~ 720th Military Police Battalion Vietnam History Project ~
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November 1966 Timeline
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This Page Last Updated  12 December 2017
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18th MP
Brigade
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89th MP
Group
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720th MP
Battalion
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The First Assignments
4 November The first assignments handed down to the Battalion from the 18th MP Brigade and 89th MP Group were: 
A Company Discipline, law, and order in support of the Provost Marshal of the City of Bien Hoa and Long Binh Post and interior security at Long Binh Post. A Company replaced the detachment of the 560th MP Company that was previously performing discipline, law and order duties at Bien Hoa.
B Company Xuan Loc Detachment, Discipline and Law and Order.
C Company Security at the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot on Long Binh Post & security for Cogido Docks and ammunition barges off loading site.
HQ Detachment assigned three communications specialist from Long Binh Post to the 560th MP Company Can Tho Detachment to operate a Radio Teletype Station. SGT Ronald Wonders, and SP/4’s Robert D. Bell and Carl G. Brewer, trained as MOS 05C, Radio Teletype Operators, manned the radio box located in a bunker beside the motor pool.
5 November - Xuan Loc DetachmenB Company was detailed to assign a platoon of MPs to the discipline, law, and order mission in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at their “Blackhorse” Base Camp. The detachment also provided town patrols in the neighboring village of Xuan Loc located in Long Khan Province, III Corps Tactical Zone approximately forty-five miles southeast of Long Binh Post, and Blackhorse was the largest allied military base in the area, part of the Saigon defensive ring. The detachments footprint was first physically located in the base camp, then later near the city of Xuan Loc at several locations, and referred to under several different names, Long Gaio, Blackhorse, Xuan Loc, and the "Husky" (compound).
11th Armored
Cavalry
Regiment

Tay Ninh Convoy  The first official convoy duties of the battalion were officially assigned to B Company. It involved the escort of ammunition and supply convoys from the 3rd Ordnance Supply Depot on Long Binh Post to the Chu Chi (Binh Duong Province) and Tay Ninh (Tay Ninh Province) base camps of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

Personal Reflections  “Members of 3rd Platoon, 4th Squad of B Company took their Parrot "LT Polly" on the Tay Ninh Convoy escort. The joke was if a canary in a coal mine gave early warning of danger, then a parrot on a perch in a jeep could warn of an ambush.”   SP/4 Allan M. Portnoy, B Company & 615th MP Company, 720th MP Battalion, October 1966-October 1967.

SP/4 Patrick

Personal Reflections  “The Tay Ninh convoy used to leave real early in the morning- like 0330 hours or so. One morning I was leaning on my jeep waiting for all of the trucks to arrive and I was half asleep. I heard someone talking and looked around and a three star general was walking down asking everyone about the food and if they had eaten. Startled, I just said- "yes, it was OK."

     The general then asked the older guy I was working with (he was maybe 23). He pushed his helmet up and with bloodshot eyes said to the general, "who the hell could eat at this time of the day."

     The general laughed and said, "I'm with you buddy."  SP/4 Charles R. Patrick, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, October 1966-October 1967.

Personal Reflections  “SP/4 Robert C. Schlag, Jr. from A Company [Oct 1966-Oct 1967] was in the jeep behind me, his call sign was "Smooth Glacier 9." The escort radio net had been a source of entertaining goofiness all day and SGT Norman J. E. Eck [A Company, Oct 1966-Oct 1967] came on the net and warned all, "the next person playing on the radio will answer to me."

     We cleared a portable bridge next to a blown one (convoy progress check point) and reported "Smooth Glacier 8 clear [passed] Charlie Papa Echo. SP/4 Schlag then reported, "Smooth Glacier 9 clear Charlie Papa Echo, echo, echo, echo, echo, echo, echo, echo.

     I can still remember seeing SGT Eck standing on the top of the bridge at Newport waiting for us to get there."  SP/4 Charles R. Patrick, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, October 1966-October 1967.

SP/4 Schlag

      Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie Companies also jointly provided military police support to Allied units as directed by commanding officer, 179th Provost Marshal Detachment, 95th MP Battalion, 89th Military Police Group, 18th Military Police Brigade, United States Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV).

     Although the first official operational assignments to the battalions three organic companies (A, B & C) were unit specific, all three companies shared the duties on a rotating basis.

     During the first months many of the original battalion staff were reassigned and exchanged for men from other MP companies already in Vietnam. This was done due to the one year tour rotation program, it prevented the entire battalion staff from having to leave at the same time when their tours came to an end.

USARV
Operation ATTLEBORO
9 November  At the end of operational planning for Operation ATTLEBORO, it became necessary for USARV Headquarters to provide the equivalent of a Provisional Truck Company to augment 1st Logistical Command truck units supporting the rapidly expanding operation. In a matter of nine hours, 22 vehicles and sixty personnel, primarily from the 92nd, 95th and 720th MP Battalion, were assembled at Long Binh Post prepared to participate in convoy operations.
Personal Reflections
     "From Da Nang harbor we traveled to Vung Tau where we off loaded into landing craft after being issued 100 rounds of ammo and hauling our two duffel bags of gear.
     We "hit the beach" and were loaded up in deuce and a half's and hauled to the airport. We then loaded up on cargo aircraft, Army Caribou's I believe, and headed up to Bien Hoa airport.
     “Due to a shortage of transportation company truck drivers at the time, on occasion during the major support operations MPs were assigned to drive trucks loaded with ammunition to fire support bases in III Corps Tactical Zone."   SP/4  Charles R. Patrick, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, October 1966-October 1967; Photograph G0714.

10 November  The Battalion also provided general purpose military police support as an Army-level Battalion to include; discipline, law, and order; physical post security; traffic control; POW (Prisoner of War) transport, confinement; and convoy escort.

     What began as a small-scale, limited-objective combat training exercise for the 196th Light Infantry Brigade on 14 September unexpectedly developed into a widespread, protracted, multi organizational battle before it ended on 24 November 1966.

      The area of operations was on the southern fringes of the Dong Minh Chau, or War Zone C, as it was popularly called, and War Zone D, just to the east and in the southern portion of Phuoc Long Province, III Corps Tactical Zone.

< War Zone C & D

196th Light
Infantry
Brigade
     The final troop list of participating units included elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, several Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions, a Special Forces-trained "Mike Force" and U.S. air support, 22,000 Allied troops in all. It was the largest US. operation of the war to that date.
1st Infantry
Division
25th Infantry
Division
173rd
Airborne
Brigade
5th Special
Forces
Group
2nd Field
Forces

6 November The corps-level II Field Force Vietnam took control of the operation until the final action on 25 November 1966.

   This operation was the field test of a new search and destroy pattern of area warfare; multi-divisional corps level operations.

Operation SHOTGUN

15 November The Battalion was officially assigned the mission of convoy escorts and security in support of the 90th Replacement Battalion at Long Binh Post. Convoys were escorted between Long Binh Post, Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Camp Alpha outside of Saigon.

     The MPs provided gun jeep escorts for the military busses and vehicles used to deliver troops departing and arriving the Vietnam theater of war in III and IV Corp Tactical Zones. Later (exact date at this time unknown) these escorts would be named and referred to as Operation SHOTGUN,
POW Escort and Hospital Guard Mission
     The Battalion was officially assigned the mission of guarding and escorting all enemy Prisoners of War and Detainees being treated in Allied Medical facilities within the III Corps Tactical Zone. This assignment would rotate between the Battalion companies and eventually expand to include the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Wounded prisoners were brought to the 24th Evacuation Hospital for emergency treatment then taken across the street to the 50th Medical Company for convalescence until they were well enough to be taken to the III Corps POW enclosure for final disposition. The MPs of the 720th were responsible not only for pickup and transport but providing staff to guard the POW’s in the designated hospital wards at the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospital and 50th Medical Company.
Operation OVERSEER

     Operation OVERSEER was initiated as a Battalion mission to provide daily route and supply convoy security for the 40 mile run from Long Binh Post in Bien Hoa Province to the city of Xuan Loc and the nearby headquarters of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment “Blackhorse” base camp just south of the city in an area formerly known as Long Gaio in Long Khan Province. In later months and years this operation would be referred to as the Long Gaio, Xuan Loc, and Blackhorse Convoy. The name Blackhorse was in recognition of the black stallion displayed on the 11th Armored Cavalry Division shoulder patch.

     The convoy would depart the Long Binh Post staging area head northeast along Highway QL-1 (about 40 miles) through the city of Xuan Loc. After passing through Xuan Loc, Highway QL-1 turned southwest at a fork in the road where the Highway-1 sign pointed to Da lat. The southwest Highway LTL-2 was a two-lane dirt road (for about 5 miles) through a Michelin rubber plantation to the base camp.

11th Armored
Cavalry
Regiment
      In later tours this operation would be referred to under several names, the Long Gaio, Xuan Loc and Blackhorse convoys. All three organic companies to include the 615th MP Company (subordinate) participated either jointly or individually at one time or another in escorting the convoy.
     The convoy was initially run on Highway QL1 during the daytime until heavy traffic congestion forced a change to the evening hours. The average number of supply vehicles was from twenty to thirty. They included the fuel tankers, flat beds, tractor-trailers, reefers (refrigerated trucks), and ambulances that carried plasma and other medical supplies. The standard MP escort vehicle at that time was the gun jeep, armed with individual crew weapons and one M-60 machine gun. Later when Armored Personnel Carrier's and V100 Armored Commando Cars were assigned to the Battalion, they supplemented the escorts. Helicopter gunship's and Forward Air Controller’s, were also utilized to scout and provide operational control for air cover and artillery assistance when they were available, and weather conditions permitted.
19th TASS

     Air support for the convoy was provided by the 505th Tactical Control Group, 19th TASS Tactical Air Support Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment-Army TACP (Tactical Air Control Party) Air Liaison Officer, U.S. Air Force, that maintained a detachment at the Blackhorse base camp of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Blackhorse TACP call sign was “Nile Control.”

     The convoy commander, an officer from the transportation group, depending on the size, type of cargo, and intelligence reports on enemy activity in the area, would have the option of requesting FAC (Forward Air Control) support assigned to the mission, aircraft availability and weather conditions permitting. All request for FAC support through the Bien Hoa Air Force Base was coordinated by the designated Air Liaison Officer (ALO), a member of the ground commander’s staff, who was also a senior Forward Air Controller (FAC), and supervisor of the FAC unit in the Tactical Air Control Unit assigned to the geographical area.

Personal Reflections
SP/4 Jorgensen

     "When we started running the Blackhorse convoys in 1967 it was daylight. We would usually run it with 2 armored jeeps or non-armored jeeps and one V100. About 1 month into it, it was announced that we would take the night away from Charlie and run the convoys at night. At night we would try to have 3 M-60 jeeps and one V100.

      When we reached Xuan Loc at night we would immediately turn around and head for home. To me I think it was a 40 to 50 mile round trip."   SP/4 Lynn Jorgensen, 615th MP Company, 720th & 95th MP Battalions, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, 1967-1968.

Personal Reflections
      Xuan Loc convoy duties I participated in toward the end of my tour in 1967 (after Operation EMPORIA) and rotated among other duties, recon, gate guards, and perimeter posts around Long Binh.

      Remember many, many vehicles and on several occasions was the senior MP in charge but at this moment cannot remember the count. Longs lines formed along highway North of Long Binh. Many tankers (I hated to get stationed between the tankers)-tried to separate them if we could but often they would be in line together (though spaced properly). Many times I drove point with v-100 and one or two machine gun mounted jeeps.

      Do not remember the miles During our time, the convoy’s lined up at dusk and was run during the night. Return with empties was in morning light and believe returned to post mid-AM. Sleep and then back on the road again.

      I remember running point for awhile as mentioned above and then getting close to end of tour I asked the first sergeant to move me in the convoy, toward the middle, because I thought it was so risky being in front. First night out my machine gun mounted jeep was positioned among fuel tankers. Great! The night was wet-with heavy rains. I remember when I used to drive in the heavy rain; it would push the eyelids down and at times force you to sleep whilst driving (we all were so tired). In fact, on a side story I remember waking up driving under an extended roof of a building almost 30 yards off the road - everyone was sleeping under their poncho's during the heavy rain. Being so startled I swerved hard and drove back onto the roadway and by God's grace didn't hit anything. No body ever knew about the 'almost' accident except for me.

      Later in same circumstances with two very new guys as driver and shotgun, I manned the machine gun and radio (new guys didn't know procedure or check points) I was under my poncho staying warm and dry and on occasion peaking out to make sure driver had right space and was driving in the middle of the road (to avoid mines). Sure enough, the middle of the convoy received continuous automatic weapons fire right at the tanker behind me. From experienced reflex I had poncho off, machine gun pouring fire back upon those that fired at us and had the position check point called in + a flare up over the attack position. The 11th Cavalry responded in force to the attack plus there was almost immediate air support with Huey's maybe some others. Funny: I heard the new guys talking when we were at rest at Xuan Loc awaiting the emptied vehicles to get organized and return. "Damn these old guys (I was only 20) are so good! Will we ever be like that?” Later while back home, during Tet, I was hoping they were all like that. And from what I heard (some were stationed with me later in Ft. Richie, Maryland) many guys were even better than that-I am grateful.

      Lots of other stories but mostly remember being tired. When we arrived back in company I remember being so tired I could take apart our weapons, clean them and put them together with my eyes closed and half way napping during the process.”   SP/4 Dave Kerkhoff, 615th MP Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, January-December 1967.

SP/4 Kerkhoff
Personal Reflections

     “Around December 1967 as the new guy on the block, I was looking for a steady job and a steady shift, so I talked with the NCOIC of the night convoys who was getting short and he described the night convoy work as a piece of cake. He also said that there were times when he fell asleep in the jeep on the way up and back. This sounded like my kind of job, so I went out with him one night and it was OK. I told 1SG Shields that I would like to take over the night escort detail. I forgot what my father, a WWII Army vet told me, “Do not volunteer for anything,” well I got the job!

       The escort make up of the convoy was, one V-100 usually as lead vehicle with the convoy commander the rank of Lieutenant. About four or five gun-jeeps spaced through out the convoy. The last vehicle was a gun-jeep with the NCOIC. Everything went well until the week before Tet 1968.
      As we went north through Ho Nai [Widows] Village I saw two Vietnamese men standing in an alleyway, one with a radio and the other with a pair of binoculars. It appeared that they were counting the vehicles in the convoy and reporting the information. I radioed ahead to the lieutenant, explained what I observed, and asked him to be alert because we would probably get hit this night.
     A little farther up the road, a 3/4-ton Quan Canh vehicle pulled up to the back of my jeep. They wanted to tag along with us to Xuan Loc. I told them it was OK, and to stay close behind us.
      Just south of Xuan Loc the main body of the convoy was hit by a command detonated Claymore mine. I was about 30 minutes behind the main body with a broken down APC doing about five miles an hour, and an empty ambulance on the tow truck. The next problem we have is a flat bed with a broken rear axle. We chained the rear axle up off the surface of the road and were ready to proceed when we were ambushed. They were throwing grenades and small arms fire at us. We continued north on Highway-1 toward Xuan Loc. As we approach the village there was a sign on the east side of the road that said in Vietnamese, something like...”Welcome to Xuan Loc.” It was plastered with stickers of the VC and NVA flags. Standing next to it were two Vietnamese in black pajamas with ammo pouches on their chests. I stopped my little section of the convoy on the side of the road inside Xuan Loc. Rather than go back and engage the Viet Cong I decide to get the crippled vehicles to Long Gaio.
      I was about one hour behind the main body. I put the crippled APC as the lead vehicle. Now I have an APC, a flat bed, two tanker trucks, an ambulance on a tow truck, one other MP gun-jeep and my jeep. We continued north on Highway-1 to the Long Gaio cut off and proceed through the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Part way down the road I received a call on the radio from MACV in Xuan Loc wanting to know if I can turn around and proceed back south to rescue the Quan Canh’s in the 3/4-ton truck who joined us. Apparently they were also ambushed. There was no way I could go back and help them. Right after that the APC hit a land mine.
SGT Ruffer

       Needless to say, I was not having a good night. All I could think about is that lying NCO "buddy" of mine who told me this would be a piece of cake. I called in a Dust-Off, evacuated the wounded from the now burning APC, and called ahead to the lieutenant for assistance. While all of this is going on I find out he is sitting in the mess hall at the base camp having coffee. I finally got the rear element of the convoy to Long Gaio, and went to sleep in the back seat of my jeep.

      When we all returned to the company the next morning, I marched into the first sergeants office and asked him not to ever again send me out there with that lieutenant. The funny part of the story is the next night I took my MP’s to the rally point for the next convoy. The lieutenant was not in sight and I have one ambulance (no blood to transport) and one bobtail without a tow chain. I asked the guys where the rest of the folks are and they say that nobody wanted to go with us. Next I get a call over the radio from our Battalion CO who asked me how many vehicles we had. I told him two, and he said to cancel the convoy for the night. We had more MP vehicles than convoy vehicles! We did not have another night convoy to Xuan Loc after that, until some time after Tet 1968.

       The one thing about the incident that I regret even today is not being able to go back and help the Quan Canh’s in their 3/4-ton truck. Although they were not an official part of my convoy, they were fellow MP’s.”   SGT (CW5 Ret.) James F. Ruffer, 615th MP Company, 720th & 95th MP Battalions, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, November 1967-August 1968.

Personal Reflections
     "I was promoted to Sergeant (E-5) in April of 1968 while I was still on the Ambush and Recon team. I was informed that I would be taking over as the NCOIC [Noncommissioned Officer In Charge] of the Xuan Loc convoy and would receive training from SGT Richard A. Creasy. I had a total of only “one” day of OJT [on the job training] before I officially took charge of the convoy run.
      The day of my first convoy run I went to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), TOC and a Major from the 11th ACR was my liaison. He was a pretty nice guy. He told me that if the convoy ever got into any trouble we had his full support and all his cavalry assets would be available to me. During one of my other visits to the TOC I was introduced to COL Patton ,(son of the famous WWII General George S. Patton, 3rd Army) who was the commander of the 11th ACR. No nonsense type of guy is what I remember of him.
      Another day Xuan Loc base camp had received incoming VC rockets the night before and the alert status was "high." There were twenty-one MPs standing around and we got called for a reaction force that spotted some VC outside the perimeter. We were given the job to chase them down. During our sweep we found the spot where they had placed their aiming stakes and also found some of their bunkers.
      While the unloading of the trucks occurred we would have several hours of down time. Most of the men wanted to chow down right away. We ate at a maintenance battalion and at first they were not very happy to have a bunch of MPs eating in their mess. We got that problem squared away right away, and that was some of the best army chow I have ever eaten. Shit, even the liver and onions were good! They said the cooks at the mess were mechanics, but did they ever know how to cook.
      Some of the of the men would try and find a bunk to nap on. Several times were got permission to use the firing range to fire our M-79's, and that was always a kick. After the test firing we would get new ammo for the return trip. Some of the men would read books or magazines, write letters home, drive around base taking in the sights, or visit the PX. For some strange reason there always seemed to be case of cold Budweiser Beer around. I had an unwritten rule with the escort detail MPs that you could drink a few if you wanted to but no getting screwed up. I used to drive around and I was really impressed with all the versions of the tracks they had. If I was into combat arms, I would have gone armor."
     "The Xuan Loc convoy used to be a night convoy but had recently been moved to daylight hours. A Company personnel assigned to the convoy would go to the motor pool and draw the vehicles for the day. The night before a roster was posted listing the personnel for the next day. It would list who was assigned to the scout vehicle, gun jeep #1, or #2, etc. Also, who the vehicle IC [In Charge], drivers, and gunners were. Once everyone was assembled in the company area weapons were drawn from the armorer.
       As a minimum we always ran with seven jeeps and twenty-one MP's, three in each jeep. There were several times when we had prior information that the convoy would be larger than normal so additional MP's and jeeps were assigned.
       All MPs carried a .45 caliber pistol. The gun jeep driver took his M-16 rifle with whatever ammo he could carry, usually two bandoleers. The IC of the jeep carried the M-79 [grenade launcher] with a basic load of 18 HE [high explosive] rounds. The machine gunner would draw the M-60 along with 4 ammo cans of 7.62 rounds, usually about 800 rounds. All jeeps carried 2 smoke grenades and 4 hand grenades.
        Once everyone obtained their vehicles and weapons we proceeded to the firing range off of highway 1A and test fired the machine guns. We would always have to get permission from Battalion TOC [Tactical Operations Command] first. On the way to the range I would stop at Battalion TOC and pick up the cripto sheet [codes] for the day. The codes were changed every day. It was used to call Blackhorse [11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Base Camp] with the information on the convoy.
      When this was completed we went to the staging area at the far end of Long Binh Post near the 2nd Field Forces Headquarters. Once we got to the marshaling area I would meet with the liaison representative from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR). This was a Staff Sergeant [E-6] and really one hell of a nice guy. He would ride with me as we inspected the vehicles. We would drive by all the vehicles and give them a visual inspection, looking at the equipment, insuring the loads were properly secured, etc. Once everything was in order I would have all the drivers assemble and give them a briefing on the convoy run for the day. (All cargo and fuel vehicles had to have a shotgun [second] rider with them) Protocol that I covered at the briefing was first and foremost follow the tracks of the vehicle in front of you and you will probably not hit a land mine. Keep a distance of a couple of vehicle lengths from the vehicle in front. The convoy speed was 30 mph. If you developed mechanical problems you were to pull off to the side of road and let the first MP gun jeep know that you cannot continue and the bobtail [tractors without trailers] will pick you up. Most of the transport company vehicles did not have radios in them whereas the MP's did.
        If anyone hit a land mine they were to stop and dismount, and take up defensive positions until the road could be cleared. Usually if they hit a mine the road was blocked by the disabled vehicle anyway. If the convoy was ambushed continue moving to get out of the kill zone, continue to return fire, etc. Common sense dictated most of the briefing, and it always prevailed!
        If an accident occurred, one MP jeep would remain at the scene and coordinate the request for any medical assistance and the investigation with whatever MP company had jurisdiction in the area. It was usually the 720th B Company Detachment for the Xuan Loc area.
        Once the convoy was ready to leave usually around 0800 to 0900 hours (8;30-9:00 AM) I would call Blackhorse on the radio and let them know I was leaving. I had to let them know how many vehicles and the essential items, reefer [freezer] trucks, fuel trucks, and ammunition trucks. This was all done according to the crypto sheet I had picked up at TOC in the morning.
        The first vehicle to leave was the MP Scout [gun jeep]. Then my jeep, the NCOIC, was the second vehicle. Placement of the MP jeeps was done by the total number of vehicles remaining in the convoy (after the scout vehicle and the trail jeep) divided by the remaining five MP gun jeeps[each was a march unit]. The last vehicle was always an MP jeep. We always had a couple of bobtails, at the end of the convoy along with and ambulance with medics. When we left the staging area, the Staff Sergeant form the 11th ACR would make sure that all the fuel and ammo trucks were separated by other vehicles that way in the event of an ambush they would not be all blown up together.

        Once we left the compound we were under the operational control of the 11th ACR's, TOC. We had seven checkpoints along the route and being the lead element I would radio to the other jeeps in that we were at “Charlie Papa 1” [check point-1], and when the last vehicle reached the check point it would reply. “clear Charlie Papa 1.” This procedure would be followed at each check point until we arrived at Xuan Loc. The route never varied or the times changed.
        The first several miles you would be going through parts of Bien Hoa and surrounding villages. Nothing much of a threat there. The route to Xuan Loc was about 40 miles and the spot that was the worst was the last 6-8 miles, this was know as “MINE ALLEY”. Every morning the engineers would sweep the road for land mines, and finding one, would blow it up with C-4 [explosive]. On occasion they would miss a few. There were a lot of times I would turn around and find that the convoy was to spread out. I would have to get on the radio and yell at the last couple of jeeps to tighten things up.

     My gun jeep would be doing 30 mph but the vehicles in the rear were doing 60 to get caught up[ slinky effect] , not to think about all the dust they were eating in the dry season, nor the mud in their faces during the monsoons.

     Along this stretch of MINE ALLEY there were two 11th ACR reaction forces detailed strictly to the security of the convoy. They consisted of two tanks, and 4 APC's [tracked armored personnel vehicles]. It seems we were always giving the thumbs up sign [every thing OK] to each other. Numerous times throughout the convoy run the assault helicopter company would fly by and give us a thumbs up along with the Cobra Gunship helicopters. They would fly the convoy route looking for enemy activity along our immediate area.

      Once the convoy arrived at Xuan Loc our escort responsibility was finished and we went to the B Company Detachment compound while the convoy unloaded. That would last several hours, then we would return to Long Binh Post with the empty trucks." 
SGT Gary A. Sundt, A Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, October 1967 to October 1968.

SGT Sundt
Personal Reflections
     "My recollection of the Blackhorse Convoy is that it was just less than 30 miles to Blackhorse from the 1st Log marshaling area. I have several pictures of the convoy and a few of the 720th detachment at Blackhorse.
      I was assigned to Blackhorse Convoy at the end of August 1968 and worked it for about 6 months. The convoys ran every day, 7 days a week. They were only cancelled a couple of times while I was assigned, usually because the road was Condition RED.
      We usually got up around 5 AM and got dressed and had breakfast in the Mess Hall. Then the drivers would go to the Motor Pool to check out their assigned gun-jeeps. The gun-jeeps used by A Company while I was working the convoy were identified as A-21, A-22, A-23, A-24 and A-25. At least one jeep had a tow bar and most had a red emergency light. I don't remember any having a siren. The drivers would then go to the parking area in front of the Armory. There, the gunner and the IC would be waiting. The beds of the jeeps were lined with sandbags, and the gunner would load as many boxes of M-60 ammo as could fit into the back of the jeep. After everyone was loaded up, the whole group would drive out through the back gate (Hwy QL-15) and go to a berm next to the road [Hill-23], to test fire all the weapons. The gunners always test fired, that way if a weapon misfired or didn't work they would return to the Armorer and check out another. Meanwhile the other jeeps would go to the marshaling area.
      Each of the gun-jeeps were assigned a call number, i.e.: Car #10, #11, #12, #13 and Car #14 A total of 5 gun-jeeps were used. Car #10 was the lead jeep and usually raced ahead of the convoy and checked the road ahead. Car #11 was the NCOIC of the convoy. Cars #12 and #13 were positioned in the middle of the convoy. Car #14 was at the rear and had the job of keeping all civilians from interdicting with the convoy. The average speed of the convoy was 25-30 MPH.
      We never had an officer or an NCO over the rank of E-5 work the convoy. The pecking order, while I worked the convoy was; new guys were machine gunners. They were usually a PVT or PFC. After they were there for a while or promoted, they moved up to driver. Finally after you had worked the convoy and knew all the jobs associated with if you became an IC. Almost all IC's were SP/4's.
      The convoy usually left before 8 AM, we waited for the all clear from the 11th CAV. Depending on the number of vehicles we were escorting, and the trip lasted between 3 and 4 hours. We sometimes escorted up to 75 vehicles. I remember the usual number at 35-40 vehicles. The cargo varied from food, ammo, fuel, (AV Gas or POL) to PX supplies.
      The trip was hot in the dry season and cool in monsoon season. In an open gun-jeep it was hard to keep dry during monsoon. During the dry season the road from Xuan Loc to Blackhorse was extremely dusty, with a red clay dust. The 11th CAV cleared the road every day before we would leave Long Binh, but sometimes the VC would sneak in and burry a mine. Several times we came up on debris of civilians who ran over the mines. The trees had been cleared back 100 yards on both sides of the road, but the road was not paved and was constantly mined and cleared. We sometimes received sniper fire along this stretch of road. That was another reason why Car #10 raced ahead, to detonate any mines after it had passed over them at 50+ MPH. That never happened though while I was working the convoy. Car #10 was the cleanest car and Car # 14 was the dirtiest, with all the dust from the convoy.
SP/4 McKeon

       After we arrived at Blackhorse we went to the 720th Detachment and unloaded a couple of the gun-jeeps and went into Xuan Loc to visit a local establishment and wait for the truckers to unload their cargo. We would return to Blackhorse and load up and go to the marshaling area for the return trip to Long Binh. Some of the fellows didn't go into Xuan Loc and stayed at the detachment.

      We could eat in the detachment mess hall and go to the 11th Cavalry PX. Otherwise we took naps in the detachment Dayroom.

      The trip back was much faster and lasted a couple of hours. We were usually back by 4:30 PM and drove directly to the armory to off load the weapons. We cleaned all our weapons and checked them back in with the armorer. The driver would then take the gun-jeep to the motor pool, washing the jeep and fuel it for the next day. Only then did we go to our hooch’s to get cleaned up for chow.

      Besides working the Blackhorse Convoy, we were also assigned to the Long Binh Post Reactionary Force and had to be available, if called upon.”   SP/4 Thomas A. McKeon A Company, 720th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group, 18th MP Brigade, 1968-1969.

15 November  89th MP Group's  Operation Plan BOND was initiated as a Battalion mission that tasked  B Company  to assign a platoon of MP’s to relieve the 148th MP Platoon of their discipline, law, and order mission in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at their “Blackhorse” Base Camp.

     The detachment also provided town patrols in the neighboring village of Xuan Loc located in Long Khan Province, III Corps Tactical Zone approximately forty-five miles southeast of Long Binh Post. Blackhorse was the largest allied military base in the area, part of the Saigon defensive ring. The base name was derived from the distinctive Black Stallion depicted on the shoulder patch of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The detachments footprint was first physically located within the base camp, then moved in later years near the city of Xuan Loc at several locations, and referred to under several different names, Long Gaio, Blackhorse, Xuan Loc, and the "Husky" (compound).

11th Armored
Cavalry
Regiment
First Ambush Assignments

19 November  Viet Cong sappers once again attacked the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Depot on Long Binh Post with satchel charges destroying 1,265 105-mm artillery rounds. Due to the ease of the local Viet Cong to successfully attack the depot at will, the Battalion was tasked with providing outside perimeter security.

     The battalion committed one platoon from C Company tasking them to set up listening and ambush sites nightly outside the depot to supplement the static post interior security. Later A Company would be assigned the responsibility. The assignment would continue until 15 April 1967.
20 November The battalion elements assigned to convoy escort and resupply in Operation ATTLEBORO on 10 November completed their mission and returned to Long Binh Post.

Late November, Exact Date Unknown  Seven Infantry companies totaling more than 1,000 troops arrived in Vietnam and were assigned to the 18th MP Brigade to assist and augment the brigades physical security operations, and be authorized to wear the 18th MP Brigade patch.       Organized at Fort Lewis, Washington in June 1966, the units participated together in basic and advanced infantry training before departing for Vietnam.

     An advance party reached Vietnam several weeks early for briefings at Brigade Headquarters to prepare the main body for duties guarding ports, billets, pipelines, pumping stations and other vital locations.

     Arriving on the USNS Buckner, units of the main body disembarked at three locations: Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tau. One company at Qui Nhon was attached to the 93rd MP Battalion, 16th MP Group. Three companies disembarked at Cam Ranh Bay to join the 97th MP Battalion, 16th MP Group, and the three remaining companies landed at Vung Tau, in III Corps Tactical Zone. One was attached to the 716th MP Battalion, USARV in Saigon, one (D Company, 87th Infantry) to the 95th MP Battalion, 89th MP Group at Long Binh, and one in Tan Son Nhut with the 92nd MP Battalion, 89h MP Group.

     Of the seven, elements of D Company, 87th Infantry (Rifle Security) would eventually be attached to Charlie Company of the 720th MP Battalion to perform physical security at the Cogido Docks, and occasional supplemental manpower for Bravo Company village outposts and ambush teams, while one platoon would be dedicated as a mortar platoon to support the battalion’s counterinsurgency-pacifications operations in their Tactical Area of Responsibility during the 3 years of Operation ROUNDUP and STABILIZE. In 1969 during the downsizing of the 18th MP Brigade under the intensified Vietnamization program, the mortar platoon mission and its personnel were assimilated by Bravo Company.