~ 720th Military Police Battalion Reunion Association Vietnam History Project ~
February 1969 ~ Battalion Timeline
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Last Updated
21 October 2014

At the start of the month Battalion HQ Detachment, its letter companies and the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog) were headquartered subordinate to the 18th MP Brigade, 89th MP Group, III Corps Tactical Zone, Bien Hoa Provence, Long Binh Post,  South Vietnam.
18th MP
Brigade
89th MP
Group
720th MP
Battalion
February
Battalion Staff ~ 1
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Battalion Staff ~ 2
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11 February

     LTC Baxter M. Bullock, the sixth commanding officer of the battalion in Vietnam, passes command of the Battalion to LTC Robert M. O’Malley.

14 February
     The following B Company personnel were promoted, PFC’s Robert I. King, Kenneth J. Marraccini, William L. “Moe” Mohollen, John J. Vandemark, Paul E. Brown, Robert J. "Auggy" Augspurger, Jr., William C. Young, George S. Watkins, Billy J. Stivers, to Specialist Fourth Class (SP/4), PVT Sidney Lucas to Private First Class (PFC).
G1930
  11 February, LTC O'Malley and MAJ Weaver.
G1931
  11 February, MAJ Weaver and unidentified Battalion staff.
22 February
The Battalion Goes to Full Alert Status
     Late in the morning CPTJimmy H. Rich of B Company was called to Battalion TOC and informed by LTC O’Malley- “Tonight is the night for the attack.” He now had to quickly provide an OPLAN for the company, and if more detailed information existed it was not provided to him at the briefing.

     With what little information had been provided to him, CPT Rich formulated and submitted his OPLAN to TOC. By 1300 hours, LTC Robert O’Malley and MAJ David I. Bertocci the S3 made changes in their previous projected locations of the ambush squads based on recommendations outlined by CPT Rich. Later, they along with CPT Rich further discussed the adjustments, and LTC O’Malley and MAJ Bertocci made the final decision on the number and placement of the B Company assets in the field.

     The II Field Force strategy of Long Binh Post was based on the enemy attack plans used during the Tet 1968 attack. They placed the major combat commands in CTZ III on alert to assist with the defense of Bien Hoa City and the Ho Nai POW facility, all northwest of Long Binh Post, and to block any enemy units using the same interdiction routes to the Saigon Military District to the south.

     While B Company was preparing its defensive operations plan for the TAOR, the Battalio's other organic companies Alpha, Charlie and the 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog)- OPCON to the 89th MP Group, were also busy preparing defensive plans for their units that operated within the interior and on the highways surrounding Long Binh Post.

     During the evening C Company, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade was assigned OPCON to the Battalion and placed on security duty at the Dong Nai River Bridge. Air assets at Bien Hoa Air Base and Long Binh Post were on alert, but would respond only where directed once an attack began.

     Once it was evident that Long Binh Post was the focus of the attack, an immediate request went to Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (TAC) for additional reinforcements. In response they assigned a Troop from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse) and positioned it near Bien Hoa northwest of Long Binh Post.
199th LI
Brigade
11th Armored
Cavalry

     Four reinforced ambush squads were called to formation outside the orderly room where CPT Rich briefed them on their assignments for the mission, and authorized double loads of ammunition for each MP. Everyone was aware of the seriousness of the situation, but due to the limited intelligence available from Battalion TOC at that time, no one left the briefing expecting the eventual magnitude of the attack they would find themselves in the middle of, or the important role they would soon play in disrupting the enemy’s ability to mount a sustained attack and provide reinforcements.

    At 1830 hours, the four ambush squads departed the company compound for transport to their assignments. It was still daylight when Squads 74, 77, and 78 were trucked out along Highway-317 to the intersection at Gate-11 and Highway QL-15 where they unloaded and walked west to their positions along the crest of the Finger. Squad-76 required river transport so they boarded Boston Whalers for the ride south down the Ben Go River to its intersection with the Buong River and Hill-15.
23 February
The 1969 Post Tet Attack on Long Binh Post Begins

     For reasons never explained in any of the available documents, Battalion TOC decided that the B Company ambush platoon would be the only ground element to stand and face the enemy assault in the TAOR in the early morning of the 23.
     Since September 1967, the Battalion and especially B Company had been restricted to the tactics of cat-and-mouse in their pursuit of the local VC forces in and around the TAOR. It was mostly tit-for-tat with the shadowy VC always escaping across the river where they turned and thumbed their noses at the MP’s who like little children were not allowed to cross the street. It had been a frustrating eighteen months of bureaucratic rules, regulations and boundaries, and it was always the boundaries that stopped the pursuit and frustrated the troops the most. The enemy would never stand and fight. Now after all those months of frustrations, B Company was about to realize their dream. The enemy was no longer running from them, but instead coming to them, coming into their backyard to fight. It was time for the big pay back, and although greatly outnumbered, that is what B Company would do.

     Before the next 24 hours ended it would be a night and day as one unidentified officer from brigade would later say- “With B Company kicking ass and taking names!”

     Since fall of 1968, the way stations and base camps of the (Dong Nai) VC Main Force Regiment, 5th NVA Division, were marshaled in and around the area of Big Hill-38, Hill-42, and south and west of Phuoc Cang and Long Khanh villages. According to MACV intelligence reports from August 1968 the battalion had been busy in the southern Long Khan and central Bien Hoa province areas harassing ARVN and Allied forces.

     Since fall of 1968, the way stations and base camps of the (Dong Nai) VC Main Force Regiment, 5th NVA Division, were marshaled in and around the area of Big Hill-38, Hill-42, and south and west of Phuoc Cang and Long Khanh villages. According to MACV intelligence reports from August 1968 the battalion had been busy in the southern Long Khan and central Bien Hoa province areas harassing ARVN and Allied forces.

     Their parent unit the 5th NVA Division had been operating in War Zones C and D in the CTZ III area for years. Many of the combat support and convoy escort missions assigned to the 720th from 1966 through 1969 were to assist and provision the U.S. and ARVN infantry units engaging them. The 274th was also the unit that attacked and briefly occupied Ho Nai and the Widows Village north of Long Binh Post during the 1968 Tet Offensive.
Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility
     From their present location the routes of approach to the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post was limited. Any movement-in-force from their base camps towards the east could have been easily compromised by their having to pass through the villages and by the PF outpost’s of Phuoc Cang and Long Khanh, requiring them to cross Highway QL-15 and dodge the much larger 199th Light Infantry Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to their northeast, and the Thai Army base security patrols operating north and west of Bearcat. Instead, they chose to traveled north through the jungle covered streams from the two hills, cross the Buong River at its narrowest part by sampan relay, and use the tree-shrouded stream beds on the north side for access into the eastern and unpopulated sector of the Battalion TAOR.
0200 Hours  The attack began with the launching of over a dozen 122mm rockets. Once across the river their forces divided with some proceeding under Highway QL- 15 through the large culvert to attack the post east of Gate-11, while the majority traveled west up through the Finger of Land to fortify positions on Hill-23 and in line along Highway 317 across from Gate-10. To avoid the minefields along the no-mans land in between the two gates, their strategy appeared to be feigning a full attack along a wide front between the gates, while actually focusing their heaviest attack against both gate bunkers to access the un-mined roadways as safer avenue into the post. Their primary support weapons consisting of heavy mortars and 122mm rockets remained south of the Buong River, positioned atop the eastern crest of Big Hill-38. Smaller mortars were later found among the recovered weapons after the attack. Based on the lack of contact before 0200, it appears that the some of the enemy infantry and their sapper units may have already been in place along Highway 317 before the B Company ambush patrols were deployed.

     In December 2005 MAJ Oliver Rose's story of the "Ordeal Of Squad-76"' (Ambush), B Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, was published in Vietnam Magazine.

     Details of the attack and Battalion defensive actions both on and off post can be found in detail in Book II, Vietnam Journal, Volume II, "Operation Stabilize," Chapter 10, "1969 The Big Payback."
Cu Chi Detachment A group of approximately 34 Viet Cong Sappers attacked the flight line of the base camp with explosive charges and Rocket Propelled Grenades following an early morning mortar attack. The attack was centered along the outer perimeter in the area of the 554th Engineer Battalion. A total of 14 GI's were Killed In Action with approximately 40 wounded. Nine Chinook helicopters of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, 12th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade were destroyed and another three were severely damaged. No members of the C Company detachment were injured.
24 February
10th US Campaign begins, Tet 69/Counteroffensive, 23 February to 8 June 1969.
    The enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressive allied ground operations. Between 23 February and 8 June 1969, a total of 70 significant named ground operations were terminated resulting in heavy enemy loss of life and materiel .
Squad-76 Ambushed
TAOR  B Company Ambush Squad-76 came under mortar attack from a VC emplacement on top of Hill-15, assisted in destroying the enemy emplacement, and was able to withdraw without casualties.
25 February
Operation CONDOR III

     A Company was again assigned the responsibility of organizing, supervising and providing security for the movement of 1,060 vehicles of the remaining elements of the Royal Thai Army Black Panther Division from Newport to Bearcat, the final phase of Operation CONDOR III. This increment contained the division HQ and HQ Company (rear) of their 2d Infantry Brigade, three infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, and the remainder of the division combat support and service elements.

     The Thai divisional changeover was now complete, and they continued their security operations from the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post south to Nui Dat (Australian Forces AO), and west to the Dong Nai River. They remained under direct OPCON of the IIFF Headquarters and administrative and logistical control of the 9th Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade rear detachment at Bearcat.
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