Cong mortar fired two volleys of three rounds at the squad before they identified its location as on the top of Hill-15. A mortar team of the 1st Infantry Division positioned on the western end of the Finger Of land returned fire silencing the enemy tube. Squad-76, who suffered no wounded from the attack, were withdrawn and repositioned in a rice mill further north until daylight when the were sent back to search the hill.


   With the enemy attack suppressed II Field Force had Battalion further strengthened the local village outpost's. B Company began concentrating on the unpopulated eastern sector of the TAOR with increased ambush, reconnaissance and screening patrols to prevent further rocket and mortar attacks on Long Binh Post. The bulk of the NVA Main Force troops were gone, but their sapper and artillery units remained to launch a harassment campaign against ARVN and U.S. facilities to disrupt the Civic Action and Vietnamization Programs.

   As the year progressed a Battalion defoliation Program of the Buong River and its streams was completed, and B Company constructed an outpost on Hill-15 and a strong-point on the crest of the Finger Of Land.

Phase-III Vietnamization

   Brigade replaced all B Company Popular Forces Scout-Interpreters with better trained ARVN's, gaining professionalism but loosing the valuable local knowledge and intelligence contacts the PF's were able to provide. Along with the change, the outpost liaison mission was also gradually terminated returning village security exclusively to the PF's and National Police.

  As the year progressed the Intensified Vietnamization program was initiated and the counterinsurgency mission began to change to offensive screening operations, the outpost on Hill-15 and The strong-point on the Finger Of Land were closed down and destroyed to provide the needed manpower.



  As the year progressed the Intensified Vietnamization Program took precedence, and the screening operations of B Company became paramount. The Thai Army was finally conducting offensive operations against the NVA Main Force units staging and operating south of the Buong River. It was a welcomed change from 1969, however, it presented a new problem for the B Company ambush platoon. More often than not as the Thais pushed enemy units out of their AO, they often became engaged in fire fights along the river without having proper cross communications with B Company TOC. The biggest problem was the language barrier that often resulted in indiscriminate shooting into the location of B Company elements operating north of the river.

   Operations were also changing on the Dong Nai River with the mission control of the 458th PBR's being strictly reigned in by the Harbor Command in Bien Hoa. The B Company Boston Whalers were still under daily operational control of B Company TOC.

  Although the NVA Main Force artillery and sapper units operating south of the Buong River made many attempts to infiltrate and set up operations within the TAOR, B Company ambush operations were successful in shutting them down and destroying their assets before any rockets or mortars could be fired onto Long Binh Post.

Mission Change

  With Brigade units also being attritioned by the Vietnamization Program, they began searching for active MP assets they could deploy to insure proper discipline, law and order as well as security and convoy escort coverage in all four Corps Tactical Zones. Their manpower needs were now critical and they needed an MP company to send north into I CTZ to replace the Marine MP's that were sent home, and B Company was selected for mission change.

26 July Brigade terminated Operation STABILIZE turning the TAOR security mission over to operational control of the ARVN's supported by elements of the 25th Infantry Division now headquartered at Bearcat.

   B Company was merged with the 188th MP Company in Vinh Long, IV CTZ Mekong Delta, both companies were reflagged with the 188th being sent north and B Company sent south.

   Under the 720th MP Battalion the successful combined counterinsurgency and pacification program that was part of Operation STABILIZE for three years would be totally forgotten by MP historians, yet instrumental in changing the course of Military Police Corps history, training, and future missions for the next four decades.

Use Your Browser Button To Return