Exact Date Unknown, Long Than Detachment  The Company was tasked by the 89th MP Group with providing a detachment of handlers to improve security at the airfield flight line of the Long Thanh (North) base camp on Highway QL-15 in Bien Hoa Province, III Corps Tactical Zone. The detachment was formed but there were no facilities for their cantonment. Until one could be provided the detachment stayed at the Bearcat base camp (9th Infantry Division) a few miles north.

Personal Reflection    “I have many fond memories of the 212th, and especially of the detachment at Long Thanh, which my platoon initiated. We had to "hand-build" our billets, out-houses, kennels, showers, bunkers, etc. It was an amazing team-building project and instilled a lot of pride and teamwork in our detachment. Two of our handlers, Schmidt and Gerald S. Sauve, were carpenters in civilian life, and became our construction foremen. We even had to build the dog dip tanks, and I came up with the bright idea of building a frame upside-down (in order to cement a solid bottom), filling it with concrete, and once it dried, turning it upright and dismantling the wood frame.

     The first one was great, until we realized we had installed no drain and had to, subsequently, empty the chemicals every time by bucket. Needless to say, the remaining dip tanks had bottom drains.

     We also had one of our handlers (Dorsey F. Sapp), who was also a great artist, paint a giant Snoopy Dog with an MP helmet on top of the kennel roof."  2LT Gary M. Freeman, 1st Platoon Leader, 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog), 95th & 720th MP Battalion’s, 89th MP Group, 1967-1968.

23 January, Long Than Detachment   Once the billets and kennels were completed, the detachment of approximately fifteen handlers and K9's moved into their new cantonment at Long Thanh. Of the four billets, two were for the enlisted men, one for the NCO's and one was the officers tent. When off duty the MP's continued to work on quality of life projects for the new facilities.

29 January, II Field Forces, Long Binh Post   BG John S. Lekson, the Commanding General of Headquarters, II Field Forces (Long Binh Post), issued a Joint Message Form to all it’s major commands.

     There are a number of positive intelligence indicators that the enemy will deliberately violate the truce by attacking friendly installations during the night of 29 January or the early morning hours of 30 January.

     Addressees will take action to insure maximum alert posture throughout the TET period. Be particularly alert for enemy deception involving use of friendly vehicles or uniform.

HQ Long Binh Post,  Personal Reflection  “During the afternoon the 18th MP Brigade headquarters issued an alert order to all of its units. I gathered the officers to review our compound defense plan. This was coordinated with the adjacent units. To the west, across the street was the 42nd Engineer Company (Port Construction) and to the east across that street was an engineer bridge company. We had the slice in the middle with the hill in front of us. The 720th MP Battalion’s TAOR mortar platoon [D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security) subordinate to the 95th MP Battalion] was to the west of the 42nd and could provide us high explosive and illuminating mortar rounds for our support.

     I placed the company on 50 percent alert. The officers set up a TOC roster so that we would have some rest until action occurred. 2LT Freedman ensured the dog handlers going to the Long Binh Depot were fully briefed prior to their departure. They were to follow the defensive SOP instructions to fall back to fighting positions by the perimeter watchtowers of D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security) if a ground attack was launched against the ammunition depot perimeter. If the company’s remote detachments had to be resupplied, arrangements were made with the USARV air detachment helicopters on Long Binh Post.

     SGT Sylvan Schrank our kennel master, made sure the dogs were ready for their tour of duty. With the remainder of the headquarters soldiers, we manned the water tower, several fighting positions facing the perimeter, and the TOC."   CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

Editors Notes:    A major coordination mistake by Hanoi resulted in serious complications and losses for their troops as their nationwide attack began. Hanoi told its NVA commands to begin the "N-Day" attack on 31 January, their New Years Day. However, South Vietnam celebrated under a revised calendar of 30 January.

     Some of the NVA commands began their N-Day attacks on the 30th, while the others were waiting for the attacks to be launched on the 31st. This mistake provided the U.S. and ARVN troops an early warning and critical defensive response time. The mistake prevented many of the NVA troops from being in place in the center of all the major cities. In addition, their sapper teams were also left without the support of their second wave support battalions.

0130 hours (approximately), HQ Long Binh Detachment  1LT Seligman sent a runner to inform CPT Roberts that radio traffic had picked up and that some III and IV Corps locations were reporting incoming fire. CPT Roberts reported it to the TOC and from then on closely monitored the situation.

0310 hours,  II Field Force intelligence reports identified the enemy units assigned to attack and hold Bien Hoa City, and the Long Binh Post Complex as elements of the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division, the 274th and 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiments and combined Artillery Group, and the U-1 Local Force VC Battalion supported by other local force VC elements organic to the area. Their mission was to target the Bien Hoa National Police Station, the ARVN Ho Nai POW Camp where approximately 2,000 VC prisoners were held, Bien Hoa Air Force Base, HQ II Field Force and III Corps HQ compound, and destruction of the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot on Long Binh Post.

0315 hours,  The attack against Long Binh Post was directed at its northwest corner, and began with a heavy rocket and mortar barrage followed by  a ground assault at the Headquarters of II Field Force, and progressed from there.

0345 hours, Long Binh Detachment  The 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot reported they were under mortar attack followed by an undetermined number of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) into the northeast sector of the perimeter in the vicinity of Watchtower #13. It was the prelude to a sapper attack.

0443 hours,  Enemy forces and perimeter guards were engaged in a fire-fight inside the Ammunition Supply Depot.

Personal Reflection  "2LT Freedman immediately requested to enter the depot to search for his men. We discussed how we could do this. We looked at our resources for night operations and identified the ability of the enemy to ambush any rescue column. It was determined that our soldiers would follow their battle drill orders and would have moved to the perimeter fighting positions by the watchtowers supported by D Company, 87th Infantry subordinate to the 95th MP Battalion, 18th MP Brigade. These soldiers manned the towers that were equipped with 7.62 mm machine guns. Our handler teams did as we thought."   CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

     PFC Gordon Leroy Currier, age 22 of Independence, Missouri, and his K9 partner Satch (M164) of the Long Binh Detachment were Killed In Action at the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot.

     This early morning PFC Currier would face a K9 Handlers greatest concern when through the early morning darkness the enemy force found a gully to move their force to within assault distance of the perimeter. Fortune was with the enemy unit as the wind was blowing towards them preventing Satch from going on alert.

    They waited until their heavy mortar attack stopped, moved forward and penetrated the perimeter area of Tower #13 at his sector. During the mortar attack PFC Currier and Satch moved to a prepared fighting position to defend against the initial ground assault. Armed only with his M-16 rifle and a 45. caliber side arm they fought back until overwhelmed by an estimated 20-30 enemy soldiers. Both died from small arms fire.

     Enemy sapper teams who followed the ground assault that overran PFC Currier and Satch's position hid timed satchel charges on many of the ammunition pads. EOD Teams were able to locate and disarm most of the hidden charges before four of the 100 pads detonated at 0800 hours.

      PFC Currier was one of 250 U.S. Military personnel killed in Vietnam that day. His name is etched on the Vietnam Memorial Wall, Panel 36E - Line 4.

Vinh Long Detachment, Personal Reflection  “We were able to secure a helicopter from the USARV aviation detachment for a re-supply flight to Vinh Long. When I arrived at the heliport, the aircraft was waiting. We secured our supplies inside the cabin, took off, and headed southwest into the delta. As we passed Saigon, we could see the smoke rising from the fighting still raging west of the city.

     The flight was about forty-five minutes. We landed without incident and the pilot, CPT Montgomery Price, parked the aircraft near Ambassador Bunker’s C-47. He was visiting the provinces to determine the status of the government’s capability to continue governance.

     While CPT Price checked in at airfield operations, several of our handlers unloaded the supplies while the detachment sergeant and I visited the others. They briefed me on the attack and their response. I was pretty proud of their actions. They had held a piece of the perimeter that was critical. The VC attacked through the wire at the far end of the runway and seized a number of the perimeter bunkers lining it before being driven off.

     CPT Price came over and indicated that we had limited minutes on the ground. Operations had notified him that they were expecting another attack. We took off and headed northeast. We settled down to another uneventful flight using the black smoke plume that identified the western part of Saigon as our guide.

      We went back to our normal security duties knowing that we had seen combat and were better for it. During the next six months, the VC tried a number of times to penetrate our detachment perimeters. Our dogs always alerted and we were able to cause the penetrations to fail. With the exception of the unfortunate attack at Long Binh depot, the deployed company teams never allowed a penetration of their posts. In the tradition of the Military Police Corps, every man and dog did his duty to his utmost.” CPT [COL Ret.] James T. Roberts, Jr. Commanding Officer, 212th MP Company, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, Vietnam, November 1967 to June 1968.

10 February, HQ Long Binh Detachment  The company with a total strength of 218 personnel was detached from operational control of the 18th MP Brigade and the 95th MP Battalion (administrative) and attached subordinate to the 720th MP Battalion for administrative and logistical support with the 89th MP Group tasked with operational control.

     The 95th was an “Army cellular” battalion headquarters detachment, had no organic letter companies, only numbered detachment, platoon or companies and assigned the responsibility of operational control of its service support military police subordinate units in and around Long Binh Post.

Exact Date Unknown, MACV   The 95th MP Battalion HQ Detachment prepared the required documentation to submit to higher headquarters making application for its first Meritorious Unit Commendation for the period of 1 January through 31 December 1967. The 212th was included with others in its list of subordinate units to receive the award. During the higher command review process the company, along with the 148th MP Platoon, were removed from the application on 14 May 1968 by the Adjutant Generals Office, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) because they had not met the Department of The Army requirements that subordinate units must have served with the submitting command agency for six months during the inclusive dates of 1 January through 31 December 1967 before becoming eligible for the award.

18 March  The following company personnel were awarded the Army Commendation Medal for Meritorious Service under 18th MP Brigade General Orders #214: SP/5’s Gilbert C. Beyer for service March 1967 to March 1968, and Floyd R. Bryan for service November 1966 to February 1968.

23 March, Long Binh Detachment At 2030 hours, a truck drove up to the gate between perimeter watchtowers #16 an #17 at the west side of the ammunition depot on Highway QL-15. The tower guards notified the security officer, 1LT Wactor and SGT Steinberg, the Duty NCO. Flares were fired and the truck departed. At approximately 2115 hours, the truck returned to the same gate, the guard notified the patrol, the security officer and duty NCO. The patrol ordered the truck to halt, the truck disregarded the commands. The patrol fired three rounds, the truck was not struck. At 2120 hours, the security officer arrived. Two MP jeeps arrived and took the truck to the Long Binh Post Provost Marshal Office. The shots were fired at the truck by PFC Harvey O. Shimko, US54818953, 212th MP Company. 89th MP Group was notified, SGT Bryant stated that the incident was cleared up, reporting that the contracted Vietnamese National truck driver was attempting to make a delivery from Saigon and became lost.

Editors Notes: During this period (5 May through 18 June) North Vietnamese Army, Main Force Viet Cong and local organic VC units initiated their planned second phase of the Tet New Years Offensive known to Vietnam era historians as the Mini-Tet or May Communist Offensive. The North Vietnamese government’s objective was to maintain constant pressure on Saigon in III Corps Tactical Zone, although scattered attacks were conducted across the country, particularly in the far northern costal region. Their goal was to inflict casualties on the South Vietnamese Government and people, and pursue a talk-fight strategy to influence their political capital at the commencement of the Paris peace talks.

     There is also some speculation that after suffering their most severe military defeat during the war in the Tet New Years offensive, GEN Vo Nguyen Giap could have called off the second phase attacks because the element of surprise was now lost. Instead, he wanted to parlay the perceived victory granted to them by the leftist antiwar American media into further political propaganda gains without regard to the additional loss of thousands of dead and wounded among their ranks, which is what they suffered before the second phase of their offensive was over.

     It should also be noted that the NVA Main Force VC military elements in III CTZ that survived the slaughter and retreated into the local countryside, provided the local organic VC units within the Battalion’s Tactical Area Of Responsibility and around Long Binh Post with improved armaments, ammunition and explosives to carry out small unit strikes and harassment against Allied units and infrastructure in the area while they once again took sanctuary in their bases across the Cambodian border.

Personal Reflection "Lady was a German Shepard pup that was taken to Vietnam by a crew member of an off shore oil rig. When told that he could not keep a dog on the rig, Lady was sent to the MP K9 company. I was told that she received the full scout dog training and was put into service as a scout dog (but never appeared on any official books). There were rumors that she was used to produce "pure bred" pups which were sold to various units. When it was learned that the dog company was selling dogs, the Inspector General was sent to investigate.

     As the IG’s helicopter was landing, Lady was taking off in another ship. I received a call from CPT Charles E. Hobbs of the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog) asking if I wanted a scout dog. By the time I said "yes", Lady was landing. Lady became part of the 615th and was transferred (with me) to Bien Hoa when I became Deputy Provost Marshal. Lady ended up saving my life twice and I had an opportunity to return the favor for her.

21 June The following company personnel were awarded the Good Conduct Medal for exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity under HQ 720th MP Battalion General Orders #21.

SP/4 Jake E. Ross, 10 August 1966 to 9 August 1968, SP/4 James L. Julian 15 September 1966 to 14 September 1968, SP/4 Gary W. Porter 3 August 1966 to 2 August 1968, SP/4 Roger Handley 2 August 1966 to 1 August 1968, SP/4 Eliberto Elizondo, Jr. 6 October 1966 to 5 October 1968.

2 July The following company personnel received promotions to Sergeant (E5); Thomas R. Brun and Edward G. Cline.

Christmas Party At The Thu Duc Orphanage