15 April The 720th MP Battalion ambush and security assignment at the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Depot, Long Binh Post, was terminated. The twenty-six enlisted men and one officer assigned to the detail were reassigned to other duties.

This ended the first phase of the Battalion ambush assignments.

15 July Under Operation MOOSE (move out of Saigon expeditiously) General Westmoreland previously ordered the United State Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) and Joint General Staff Headquarters to move from Saigon to their new complex on Long Binh Post (Operation PISTOL). With headquarters security in mind the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) decided it needed to eliminate the enemy close-in-strike capability along the southern perimeter. They called on the 18th MP Brigade.

USARV

MACV

The Battalion was called on to perform an infantry mission which would involve enemy suppression and civil pacification utilizing, ambush & recon, river patrol & security, local level civil & military liaison, and civic action quality of life programs. The first year of the mission involved all three organic companies of the Battalion and the 615th MP Company (subordinate). Later in June of 1968 all operations would be assigned to B Company with A & C Company assisting when needed.

The ambush assignment would be formed to eliminate and suppress Viet Cong influence in the 22 square mile Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility (TAOR) that bordered the southern perimeter (Highway 317) of Long Binh Post on he north, the Dong Nai River on the west, Highway QL15 on the east, and the Buong River in the south.

In preparation for the reconnaissance, ambush and combat patrols they were to conduct, 40 men from the three organic companies (A, B, & C), and the entire 615th MP Company, attended refresher classes on recon and ambush patrol methods and techniques taught by instructors from the 5th Special Forces Group out of Bien Hoa.

5th

11 through 15 September It began with the five day Operation CORRAL, a cordon and search operation for the first phase, assisted by elements of the 9th Infantry Division and Military Intelligence. The second phase, Operation STABILIZE, would last for the next three years.

9th

15 September Under Operation STABILIZE the 720th MP Battalion had to effectively disrupt and eliminate the long existing Viet Cong infrastructure within the four primary villages within the TAOR with the end result being pacification to a degree where all operations could be turned over to local Vietnamese civil and military authorities.

Scout Dog Unit The 212th MP Company (Sentry Dog), subordinate to the 720th, was also called upon by the 18th MP brigade to organized and train a Scout Dog Unit that would be used to supplement the Battalion ambush and recon teams throughout the 1967-1970 period of Operation STABILIZE.

The TAOR at this time consisted of all the area bordered on the north by the southeastern perimeter of Long Binh Post (Highway 317), on the east by the Rach Bien River, on the south by the Buong River, and on the west by the Dong Nai River. The area later to be known as the "Finger Of Land" was not part of the early Battalion TAOR (see map to right).

The 615th MP Company was given its own Area Of Operations (see map above) to conduct ambush and recon patrols east of the 720th TAOR in the area later known as the" Finger of Land," and the area south of the Buong River containing Big Hill #38.

The 615th MP Company Area of Operations south of the Buong River later became part of the 9th Infantry Division Area of Operations (Bear Cat) until the fall of 1968 (the 9th Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade was reassigned to the Mekong Delta IV Corps Tactical Zone), when it was reassigned to the Royal Thai Army, Black Panther Division, also headquartered in Bear Cat.

9th

Most of the time the ambush areas were pre selected by Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) based on current intelligence information on enemy infiltration into the villages after dark.

The focus was on preventing the night infiltration of the villages to prevent local Viet Cong from having a close first strike capability in attacking and harassing Long Binh Post, visiting their families, forced and voluntary recruiting, obtaining supplies and, collecting war taxes from the villagers and farmers. The Battalion teams would be trucked to the edge of the villages at dusk or dropped off by River Patrol Unit boats, on occasion the 615th MP Company utilized helicopters for insertion.

Daytime recon patrols were also a large part of the ambush mission and would provide the team members with a better knowledge of the lay of the land, trails and way stations utilized by the local Viet Cong.

The squad leaders would more often than not, have the authority to select the specific ambush site within that designated area assigned to them by higher authority.

For a brief period MP's were even assigned to work with the local Popular Forces ambush patrols. One MP with a field radio was assigned to the local village PF squad for the night ambush assignment. This assignment quickly became very unpopular and was ended just as fast. The reasons were varied and valid. Many of the MP's didn't trust the PF's believing many were Viet Cong family or sympathizer's; the PF's were not properly armed or trained for the missions; due to the fact that few PF's spoke English and none of the MP's Vietnamese, the language barrier was insurmountable.

Another problem that the PF patrols presented in the early stages of Operation STABILIZE was the lack of coordination between their ambush patrols and the MP's ambush patrols. There were instances where both would meet unexpectedly in the darkness. Fortunately no loss of life resulted. This same problem would later develop between the different MP company ambush patrols.

The ambush patrol coordination problem grew much worse in 1968 with two separate company patrols (A & B) exchanging fire just outside of Outpost #1 at An Xuan Village. Several members were wounded before the mistake was discovered, fortunately no one died from the incident.

Coordination and control was also problematic in other areas of the TAOR operations, such as the exchange of intelligence information. It would have to be disseminated on a daily basis between four companies of MP's and the local Popular Forces command, who's troops very seldom had any interaction unless their trails happen to cross when in the TAOR.

18 November An ambush team from the 615th MP Company suffered two wounded during an exchange of hand grenades between their ambush team and a Viet Cong force of unknown size while in a night ambush position in an area just south of the Finger of Land. SP/4 Lynn Jorgensen and another other MP (yet to be identified) both received leg wounds.

26 November An ambush team of the 615th MP Company suffered one wounded during an exchange of hand grenades between their patrol and a Viet Cong force of unknown size while in a night ambush position near the Finger of Land. A VC Grenade came out of the night and struck the barrel of SP/4 Lynn Jorgensen's machine gun, then rolled off into the darkness to his right. When it exploded a fragment struck SP/4 Jorgensen in the right side of the head. The 615th MP's participating in the patrol were SP/4 Jorgensen, SP/4 Bixler and others yet to be identified.

29 November SGT Ward Gunther Walter age 50, C Company, Ambush Squad, died from wounds received by small arms fire in the 720th MP Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility while his ambush squad was preparing to counter attack a VC force attacking the MACV Outpost at Phuoc Cang along Highway QL15.

4 December The VC fired on a B Company day reconnaissance patrol consisting of SGT Edward L. Hall , PFC Jeffery B. Watt, CPL Le Van Muon (PF Interpreter), and others yet to be identified, and directed sniper fire at B Company River Patrol Boat operated by SP/4 Larry F. Culver.

The ambush occurred when the patrols unknowingly suprised a planned VC ambush of several ammunition barges traveling north on the Dong Nai River. During the fire fight the VC still managed to hit and damage two of the barges with Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fire. One VC body was recovered from the ambush scene and blood trails indicate the possibility of two more being wounded.

6 December The same B Company patrol returned to the ambush scene and recovered one of the enemy RPG tubes during the recovery of the damaged barge.

If you participated in any of the ambush incidents on this page, please contact the History Project Manager via the Email Link at the top of this page.