~ 720th Military Police Battalion Reunion Association Vietnam History Project ~
The History Of The Village Outpost's
720th Military Police Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility

This Page Last Updated 12 December 2014
The first Military Police Battalion in the history of the United States Armed Forces to be assigned an infantry counterinsurgency, pacification mission in which they had OPCON to all air, artillery, and infantry elements used to support their MP's on the ground, Republic of South Vietnam, 11 September 1967 through 25 July 1970.
~ The Watch Towers of the First Indochina War ~

        The principal Battalion mission of Operation STABILIZE was to change the area and attitudes of the local villagers within the 22 square mile Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) from one of enemy control and constant fear to one of safety and confidence in their local governmental authority.

        To accomplish this goal and to insure the safety of various civic action projects within the TAOR, a full time Military Police presence would be needed until the local Regional Forces ~ Popular Forces (RF-PF) and National Police (Canh Sat) were trained and equipped to a capability of handling the responsibility. The infrastructure for several of the village outpost's were already in place since the 1940’s and 50’s and served the same purpose during the First Indochina War, long before the arrival of US Military Forces in Vietnam.

18th MP
Brigade
89th MP
Group
720th MP
Battalion
 

        During the First Indochina War 1945 through 1954, the French Union Forces built "poste kilométrique," (watch towers) as one of their key features of the pacification strategy. The isolated watch towers were manned by a handful of local auxiliaries and dotted every kilometer along the lines of communications.

        At that time radio communication among the small village outpost was non existent. The outpost's were arranged in close proximity to afford the militia manning them to communicate between themselves by runners or signals.

 

        A larger tower was also the central feature of every outpost, most of which were only slightly modernized versions of the "moat and keep" castle.

        These watch towers were introduced in the southern delta area in 1947 and later extended to the Central and Northern Highlands and the Red River delta of north Vietnam during the period of the Fist Indochina War.

        Most towers were about 3 to 4 meters wide and 5 to 6 meters high with 30 centimeter thick brick walls. Roofs were usually tiled and both four-sided, and two-sided were common.

        The door, if there was one, was set about 2 meters off the ground and was accessed with a ladder which was pulled inside the tower at dusk.

Photo G0834 The small tower at Outpost #4 in Long Binh Tan Village. Courtesy of CPL Thomas T. Watson, B Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, March 1968 to March 1969.

 
        In many cases, the risk of one of the defenders opening the door during a Viet Minh (forerunners of the Viet Cong) attack was avoided by having no door at all, access being possible only by a ladder reaching the top of the tower.

        From 1950, as the Viet Minh fielded increasing numbers of hollow charge weapons, (capable of penetrating the brick wall) a layer of logs or bamboo was often added for increased protection, covering either the base or the whole of the tower.

 
        Within the 720th MP Battalion TAOR there were four watch towers. Two (larger version) were still in use at village outpost in An Xuan, Outpost #1, and Long Binh Tan, Outpost #4. The remnants of a former tower (smaller version) were used as the foundation of the outpost at the entrance to An Hoa Hung Village, Outpost #3.
 
Photo G0627 The "French Fort" (1967). Courtesy SP/4 Robert E. “Twiggie” Henslee, A Company, Aug 1967 to Sep 1968.

        The remains of a large tower, minus the roof structure, were situated south of the Village of An Xuan along the Dong Nai River. This abandoned tower was used as a fixed feature map reference referred to by the MP’s that worked in the area as the "French Tower or French Fort."

        When the 720th MP Battalion first took over the TAOR the tower was still pretty much in its original condition (as shown in this photo, left). Since it was not manned by US or Allied Forces it became a hazard for shipping on the river because it presented an unoccupied fortified position for the local VC to launch ambushes on the numerous fuel and ammunition barges that traveled the Dong Nai River.

        For that reason it was later destroyed down to its foundation.

~ The Watch Towers of the Vietnam War Era ~

        The intended use of the towers and their condition changed very little during the Vietnam War era. Some cosmetic repairs were made to the brick walls that were damaged by Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fire and heavy caliber firearms over the years, and instead of the use of logs or bamboo to reinforce the walls, sandbags and chain link fence *curtains were sometimes used.

* The curtains of chain link fence were draped down from the top of the tower towards the ground away from the tower base. They were used to prevent explosive charges, or grenades from being tossed into or near the tower walls and to cause the deflection of rocket propelled grenades (RPG's).

        The clay tile roof was replaced by tin or heavy lumber with several layers of sandbags. What did change was the area immediately surrounding the towers. In the 1950’s the local force Viet Minh’s use of small caliber firearms and primitive cross bows and arrows were no great threat to the structures. With the introduction of heavy caliber firearms and armor defeating shoulder fired and crew served weapons the attackers would now have to be held off at a longer distance for any reasonable defense of the tower.

        Additional defensive bunkers were built to compliment the overall defense and the compound perimeter was enlarged and improved with trench lines, rolls of barbed wire and Claymore antipersonnel mines.

~ The Outpost Mission ~
        The MP’s and Popular Forces (PF’s) stationed at the outpost provided an immediate deterrence to widespread enemy use of the villages for resupply, forced recruitment, war tax collections and rest. There presence was also a much needed psychological boost to the villagers and Popular Forces Units sense of security. The outpost staff were also valuable for intelligence gathering, civic action security programs, and other non war related emergencies that occurred during the daily routine of village life. The daily interaction between the MP’s, PF’s and local villagers helped to improve relations and understanding between the US Military and the Vietnamese populace. With the addition of MP ambush and recon patrols working in the area to disrupt enemy movement and Civic Action MP jeep patrols in the larger villages, the outpost also became valuable bases for operation and resupply.
~ Effectiveness of The TAOR Outpost ~

        None of the outpost were strategically critical in preventing small scale communist infiltration, but they did provide an early warning system and intelligence conduit for any large scale enemy move on Long Binh Military Post from the south west.

        Their effectiveness became very apparent during the 23 February 1969 Post Tet Offensive attack on Long Binh Post. The large scale enemy attack on the post completely avoided the western half of the Tactical Area of Responsibility where the four outpost were located, and utilized the eastern half that was unpopulated.

        The positioning of the outpost also restricted the enemy assault on the perimeter to the area east of the An Hoa Hung village. If the assault had been launched from the villages of Long Binh Tan and An Hoa Hung in the western half of the TAOR, civilian casualties in the ensuing fight would have been very high.

        Several months after the successful defense of Long Binh Post during 22 & 23 February 1969, two new outpost were constructed in the eastern sector of the TAOR. One on Hill-15, and the other on the "Finger of Land."

        Both land features had played an important strategic part in the defense of the post by the B Company ambush teams positioned in the area during the start of the 23 February attack. With the addition of two permanent base camps ( outpost) to operate from in this strategic area, future assaults with the magnitude of the one launched on 23 February were deterred.

~ Staffing, Command, and Control ~

        The exact date is still unknown as to when the first MP’s were assigned to duty at the outpost following Operation CORRAL and the start of Operation STABILIZE. What is known is that in August 1967 a combined platoon of battalion MP's from A, B and C Companies was formed to conduct ambush and recon patrols in the TAOR. The platoon was headed by 2LT Robert S. Wilkerson, of B Company and included, SGT Ward Gunard Walter (KIA 29 Nov 68), and SP/4 Robert R. "Andy" Anderson, of B Company, SP/4 Appamenio Lara (KIA 30 May 68) of C Company, and others yet to be identified. In addition to TAOR reconnaissance patrols the platoon also performed outpost inspections as a prelude to Operation STABILIZE.

September 1967 The overall daily command and control of the TAOR was conducted through the 720th Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC). During the first phases of TAOR operations all three letter companies in addition to the 615th MP Company were assigned joint and unit specific missions and areas of operation (AO).

March 1968 There were four outpost located within the TAOR jointly staffed by Battalion MP’s of all three letter companies and local PF’s. They were Outpost #1 in An Xuan, and Outpost #2 in Long Hung that were manned by B Company MP’s who physically lived at the OP. Outpost #3 at the entrance to An Hoa Hung was manned by C Company and Outpost #4 at Long Binh Tan was manned by A Company MP’s, who worked it in 12 hour shifts.

        The B Company Outpost’s #1 and #2 were staffed with a minimum of four MP’s each, usually commanded by an NCO the rank of Sergeant (E-5), when available. The C and A Company outpost’s, #3 and #4 respectively, were staffed by an average of two to three MP’s during each shift. In addition to the Operation STABILIZE TAOR staffing mission, all three letter companies also continued their convoy escort and discipline, law, and order missions.

March April and May 1968 There were several Battalion sized village cordon and search operations similar to Operation CORRAL and conducted for the same purposes. During the first two cordon and search operations in April and May of 1968 the 116 man 301st National Police Field Forces Company was assigned to the operational control of the Battalion. Members were integrated into the Battalion Tactical Operations Command [TOC] to insure coordination of all NPFF operations. Their American advisor and the bulk of the company stayed at Outpost #2 where their headquarters in the TAOR was based during the joint operations.

26 June 1968 This level of staffing and assignment at the outposts changed when the Operation STABILIZE missions were consolidated by the Battalion and assigned exclusively to B Company. A and C Companies withdrew their TAOR staff and reassigned them to their other missions. All four outpost were now being staffed by B Company MP’s who physically resided in them, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

        The staffing levels at each outpost would vary depending on availability of men, enemy activity in their respective areas, and other company priorities. With B Company now being responsible for all TAOR operations, mission coordination improved greatly, however staffing shortages would be a recurring theme throughout the history of Operation STABILIZE. Outpost duty would remain the red headed stepchild of the battalion and company logistical priorities and staffing.

        In addition to the consolidation of the Operation STABILIZE missions under one company, the daily tactical operational control of the TAOR would also be handled through the new B Company TOC building. This included not only the responsibility of the outposts, but also the river patrols, ambush and recon teams, and assisting with the 89th MP Group, and 720th MP Battalion civic action programs (CAP) planned for the villages.

1969 The four principal village outpost began to have their staff of MP’s removed and reassigned to other company priorities. This realignment of outpost priorities is believed to have occurred for two reasons.

         The first being the primary goal of Operation STABILIZE was being accomplished, in which the counter insurgency and pacification mission in the populated western half of the TAOR was successful and would now become the primary responsibility of the Vietnamese National Police and local Popular Forces supported by B Company daytime Civic Action Patrols and evening ambush and recon patrols.

        The second being the focus of the Long Binh Post security was now the two new B Company base camps (outpost) that were built in the eastern unpopulated sector of the TAOR during April through June of 1969 .

        With the successful results of the B Company defense of Long Binh Post during the 23 February 1969 attack, the eastern half of the TAOR was immediately identified as the defensive weak spot. With two new static base camps (outpost) in the eastern sector to staff around the clock, and troop reductions under the Vietnamization program underway, the B Company manpower was stretched thin.

2 August 1969 the MP’s from B Company were entirely removed from the four village outpost and their mission became the responsibility of the local Popular Forces and National Police.

12 July 1970 Operation STABILIZE came to a close and all the remaining TAOR tactical responsibilities were transferred to the local ARVN, Regional Forces - Popular Forces and National Police, with US support coming from the 25th Infantry Division.

        The unique and historical infantry mission of Operation STABILIZE under the 720th MP Battalion and B Company came to a successful close.

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