~ 720th Military Police Battalion Vietnam History Project ~
January 1967 ~ Battalion Timeline
  Regardless of MOS if you recognize or participated in any of the events listed on this Timeline page and would like to contribute any information, personal stories, documents, old orders, media articles, photographs, or, if you can provide information on any events not listed, please take a moment to contact the History Project Manager (Tom Watson) at the Email Link provided below. Your contributions are important to the recording of your personal service, the Battalion history and are always welcomed here.
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Last Updated
24 October 2017
18th MP
Brigade
89th MP
Group
720th MP
Battalion
      All major theater activities, stateside incidents, or Cold War and Vietnam War events that affected the 720th MP Battalion’s force allocations, training, operations, deployments, morale or history are shown in Italic blue American Typewriter font.
At the start of the year Battalion HQ Detachment, its organic letter companies and the 615th MP Company were headquartered subordinate to the 18th MP Brigade, 89th MP Group, III Corps Tactical Zone, Bien Hoa Provence, Long Binh Post,  South Vietnam.
The average Battalion strength for the month was 630 enlisted men, 4 warrant officers and 23 officers.
Headquarters, 720th MP Battalion, Long Binh Post, Bien Hoa Province, III Corps Tactical Zone, Vietnam in 1967. Courtesy of SP/4 Gregory M. Sango, C Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, September 1967-September 1968.
Operation MOOSE

     In early 1967 General William C. Westmoreland (theatre commander) began a campaign to reduce materially the U.S. troop presence in major cities-especially Saigon. Under the direction of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) J4 Section, a program with the code name MOOSE (Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiously) was established.

    Under Operation MOOSE most of the major U.S. commands would eventually be relocated within the footprint of the rapidly expanding Long Binh Post cantonment in III Corps tactical Zone, Bien Hoa Province.
USARV
2 January
Civilian POW's Monahan & Scales Released By VC

     In the morning, SP/4 Gary Watts of A Company was assigned as the driver for the shift Patrol Supervisor. It was a duty he liked, being around all the action and without responsibility for any of the paper work. When the call came over the radio for the Patrol Super to drop him off at a ward of the 93rd Evacuation Hospital for assignment as a Guard, he figured his day was quickly going to hell. The guarding of wounded enemy POW’s had become a routine duty for the troops, and with major search and destroy operations being launched on a continuous basis there were plenty of POW’s in the system to go around. As assignments went, guard duties at the two evacuation hospitals on Long Binh Post were tedious and boring.

The only benefits for the long twelve hour shifts were access to good chow, air conditioned wards, and being around the American nurses, and not necessarily in that order depending on how much time you had in-country. This day SP/4 Watts assignment would take on a completely new and special reason, one that quickly overcame the usual disappointment associated with the detail.
SP/4 Watts
     “I was shown to my station outside the ward, and my orders were: “To allow only hospital personnel through the door. No one else was authorized to enter the building.” That was it, no other orders or information. Only a few hospital personnel were coming and going into the ward. Later in the morning three men in civilian clothes with cameras hung around their necks approached me but stopped short and sat on the sand bagged wall about forty feet away. Over the next half hour or so, others started to gather with them. I decided to station myself inside the door to avoid attracting attention. Once inside I became curious about who or what I was guarding. I was in a semi reception room, beyond it were curtains drawn across another door, and inside of that was a partition.

     The doctors and nurses were going in and out of the partition area. I looked over the partition and saw two emaciated men in hospital gowns. They both appeared to be in their forties. They saw me, said hi, and I returned the greeting. I asked how they were doing, they replied, “real well.” I told them if there was anything they needed to let me know. One of them said, “We’d like big bowls of ice cream with lots of fruit.” I told them I would take care of it. I knew the Mess Sergeant at the hospital and called him, he personally brought two large mixing bowls of ice cream with fruit to the ward. By then rumors had already spread that there were two Americans in the hospital who had just been released by the Viet Cong. The Mess Sergeant knew about them, and that’s when I learned who they were. They dug in and had the bowls empty in no time. I probably should have checked with the Doctor, but no one seemed to mind. They were famished and eating.

     The only time I had to enforce the off-limits orders was when an American who said he was from the U.S. Embassy wanted access. He never showed me any identification, wasn’t dressed to fit his story, and I informed him that unless otherwise ordered, I wasn’t going to let him in. He became belligerent and demanded access. He used the telephone and called someone complaining about my orders, then hung up the phone and said he’d be back. I never saw him again.

    I spent some time talking with them; their names were Robert Monahan and Thomas Scales, civilians working for Pacific Architects & Engineers [PA&E] under government contract. They were captured eight months before at a VC roadblock just outside of Xuan Loc in May of 1966. Upon capture the VC stripped them of their boots and they were never allowed any shoes, socks, or sandals for their feet since then. They had a hard time walking. Their feet looked like raw hamburger, not bleeding, but really in bad shape. They said the VC had been rough on them in the beginning. They were construction foremen, the VC accused them of working for the CIA so they were beaten and interrogated. I spent the rest of my shift talking with them, and again the next morning when I returned. They enjoyed the friendly interaction and special attention.

     On the second day they were debriefed by Military Intelligence, had a visit with PA&E executives, followed by a press conference. I was allowed to stay in the room during the debriefing. I was impressed with the information the two provided. During their ordeal they were held in a local VC camp north of Xuan Loc. From a map they pointed out where they were captured, how far they traveled, and in what direction.

     They told of other POW’s, a Philippine woman who was released with them whose husband, an Australian citizen, died of illness in captivity. There was another American, whose name I don’t remember, and other POW’s in the camp they were allowed no contact with. They told of a day they were suddenly moved from the camp, and the next day they could hear bombs from B-52’s striking the area they moved from. They told about how at Christmas (1966) they decided to act as if they had become crazy. They sang Christmas carols, ate dirt, and acted disoriented. They suspected it might have contributed to their eventual release.
SP/4 Watts & POW's Monohan and Scales

     After the debriefing the PA&E executives came in, took pictures, and talked with them about their return home. They were scheduled to depart the next day. PA&E arranged for a news conference at the hospital meeting room. It was amazing; there must have been fifty or more reporters. As we approached the door the news people were walking backwards and taking photos. One even tripped falling over backwards, got up and kept taking pictures. The crowd parted to allow us into the entrance. The conference room was full of reporters and motion picture cameras. It was an incredible site to me. They had a table for Monahan and Scales to sit while they answered questions. I stood behind them being squeezed by officers trying to get in the view of the cameras. One of the questions that stuck in my mind all these years was the question of them returning to work in Vietnam. One of the PA&E execs said they’d be back after a month of R&R in the States. I knew better because they told me of their fear of the VC, they made no bones about it- they were never coming back. The next day they left for the States, and I was assigned to the Tay Ninh convoy, back into the grind.”  SP/4 Gary C. Watts, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, September 1966-1967.
Prelude To Operation CEDAR FALLS

     The Battalion was assigned the responsibility of securing and escorting resupply convoys from Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside of Saigon to the Tay Ninh Base Camp of the 25th Infantry Division to support the ongoing major offensive operations in the area. The Battalion committed a platoon of 27 MPs and 9 gun jeeps of A Company on the first run.

     With the addition of the A Company MPs on the Tay Ninh Convoy escort detail the 25th Infantry Division and 196th Light Infantry Brigade were able to free up one armored cavalry platoon for other combat missions under Operation CEDAR FALLS. They were also able to reduced their mileage of Armored Personnel Carriers within the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry by approximately 25% during the period.
25th
Infantry Division
196th Infantry
Brigade

     The 25th Infantry Division Commander was so appreciative for the assistance he directed a letter of appreciation on 21 January to the Commanding Officer of the 18th MP Brigade praising the MP convoy escort operations.

     The MP escorts were instrumental in the increased efficiency of convoy movement to their numerous base camps during the initial phases of Operation CEDAR FALLS, a reduction in traffic disruption and vehicle crashes, greatly enhancing the division civic action program.
3 January
Operation DECKHOUSE-V

Vung Tau  Due to increasing concerns of deteriorating security in the ARVN controlled CTZ IV, GEN Westmoreland began developing a plan as early as 1966 to expand U.S. assistance in the area from just MACV advisory to direct U.S. tactical combat operations with the reassignment of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade from Corps Tactical Zone III to CTZ IV. As part of the planning MACV initiated trial amphibious operations, and the first was named Operation DECKHOUSE-V.

     One platoon of MPs from A Company commanded by 1LT Gordon L. Locke were committed in support of the 2-24 January clearing operation conducted by U.S. Marine Corps and ARVN (Army of The Republic of South Vietnam) elements consisting of the 3rd, 4th, 6th Battalions.

      Their primary mission was to construct a POW cage at Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy Province, escort and secure POW's from the area of operations to the POW cage at Vung Tau, process POW's, and escort them from Vung Tau to the ARVN III Corps POW facility at Bien Hoa (Ho Nai).

     The ARVN forces made amphibious and heliborne landings in the longtime Communist sanctuary of Than Phomg, on Thanh Phu Island just south of My Tho in Go Cong Province, a sparsely populated coastal area in the CTZ IV eastern delta southwest of Vung Tau along the South China Sea.

     Their goal was to seek out and eliminate the VC infrastructure of cottage level military factories, logistic dumps, and garrisons hidden within the islands numerous canals and jungle swamps. Due to a weather and rough-sea related delay in the landings, it’s believed the VC became alerted to the amphibious forces, and fled the area avoiding direct contact with the advancing ARVN Marines.

      The VC limited their defense to sniper and harassment fire. The ARVN’s discovered and destroyed three VC factories used to make grenades, mines, and booby traps; numerous support buildings used to house and train troops; and two 61mm mortars. Although the source and numbers cannot be verified by available official documents, it was reported that twenty-one VC were killed, and seven ARVN Marines were lost due to enemy action and accidents.

      Although the POW capture rate was below that anticipated, only one enemy POW was held at Vung Tau, the exercise was an excellent training devise for the members of the Battalion. No significant problems were encountered and no Battalion casualties occurred.
Vung Tau Region
Bien Hoa to Vung Tau Route

      During the operation, the MP’s encountered and addressed several operational deficiencies with their refugee and POW-Detainee holding areas. The first involved problems with the transport and construction of the temporary facilities and related items, i.e. concertina wire, fence poles, tents, utilities and expendables. They came up short because some of the items were not packed at time of deployment, so the materials had to be scrounged from local sources.

      Their recommendation was to prepare an official inventory list and have the items pre-packaged and available at Brigade, Group, or Battalion for either air or surface movement for future operations. The second deficiency was that when the separate refugee and POW- Detainee facilities were constructed within close proximity to each other, it created a cross communication security risk because many of the refugees and detainees were found to be related. The procedures were adjusted for future operations, no other significant problems were encountered, and no platoon casualties occurred during the operation.

      A Company troops assigned to the mission were, 1LT Gordon L. Locke, SP/4's John D. Sexton, Charles Patrick, and others yet identified.
1LT Locke
SP/4 Sexton
SP/4 Patrick
 Wanted: Names of MP's assigned, photographs, personal stories or official orders and records relating to Operation DECKHOUSE-V, please use the Email Link at the top of this page to notify the History Project Manager.
5 January
Operation CEDAR FALLS
5 ~ 26 January
Headquarters
II Field Forces
1st Infantry
Division
25th Infantry
Division
173rd
Airborne Brigade
11th Armored
Cavalry
196th Infantry
Brigade
18th MP
Brigade
89th MP
Group
720th MP
Battalion
     During the period of 5 January to 26 January 1967, the Battalion provided the 2nd Platoon of B Company commanded by 1LT Thomas L. Feuerborn to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. The twenty-man platoon was committed to the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.
     The platoon from B Company departed Long Binh Post at 1300 hours and began earning the 18th Brigade the reputation as “the only combat tested MP Brigade” by living and working in the “boonies.” The platoon spent 20 days in the field with the infantrymen.
     After an hours drive they reached their first temporary bivouac area in a field near Phu Loi where they spent two days before moving on to a refugee control point on the outskirts of Ben Cat located at the intersection of Highways QL-13, 240 and TL-7B in Binh Duong province northeast of Cu Chi. There they set up their cantonment tents, established a perimeter and fighting positions. After five days they again broke camp and moved to the other side of Ben Cat and again established a cantonment. This one would last through the duration of their missions.
     They escorted supply convoys, provided search and security for medical and PSYOPS teams treating the villagers, performed traffic defile control and bridge security, assisted with refugee control and transport, village security, Commanding General security team, Tactical Operations HQ security, security for tunnel rat teams. On one tunnel rat mission, PFC John Miller and SP/4 Randy Shover assisted the rats in the planting of the explosive charges to destroy the tunnels. They also escorted convoys of captured enemy rice catches.
     The biggest responsibility was refugee control. Here they secured the village with the military intelligence teams, segregated the populace into three groups, innocent civilians, enemy supporters/suspects, known enemy soldiers, and escorted the war innocent’s to the control point where they were fed and then transferred to more secure villages. As a result they were also credited with the capture of seven VC suspects.

     Allied Forces involved were the command headquarters of the II Field Forces, combat elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, B Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, 1st ARVN (Vietnamese Army) Airborne Brigade, 7th and 8th ARVN Regiments, and an ARVN Ranger Battalion.

     This was the first corps-sized American search and destroy operation of the war to prevent ex-filtration from the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle, denying the use of the Saigon River in the sector to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces. It took place in The Iron Triangle a 60 square mile area bounded by the Saigon and the Song Thi Thinh Rivers, and the Thanh Dien Forest.
   Communist Forces involved were, 9th Viet Cong Division and the Viet Cong Military Region 4 Headquarters.
     On 6 January the 1st Division under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, which at the time was attached to the 25th Infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry moved from Dau Tieng along the southern edge of the Boi Loi woods to an overnight position.
     At the same time the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry with Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry attached, moved into the area north of the Trung Lap Ranger Training Center, to initially open a route and secure artillery support bases. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry and supporting artillery, consisting of the 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery, and A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, was lifted into these bases.

    The 196th Light Infantry Brigade Command Post and elements of the 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery moved by convoy to Trung Lap.
     On 7 January the 1st Battalion, (Mechanized), 5th Infantry secured a Landing Zone for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the Saigon River at the same time the 2nd Brigade moved to blocking positions along the Saigon river north of the Filhol Plantation and Nha Viec. They deployed with Task Force 2nd Battalion , 34th Armor in the north, Task Force 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry in the south.

      During the nights a maximum amount of ambushes were placed along the river. During daylight minimum forces secured the river, allowing extensive search and destroy operations in the Viet Cong base areas.
     Control of traffic on the river was the responsibility of the 25th Infantry Division, while the 1st Infantry Division was responsible for the control at the junction of the Saigon-Thi Tinh Rivers.

      The 1st Infantry Division with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment blocked enemy escape routes across the Thi Than River, executed an air-mobile assault north of the Iron Triangle, and then executed search and destroy operations south through the area.

Reflection  "Its been over 36 years since I worked Operation CEDAR FALLS so it’s tough to recall all the details of that assignment. There are a few incidents however that come to mind. I can’t remember the exact dates or locations and most of the names of the men that were present, but some of the details are still fresh."  SGT J. T. Cartee (1SG Retired), B Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, September 1966 to September 1967.

     On 11 January at 2100 hours, SGT Crook’s squad of four to five jeeps was assigned to escort elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) from Xuan Loc into the area. During the operation each of the gun jeeps also pulled trailers. The reason for the trailers was to have them available to scrounge supplies and any other materials needed for their bivouac area. It was getting dark around 2100 hours (9:00PM). The tracked vehicles they were escorting unexpectedly left the roadway on line to conduct a sweep into the jungle. The jeeps being the only wheeled vehicles couldn’t follow so they continued on in the direction of the B Company MP Platoon bivouac.

     Shortly after departing the armored elements the MP jeeps were ambushed and came under heavy enemy small arms fire, one B Company MP was seriously wounded by AK-47 fire. The MPs were pinned down and maintained counter fire on the enemy until the 11th ACR units returned to the roadway to assist them. Once the firing stopped the 11th ACR summoned a Dust-off to transport the wounded MP to a field hospital. SGT Crook and his MPs spent the remainder of the night with the armored unit until daylight when they were escorted back to the B Company bivouac. Several of the MP squads jeeps were damaged by small arms fire and had to be towed by the Armored Personnel Carriers (APC).

     SP/4 Gerald E. Reddaway of B Company, distinguished himself by valorous actions while serving as a member of a squad supporting the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. While returning to base camp, the six man squad was attacked by Viet Cong on a narrow path surrounded by dense jungle. With total disregard for his own safety, SP/4 Reddaway ran to the aid of a seriously wounded man and carried him to safety while receiving intense hostile fire. He skillfully applied first aid to his injured comrade and was preparing him for medical evacuation by helicopter when they were again subjected to intense fire. Using his body as a shield, SP/4 Reddaway carried the wounded man to a nearby jeep.

     SP/4 Reddaway was later awarded the Army Commendation Medal for Valor for his actions.

Wanted : Photograph of SP/4 Reddaway and the name of the wounded MP, please contact the History Project Manager via the Email Link at the top of this page.
Reflection-Exact Date Unknown  "There was a old one lane bridge over a small river or stream who’s name I can’t remember. The bridge was dilapidated so the engineer's built a temporary bridge along side it to move the operational traffic. All the vehicles using this roadway had to cross over it. The MP’s who were assigned to the bridge and defile had to insure that due to weight restrictions, traffic was limited to one heavy vehicle at a time. The bridge master was a Lieutenant from the engineer unit and he was responsible for making the decision on the heavy vehicles. A VTR came down the roadway towing a disable Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). The VTR driver was instructed by the MP’s to winch the APC across separately so the combined weight of both vehicles wouldn’t be on the span at the same time. The officer with the mechanized unit for some unknown reason ordered the VTR to cross with the APC in tow. The bridge master didn’t object even though he had operational jurisdiction. While they were crossing the span the heavy weight caused it to collapse into the water below. Fortunately the vehicle operators survived the fall. It took the engineers several days to clear out the vehicles and build a Bailey Bridge in its place. And as usual, the MPs working the detail at the old bridge were blamed for its collapse. SGT J. T. Cartee (1SG Retired), B Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, September 1966 to September 1967.

Reflection-Exact Date Unknown   "It seemed that during the operation Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army radio traffic flooded our assigned radio net just proceeding enemy actions against the U.S. Forces. I can’t say if this was intended to tie up the U.S. radio net or if the enemy were using it to instruct their units prior to a battle. I did notice while working the POW detail that of the enemy prisoners of war that were captured, many had small new transistor radios in their possession.

     When I asked an intelligence unit officer about it he said they were given the radios to receive instructions from their headquarters. It was cheaper than heavy field radios, but you didn’t have the ability to talk back to the headquarters and acknowledge receipt of your orders." SGT J. T. Cartee (1SG Retired), B Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, September 1966 to September 1967.
SGT Cartee
     Totals for the 18-day operations were 331 Viet Cong killed by actual body count, 39 Prisoners of War captured, 147 Hoi Chanh's (voluntary surrenders) rallied, and 147 detainees held for questioning, seven M-1 rifles, 10 Mauser rifles, six AK-47 assault rifles, 18 pistols, two shotguns, one pellet gun, three rocket launchers, two Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), three rounds of rocket ammunition were captured, along with numerous miscellaneous explosives, bangalor torpedoes and grenades. The confiscated 21,385 tons of rice. Air support sorties numbered 409 and five B-52 bomb strikes were made during the operation.
Wanted: Names of the other MP's assigned to the B Company squad, photographs of the operation, official documents, personal stories, and photographs. Please contact the History Project Manager via the Email Link at the top of this page.
8 January
PFC Woodrow M. Snyder of B Company Xuan Loc Detachment was promoted to Specialist 4th Class.
     The Battalion completed the last 20 vehicle convoy escort of Operation CANARY that began on 4 December 1966. The entire 36 day continuous convoy operation was completed without any major accidents or incidents.

     COL Edward B. Kitchens, Jr. Chief of Staff, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, sent a Letter of Appreciation to 18th MP Brigade Headquarters expressing his appreciation for the assistance provided by the battalion during Operations CANARY (movement of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade) and DUCK (movement of the 9th Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade).

     In the letter he stated, “…was conducted by the officers and men in a highly credible manner. Working 24 hours a day, the men of the battalion conducted themselves in a competent and efficient manner thereby insuring the rapid and trouble free movement of the convoys. Their enthusiasm, willingness and professional ability were material contributions to the accomplishment of Operations CANARY and DUCK.”
11 January
Operation CEDAR FALLS
     SP/4 Gerald E. Reddaway of B Company distinguished himself by valorous actions while service as a member of the 2nd Platoons 3rd Squad supporting the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. While returning to base camp, the six man squad was attacked by VC on a narrow path surrounded by dense jungle. With total disregard for his own safety, SP/4 Reddaway ran to the aid of SP/4 Phillip Reed who was seriously wounded in the ambush, and carried him to safety while receiving intense hostile fire. He skillfully applied first aid to his injured comrade and was preparing him for medical evacuation by helicopter when they were again subjected to intense fire. With the assistance of heavy cover fire from the other squad members, using his body as a shield, SP/4 Reddaway carried the wounded man to a nearby jeep. SP/4 Reddaway was later awarded the Army Commendation Medal for Valor for his actions .
15 January

     LTC Geln A. Hill who brought the Battalion to South Vietnam on 19 October 1966 from Fort Hood, Texas, passed command to LTC Kenneth Weinstein.

 Wanted: Photographs of the change of command ceremony, please use the Email Link at the top of this page to notify the History Project Manager.
LTC Hill
LTC Weinstein
21 January
     The Commanding Officer of the 25th Infantry Division issued a letter of appreciation to the 18th MP Brigade Commander expressing his appreciation for the assistance and efficiency of escort operations rendered by the platoon of A Company MPs first assigned to the Tay Ninh Convoy on 2 January.
24 January
     The A Company platoon assigned to support the Marine and ARVN elements in Operation DECKHOUSE-V on 3 January completed its mission and returned to operational control of the Battalion.
26 January
     The B Company platoon assigned to support the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Operation CEDAR FALLS on 5 January completed its mission and returned to operational control of the Battalion.
31 January

   Members of the 4th Squad, 3rd Platoon, B Company gather to receive their mail by the squad tent on Long Binh Post. The photograph was taken from the fire watch security shack known as the "Tree House" built in a lone tree in the Battalion compound.
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