1 November, Wednesday Casualties A Company jeep on patrol duty ran over a Russian Land Mine just northwest of a check point. The resulting explosion killed two and seriously wounded two. Killed In Action were, CPL John F. Gargan, and PFC Billy J. Porter. Wounded In Action were, SFC Francis J. Freeman, and SGT Duane F. Carey. SFC Freeman and SGT Carey were taken to the Hospital Ship Consolation.

SFC Freeman was later recommended for the Soldiers Medal for his heroic actions. Disregarding his wounds, SFC Freeman immediately dragged PFC Porter from the wreckage when he observed the vehicle fuel tank was spilling gasoline on him, he then ran approximately one mile to summon assistance.

7 November, Tuesday The Company supply truck was ambushed on it’s return trip from Kowon, North Korea. PFC George R. Weber, the driver, and CPL Wilbur F. Perkins became separated when they had to abandon the vehicle to escape capture. The truck and it’s cargo of supplies were lost to the Communist. CPL Perkins finally made it back to the Company compound that evening, PFC Weber was among the missing.

9 November, Thursday PFC Weber‘s ordeal ended with his safe return to the Company compound.

10 November, Friday The Company once again was ordered to move out. They loaded what they could into trucks and jeeps and started out on their eighty mile trip to Hamhung, North Korea. The advanced point vehicles of the convoy were two M-20 Armored Cars and five jeeps with machine guns. The advance point group was commanded by the Company Commander, CPT Samuel T. Denton.

The advance point group was fired upon while near Kowon, they engaged and killed approximately ten North Korean Soldiers in the fight.

The remainder of the convoy run was uneventful. The Company arrived at Hamhung and began setting up their Command Post and billets in the City Medical College building. Their immediate duties were establishing check points and patrol in one-half of the city.

15 November, Wednesday One Company M-20 Armored Car was accidentally burned, there were no injuries from the fire. With the temperatures below freezing the MP's started a small fire to thaw out the fuel line, which was a common practice at the time. The fire ignited some fuel and the car caught on file.

26 November, Sunday In the evening 1LT William Van Buskirk (Executive Officer) was briefed by MAJ Carken and LT Grams of the X Corps Provost Marshal Office, on the operational needs of Control Points on the Hamhung to Hagaru'ri Main Supply Route north to the Chosin [Changjin] Resevior.

With the North Korean Peoples Army all but desemated and in a full retreat, the Allied battle cry was “Home by Christmas,” and it all depended on how efficiently the MP's of the X Corps MP Company operated the supply route for what was planned as a final mopping up operation. Disregarding warning of a possible Chinese intervention, General Douglas MacArthur intended to pursue them to the Yalu River, the North Korean border with Communist China.

The lower southern two-thirds of the Main Supply Route [MSR], from Hamhung to Hagaru'ri was one lone road therefore, their job consisted of setting up Control Points where they were to assemble convoys of twenty or more vehicles and run them through a section of the route using a shuttle system for north and south bound traffic. The northern third connected Hagaru'ri to the south western side of the Chosin Resevior where elements of the 1st Marine Division were positioned. The Company’s responsibility was to patrol the entire route (southern two thirds) and do any and everything in their power to maintain a steady, uninterrupted flow of traffic north.

27 November, Monday, 0400 hours [4:00 AM],1LT Van Buskirk departed Hamhung with SFC Lester J. Klein and forty enlisted men to establish the Control Points on the Main Supply Route.

Unbeknown to them at the time, the Communist Chinese Forces were launching a massive surprise attack with ten divisions (125,000 troops) against a thin front line of allied forces, starting with Task Force Faith, 7th Infantry Division, who were positioned on the east side of the Chosen Reservoir. That attack would be followed with one against the 1st Marine Division positioned south and west of the reservoir. Within days the Chinese would have both units surrounded and cut off. The "Home by Christmas" battle cry would soon give way to a new battle cry coined by the Marines of, "Retreat, hell, no! We're attacking in another direction."

7th

1st

The first Check Point was the junction of the Main Supply Route and the main street in Hamhung, the personnel to operate this point were assigned from the Company at Hamhung.

The second Regulating Point was set up ten miles north of Hamhung, with six additional traffic Regulating Points between Hamhung and Hagraru'ri. Four of them were at known geographical locations at, Hatong, Majon dong, Koto'ri, and Hagaru'ri, the other two points were located at isolated spots on the MSR where the shuttle system warranted a regulating point. The last Check Point at Hagaru'ri was posted by 1030 hours [10:30 AM], and they were also responsible for regulating the traffic from a large supply depot with access to the Main Supply Route.

The two northern most control points were located at Koto'ri and Hagaru'ri, the latter being on the southern edge of the Chosin Reservoir.

The Koto'ri control point was manned by SFC James G. Lewis, CPL James M. George, CPL Dennis H. Ramsey, PFC John H. Porter and PFC Francis W. Connors.

The Hagaruri control point was manned by, CPL James C. Foster, CPL William J. St.Pierre, CPL Robert Harley, PFC James O. Ederhart, PFC Donald P. Chaput and PFC Harold R. Farnsworth.

1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein proceeded to the local Marine Provost Marshal Command Post and advised them of the locations of the Company Control Points on the MSR for liaison and coordination. He remained at the Command Post for some time, enjoyed a delicious can of “C” rations and hot coffee. As he was about to depart on an inspection run back down the entire MSR, two Marine MP’s reported in to their Provost Marshal with an alleged enemy prisoner, picked up in the vicinity of Hagraru'ri.

Upon interrogation of the POW it was discovered that hordes of Communist Chinese troops were at that very hour advancing on Hagaru'ri. This was the first inkling anyone had of the intervention of the Chinese.

1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein proceeded with his inspection trip of the entire route before nightfall then returned to his temporary Command Post at the foot of the seven mile mountain pass [Funchilin Pass] located south of Koto'ri and Hagaru'ri.

28 November, Tuesday 1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein proceeded north toward Hagaru'ri to check on the progress of the Control Point. When they reached the Koto'ri post they were informed that it was impossible to proceed further because the Communist Chinese had completely surrounded the village during the night. They continued north to verify the information reaching the midway point they were forced by enemy activity to return to Hagaru'ri.

1950 Hours 1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein were again on patrol of the Main Supply Route when they met up with elements of a transportation and Signal Corps unit proceeding south. 1LT Van Buskirk learned that the units worked in coordination with the Koto'ri Control Point. They warned him that Koto'ri was in imminent danger of being over run by the Chinese Forces this evening. 1LT Van Buskirk continued on to Koto'ri to check on the status of the MP’s finding they were very busy with the increased traffic flow.

1LT Van Buskirk was informed by the local Signal Corps officers that his five MP’s were of great assistance and needed at the Koto'ri Control Point. The men were briefed on the danger of the Communist Chinese threat and passed on the suggestion they be relieved from the post. They were provided with additional rations, ammunition and equipment before 1LT Van Buskirk departed.

1LT Van Buskirk returned to his Command Post, contacted and briefed the Company Commander, CPT Samuel T. Denton, and X Corps Provost Marshal, LTC William Campbell. He was informed that regardless of the threat the Company was to do everything in their power to maintain a steady, uninterrupted flow of allied traffic, and they were to fulfill their assignment to the very end.

That night the Communist Chinese Forces continued their offensive and surrounded the small village of Koto'ri cutting off allied access to the five man MP Control Point who were now trapped between the Chosin Reservior and the Chinese lines along with the 1st Marine Division and the surviving elements of the 7th Infantry Division who had been badly mauled in the opening days of the offensive.

The Chinese Communists forces, estimated at 60,000 to 120,000 strong, now had the entire 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division, estimated at 12,000 men, trapped. Their only chance of escape was to breakout southward and run the Chinese gauntlet down the eighty mile Main Supply Route through the Funchilin Pass to the X Corps defensive perimeter at Hungnam. To accomplish this they also had to fight another enemy just as deadly as the Chinese that would exact additional casualties, the strong winds, snow, and minus 30 degree temperatures of one of the fiercest Korean winters on record.

29 November, Wednesday In the morning 1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein again departed the Command Post to conduct an inspection of the MSR seven mile pass, also known as the Funchilin Pass. Reports were received the night before that Marine patrols had engaged the enemy on both sides of the pass. The enemy lines were dug in at the crest of the pass creqating a no-mans-land. This time they took an additional two jeep patrol with them for support. They were turned back by enemy activity at the crest of the pass. As their orders specified, they continued to run their twice daily patrols to the crest of the pass.

On two occasions, LTC Waldron C. Winston, Commanding Officer of the 52nd Transportation Truck Battalion, X Corps Artillery, requested that 1LT Van Buskirk personally conduct a reconnaissance patrol up the Main Supply Route through the pass to identify any good truck turn around points for a large convoy to assist in any allied breakout from the Chinese encirclement at Hagaru-ri-Koto'ri.

During the first reconnnaissance patrol 1LT Van Buskirk and SFC Lester J. Klein proceeded to the Marine outpost on the road, two miles below the summit of the mountain. Beyond that point was considered no-mans-land, it was narrow, with no vegatation for concealment. They left their jeep and proceed on foot north on the road into no-mans-land. After traveling a mile they were able to locate an area meeting the needs of LTC Winston, plotted it on their map and proceeded back. They had successfully avoided being spotted by the enemy forces in the pass. Later 1LT Van Buskirk would reflect that “that mile up and back seemed like fifty.”

30 November, Thursday In the early morning hours 1LT Van Buskirk and CPL MacArdel were detailed by LTC Winston, 52nd Transportation Truck Battalion, X Corps Artillery, to personally proceed with his convoy of twenty trucks up the Funchilin pass carrying elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, who had since relieved the Marine outpost just below the crest of the mountain. The group was part of a planned attempted break through to Hagaru'ri from the south.

10th

7th

The convoy reached the point where the former Marine outpost had been located and immediately came under heavy enemy small arms fire. The infantry dismounted and set up defensive positions. When the ambush started several of the drivers in the lead vehicle fled their trucks to the rear of the convoy. The convoy was now dead in the road spread out along the winding mountain pass. They managed to get the vehicles in the rear of the column below the infantry defensive positions turned around, but were not sure of the status of the lead trucks. LTC Winston ordered the MP patrol to go forward around the protective bend in the roadway, beyond the infantry defensive position, to see if the lead trucks had been recovered.The MP patrol performed the mission and gladly reported that all the lead trucks had successfully been recovered.

During the return trip south down the pass the MP patrol discovered that the Chinese Communist Forces had destroyed the critical pump house bridge that was part of the water release from the Chosin [Changjin] Reservoir.

The entire center span of the narrow one lane concrete bridge was gone leaving a gaping twenty-four foot long hole that dropped down into the valley one mile below. The convoy would now be trapped between the Chinese and the bridge.

1LT Van Buskirk and CPL Darrell D. “Mac” MacArdle dismounted and searched the pump house. They discovered some heavy wooden rafter timbers in the back of the building. They spent the next several hours carrying the timbers to the opening in the bridge and placing them side by side creating a suitable temporary bridge deck. By then it was dark and another bone chilling North Korean winter night enveloped them high up on the side of the mountain.

With the convoy now stopped at the bridge, LTC Wilson came up to the front to see was was causing the delay. When he observed what the MP patrol had done to overcome the obstacle, he was later quoted by 1LT Van Buskirk as having used the word “Amazing.” It took both MP’s and LTC Wilson’s persistence to encourage some of the truck drivers to use the new deck to cross the chasm while driving under blackout conditions.

The process used to cross was rather hazardous. Each truck had to approach the temporary decking individually at a very slow and steady speed, otherwise the weight of the truck and spin of the tires could push the unsecured planks apart resulting in both the truck and the planking falling to the floor of the now dark valley a mile below them. The crossing was succesfull and the the remainder of the trip back to Hamhung was uneventfull.