August 1969 ~ Battalion Timeline |
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August |
At the start of the month Battalion strength in personnel was, 26 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 754 Enlisted Men. |
During the month, a Saturation Enforcement Squad was formed formed and activated under operation control of the 89th MP Group on four occasions during the months of August through October 1969. The squad was committed to concentrated enforcement and suppression of offenses in specifically designated "high offense areas." |
 Wanted: Infromation and photographs from Battalion personnel who worked in this unit, please notify the History Project Manager via the Email Link on the top of this page. |
1 August |
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LTC Robert M. O’Malley passed command of the Battalion to LTC Henry N. Henry, Jr., (seventh Battalion Commander in Vietnam) who was reassigned from his duties as the Provost Marshal of CTZ IV, 22nd Provost Marshal Detachment, 92nd MP Battalion. It's believed that LTC O’Malley returned stateside. LTC Henry was a 1950 draftee of the Korean War, having served in the infantry as an enlisted man where he received a “Mustang” battlefield commission. He stayed in the infantry until 1958 when he received a Regular Army commission in the Military Police Corps. He attended the MP schools and taught there for three years before being assigned on ROTC detail for three years. He then served as the Provost Marshal of the European Exchange System for two and a half years. |
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2 August |
All Outpost Missions In The TAOR Terminated |
TAOR Due to the increased emphasis on Vietnamization, B Company abandoned the two fortified strong points on Hill-15 and on the Finger of Land, built in the spring of 1969. The fortifications at both locations were destroyed. The village outpost's staffed from late 1967, #1 in An Xuan, #2 Long Hung, #3 An Hoa Hung and #4 Long Binh Tan, were turned over to the local Popular Forces. All B Company personnel withdrawn from the facilities were committed to increased reconnaissance and ambush missions within the Tactical Area of Responsibility. |
Change In Tactics Under Intensified Vietnamization |
TAOR From 1967 through early 1969 before Vietnamization was returned to its proper priority status, the battalion troops assigned to the TAOR performed all tactical aspects of an aggressive counterinsurgency mission against the local VC shadow government both inside and outside of the villages, and their squad leaders had the authority to immediately engage any enemy elements they observed or encountered on their assignments. The PF scout-interpreters assigned to the teams were raised in the TAOR and had a wealth of knowledge on the terrain, enjoyed the trust of the villagers, and possessed intimate knowledge of the local VC infrastructure and membership. But this was now late 1969, the villages were now tactically off limits without specific orders, and the duties of the ambush-reconnaissance teams were changed from aggressive overall counterinsurgency (elimination of enemy political and military cadre) to just defensive screening of enemy military units to prevent their incursions in the TAOR to set up and launch close-in mortar and rocket attacks against the post. In addition, authority to engage enemy operatives unless under direct attack had been changed from the purview of the squad leader’s, and transferred to company and/or Battalion TOC level. Their PF scout-interpreters were also quickly replaced with specially trained ARVN's, who were strangers to the area and its people. Separate from the Vietnamization Program, and primarily due to the permanency of Main Force VC units operating south of the Buong River, the changes in the mission also required changes in the size and tactics of the ambush teams. Before mid 1969 they were generally squad sized, and lightly equipped like their VC nemeses, allowing them the ability of speed, noise discipline and concealment. Now with the addition of larger, better armed and trained Main Force VC units operating within the area, they were operating at platoon size, carrying full field packs and steel helmets which provided a better degree of safety and defensive capability, but complicated water borne transport and negated to a larger degree their ability for speed and concealment. Although the size of the tactical units and length of their field missions had expanded, the troops still had to contend with the same hardships as their predecessors did, created by the wet terrain and weather. . |
11 August |
MPC Conversion Day |
Series 661 Military Payment Certificates (MPC) were withdrawn from circulation and the new Series 681 was issued to all United States military personnel. |
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| Wanted: if you participated in an official capacity on Conversion Day or can provide any official documents, personal stories or photographs, please contact the History Project Manager at the Email Link at the top of this page. |
12 August |
Communist Mini Offensive |
The Viet Cong began a new offensive attacking 150 targets throughout South Vietnam. |
Quan Loi Convoy Ambushed |
1530 Hours Elements of approximately three North Vietnamese Army companies attacked the Quan Loi convoy on Highway QL-13 (Thunder Road) being escorted by C Company MP's. The attack began with a barrage of heavy mortar, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire. The ambush was first initiated by the destruction of a culvert with a command detonated mine that split the convoy in half. While one segment continued on to Quan Loi, the other consisting of 5 vehicles was faced with the enemys' barrage of fire in the kill zone from both sides of the roadway. |
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SP/4 Clarence H. Miley immediately returned suppressive fire with M-73s (7.62 machine guns). Then leaving the protection of his V-100 Armored Commando Car, Miley directed each vehicle to turn around and proceed back to the nearby fire support base Thunder III. A 1st Infantry Division mechanized reaction force responded and attacked the enemy positions with the assistance of tactical air and supporting artillery from Fire Support Base Thunder III, who also came under enemy mortar attack. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment responded with an Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge to cover the destroyed culvert, and allow the stranded convoy vehicles to exit the ambush site. There were 2 U.S. troops killed in action, and 8 wounded. Enemy losses were, 54 dead, 2 captured, and a quantity of weapons and ammunition were recovered. SSG James B, Rehm and his Military Police vehicles returned from Quan Loi and set up a defensive position in order to stop the enemy fire. When all of the convoy had passed through the kill zone, SSG Rehm and SP/4 Miley continued with the convoy to Quan Loi. Both MP's were later presented with Bronze Star Medals for Valor for their actions in repelling the enemy attack and getting the convoy vehicles free of the kill zone. The awards were presented by BG Arthur Hurow, Commanding General of the 48th Transportation Group. Also attending the ceremony was COL W. H. Brandenburg, Commanding Officer of the 18th MP Brigade. |
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14 August |
Quan Loi Convoy Ambushed |
History Project Managers Note: The following synopsis was based on an official witness statement of the ambush and actions of the MP's issued by CPT Lynn B. Starkey, Jr. Transportation Corps, Movement Officer in his recommendations for appropriate valor awards. Additional details have been added to the statement that were obtained in further research of 1st Infantry Division records and related media articles and interviews conducted by the History Project Manager. |
1125 hours The 52-vehicle Quan Loi Convoy escorted by four gun jeeps of C Company was returning to Long Binh on Highway QL-13 [Thunder Road]. The first march-unit (Devil-1) of 26 vehicles had entered Chon Than as the second march unit (Devil-2) of 26 vehicles was nearing Fire-Support Base Thunder III. The second march unit was struck in the center with rocket propelled grenades (RPG), mortars and intensive small arms fire from an enemy force estimated to be battalion sized positioned on both sides of the road. As an immediate result two POL tankers were destroyed in the center of the road. Two other tankers attempted to pass but were stopped with flat tires caused by small arms and shrapnel. One convoy control jeep was also struck with small arms fire. |
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MP's SP/4 Mitchell, SGT Robert C. Keil and SP/4 Johnson advanced forward to help the remaining trucks around the wreckage. All of there individuals returned intensive fire to the enemy and rendered aid to the wounded. SP/4 Mitchell also established radio contact with the northbound Quan Loi Convoy MP personnel. He tried numerous times to get a Medevac but was unable to do so. He and his fellow MPs continued to fire their weapons to the flanks. Soon afterwards SP/4 Mitchell informed SSG Medley that they were out of ammunition, and still receiving intensive small arms fire. SSG Raymond Medley, SP/4 Brocato, SP/4 King and I immediately drove three kilometers north in a jeep to assist them. As we approached and entered the Kill Zone, SSG Medley was firing the machine gun to the flanks. SP/4 King was firing the M79 as SP/4 Brocato drove at high speed to the north. Seventy-five meters from the burning tankers we dismounted and continued to fire to the flanks to hold thy enemy down. SSG Medley carried resupply ammunition to SP/4 Mitchell and his MPs. SP/4 Medley also threw smoke to lead in the Medevac. After the wounded had been evacuated, SP/4’s Mitchell, SGT Keel, and Johnson drove out of the Kill Zone to return to their southbound convoy. By this time two V-100’s manned by SP/4 Adam Garza, SP/4 Archie E. Moss, SP/4 Authement, SP/4 Don L. Morris, SP/4 Olsen, and SP/4 Stoner arrived and began placing continuous and accurate fire to the flanks. SP/4 Moss made a confirmed kill 100 meters to the left. |
Soon afterwards artillery, tactical air support, and armored vehicles arrived at the ambush site to secure the area. Only then did the Military Policemen involved leave the Kill Zone. All personnel involved continually exposed themselves to enemy fire to perform their duties. Total U.S. casualties were 1 dead, and 3 wounded. Enemy losses were 20 dead, 1 captured, along with an assortment of weapons and ammunition. |
"Their heroic actions reflect great credit upon themselves, their unit and the United States Army. Appropriate action should be taken to recognize their valor." Lynn B. Starkey, Jr. CPT, Transportation Corps, Movement Officer. |
"It is worth noting that one particular incident during this fight was the outstanding act of daring on the part of SP/4 Adam Garza. I was the driver on his V100 and Authement was the gunner. At one point the entire road was blocked by a blown up tanker, and no traffic could pass, either way. Garza dismounted the V100 and in clear open view of the enemy, under fire, he grabbed the winch on the front of our V and when I released it he took the cable to the tanker and hooked it on the front of it so I could pull it out of the way by backing the V up, pulling the tanker off to the side of the road. After the road was cleared so traffic could get by he remounted the V and again manned the turret and the machine guns. As far as I am concerned he was the hero of the day. The rest of us were just trying to save our own asses, and those of our buddies. I asked CPT Starkey to give him special recognition for that act but somehow it was never addressed.” SSG (CW3 Ret.) Archie E. Moss, C Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, May 1969 to April 1970. |
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| Wanted: It has been reported that all the C Company members of the convoy escort received the Bronze Star for Valor. If you can verify this information or provide any other photographs, award citations, information or personal stories pertaining to this ambush, please notify the History Project Manager via the Email Link on the top of this page. |
18 August |
1LT Charles R. Moran, HQ& HQ Detachment, was assigned as the Battalion Motor Officer. |
20 August |
CPT James L. Wilson of HQ & HQ Detachment was assigned as the new Battalion Adjutant. A reinforced enemy platoon attempted an ambush of the Quan Loi convoy being escorted by elements of C Company on Highway QL-13. A quick mechanized reaction force from the 1st Infantry Division crushed the attack allowing the convoy to continue unharmed. U.S. losses were two wounded. Enemy losses were seven dead, two captured, along with a small, supply of weapons, and ammunition. |
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26 August |
TAOR With the continuing stand-down of U.S. combat commands, the availability of trained Medics who had yet to qualify for DEROS increased, and the repeated requests for medical corpsmen to supplement the B Company ambush teams was finally satisfied with the assignment of three medical corpsmen from the 44th Medical Brigade (Long Binh Post). CPT Jones was continuing to reshape the ambush platoon into a regular and fully equipped infantry posture. |
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Regardless of MOS if you recognize or participated in any of the events listed on this Timeline page and would like to contribute any information, personal stories, documents, media articles, photographs, or, if you can provide information on any events not listed, please take a moment to contact the History Project Manager at the Email Link provided for you on this page. Your contributions are important to the recording of the Battalion history and always welcomed here.
SP/4 J. C. Mitchell
SP/4 R. W. Olsen
CPT Wilsonr